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“The common ground of our humanity is greater and more enduring than 
the differences that divide us. It is so, and it must be so, because we share 
the same fateful human condition. We are creatures of blood and bone, 
idealism and suffering. Though we differ across cultures and faiths, and 
though history has divided rich from poor, free from unfree, powerful 
from powerless and race from race, we are still all branches on the same 
tree of humanity.” 
Nelson Mandela 
The fossil fuel landscape 
Source: Free Image on Pixabay - Person, Walking, Pipeline, Tube. (n.d.). 





Every year, Oil and Gas (O&G) companies spend a significant amount of money on social 
investment programmes in communities that host their activities. Yet the benefits of these 
programmes are debatable. This thesis reports on a qualitative study, which explored O&G 
social investment experts’ discursive understandings of their social investment practices.  
The study involved 20 participants: 17 O&G social investment experts from 11 different 
countries, and three government representatives from two countries that hosted O&G 
companies. Participants were from all continents except for Asia. Data were collected 
through semi-structured and open-ended interviews. I also analysed the social investment 
guideline documents most frequently utilised by experts, namely the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability; 
and the World Bank Group (WBG) Community-Driven Development Principles. I used 
discourse analysis to examine and interpret the interviews and guideline documents. 
When participants talked about social investment, they adopted four main discourses, often 
in concurrent and conflicting ways. I describe these as working on, working around, 
working for, and working with discourses of social investment. Working on discourses 
revealed one-way and top-down understandings of social investment, where companies 
assumed they were the keepers of knowledge and the agents of development. Working 
around discourses positioned social investment as ultimately fulfilling the company’s 
operational interests, but also as benefitting communities. Working for discourses 
underpinned social investment developed for the purpose of meeting license compliance 
requirements, which tended to focus on the government’s agenda for social development. 
Working with discourses emphasised community-centred and participatory understandings 
of social investment.  
In this thesis, I argue that working with discourses represented the ideal approach to social 
investment. However, participants’ use of working with discourses was complicated by 
their simultaneous use of other discourses in discussing their social investment practices. 




complex and conflicting ways. Participants’ contradictory representations of social 
investment may have reflected the contradictions that were also evident in the guideline 
documents, which influenced their work. The experts’ use of the four discourses of social 
investment highlighted the contradictory nature of O&G social investment, and the 
complex positioning of social investment personnel, particularly when their personal views 
were at odds with institutional policies and practices.  
Overall, this research demonstrates the complexity of O&G social investment, which is 
often used as a single tool to address multiple issues, such as risk mitigation, 
compensation, license to operate, and community development. The thesis concludes with 
an alternative approach to O&G social investment, where social investment represents one 
of the main tools of social engagement, rather than its substitute; and where care, instead 
of profit, becomes the lynchpin of O&G social investment. I hope that this research serves 
as a starting point from which companies, social investment experts, communities, host 
country governments, and international banks can build more participatory and 
community-centred social investment programmes to promote positive futures for all 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The oil and gas (O&G) sector is the leading sector in developing social investments 
worldwide (Frynas, 2009a, 2009b). Broadly speaking, social investment refers to the 
services or resources that O&G companies (mainly multinationals) provide to their host 
communities. O&G companies collectively spend amounts that surpass US$500 million 
per year on social programmes (Frynas, 2005, 2009b). O&G social investment 
programmes range from building schools to making charitable donations to developing 
fish-farming initiatives (Frynas, 2009a; Garcia & Vredenburg, 2003; Newell & Muro, 
2006). The benefits of O&G social investment for host communities are often contentious. 
Social investment by the O&G sector is perceived and approached in different and 
conflicting ways. For example, social investment may be perceived as fostering 
development and challenging poverty in host societies; and as bribery and deceit that 
actually jeopardises the development of local communities (Fleming, Roberts, & Garsten, 
2013; Hilson, 2012; Ite, 2004; Lorenzo-Molo, 2009; Van Tulder, 2008; WBG, 2004).  
1.1 What led me to this research? 
Before deciding to undertake this PhD programme, I worked for three years implementing 
social investment for an O&G multinational in the Brazilian Amazon1. During this time, I 
found my thinking constantly challenged. I faced numerous dilemmas when working with 
social investment in the O&G sector. The communities I sought to work with were located 
near O&G operational sites and were very isolated from city centres. These communities 
had no access to basic services such as health care. At the beginning of my work, I 
believed the company should ‘help’ these communities by, for example, providing them 
with weekly doctor visits and free medicine. Little did I know that by taking the role of a 
health care provider, the company was fulfilling a role that is usually taken by government. 
When the company’s operation ceased, I faced an ethical dilemma. When we withdrew, 
                                                
1	The views that I herein present are about my own experiences and impressions of working with social investment in the 
O&G sector; they do not represent the company’s position regarding social investment. Because I signed a 
confidentiality contract with the company, I do not name the company I worked for, or anyone I worked with, in social 




the health care would leave with us. Was it right to take away from the community the 
basic medical assistance they had so long aspired for? I recorded such events in my field 
notes since they struck me as important. A desire to understand these challenges and find 
possible solutions led me to pursue this doctoral research. 
As a social investment expert, I was involved in annual reporting, risk mitigation actions, 
resettlement and impact compensation, and the development of social programmes. I spent 
much of my time in the company designing and implementing social investment 
programmes in/for communities located within a15 kilometre radius of the prospection 
field (distance determined by Instituto de Proteção Ambiental do Amazonas). Social 
investment programmes were also developed in centres of the main municipalities.  
Before the company arrived at the operational sites, other O&G firms had previously 
prospected the areas. These firms had impacted the local communities with their 
operational activities (for examples of the social impacts generated by O&G companies in 
the Brazilian Amazon see Pereira (2014)). When I first arrived at the host villages, several 
community members regularly protested against the impacts of previous companies. They 
enquired about the precautions ‘my’ company was taking to avoid such impacts. The 
community members complained about the increase of local inflation due to the increase in 
money supply; and the increased cases of prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
unwanted pregnancies generated after previous companies explored the area.  
In an effort not to promote the same impacts, I, along with the social investment team, 
planned and implemented a series of mitigation actions and additional social programmes, 
such as environmental protection projects and women’s sewing initiatives. Despite my best 
intentions when designing the programmes, a large number failed to achieve their intended 
outcomes. For instance, several social investment programmes promoted growing 
community dependency upon foreign assistance, unrealistic expectations regarding O&G 
social investment, and increased dissatisfaction among the recipients when the programme 
or operation ceased.  
I occasionally felt that my interests in helping the communities did not always coincide 
with the company’s or the government’s social investment expectations and priorities. 




know whether I should represent my social investment ideals, or the interests of the firm, 
community, or government. 
Before beginning this PhD, I believed that O&G companies could play a big role in 
alleviating poverty in host communities. I just did not know which would be the best way 
for this to be achieved. I believed that the key element to social investment success rested 
on the experts’ ability to negotiate their personal ideals alongside the expectations of the 
communities, government, and company. This is when I decided to pursue a PhD in O&G 
social investment.  
1.2 Positioning myself in the research aims and questions 
Before working with O&G social investment, I pursued a Master’s degree in Education at 
the University of Otago in 2009. My Master’s research aimed to understand how 
neoliberal education policies proposed by the World Bank Group have influenced Brazil’s 
education policies since the 1990s. In my Master’s research, I analysed reports and 
periodicals published by the World Bank Group and the Brazilian government. In my 
analysis, I utilised the theoretical perspectives that introduced me to the concepts of 
discourse, language, and power that I have adopted in this doctoral research. 
This research is shaped by my life experiences. My Master’s research has provided me 
with the theoretical knowledge that helped me frame my doctoral research aims and 
questions. My research aims and questions were shaped by my professional experiences in 
the O&G sector. My personal and professional experiences along with the theoretical 
framework adopted in my Master’s research shape how I position myself as a researcher in 
this research. 
Consequently, when I embarked on this doctoral journey, I wanted to understand and 
expand upon my own experiences in the O&G sector by listening to other professionals 
that directly work with social investment. I therefore aimed to explore how O&G social 
investment experts understood and practised social investment in the O&G industry 
through attending to the discourses they adopted when talking about social investment in 




while implementing social investment. In broad terms, this research addresses four 
questions. These are: 
1. Which discourses do O&G social investment personnel draw on to talk 
about social investment?  
2. How are the discourses adopted by the O&G participants reproduced in the 
social investment guideline documents?  
3. What are the experts’ recommendations for future O&G social investment?  
4. Which discourses are evident in participants’ recommendations for future 
O&G social investment?  
Chapter 5 elaborates on how the research questions were developed. 
1.3 Theoretical approach  
In this thesis, I understand ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ to be discursively constructed within 
the “possibilities and constraints inherent in the material world” (Sims-Schouten; Riley & 
Willig, 2007 p. 101). In this, I draw on Sims-Schouten et al.’s (2007) critical realist 
perspective, which considers that material practices, although not reduced to discourse, are 
nevertheless connected to discursive practices. Specifically, I recognise the material 
consequences of O&G companies’ operations and their influence in shaping social 
investment discourses and hierarchical relations of power between companies and 
communities. I acknowledge the materiality of O&G pipelines and other infrastructure, 
while recognising that social investment experts discursively constructed them in a variety 
of ways, for example, in relation to the disruptions and benefits such infrastructure might 
bring to affected communities. While my focus in this thesis is on analysing the discursive 
meanings social experts’ attribute to O&G operations, I also acknowledge the material 
consequences of such operations. 
In what follows, I adopt a hybrid epistemological approach that draws on the work of key 
scholars associated with a range of critical theoretical traditions, including neomarxist, 
postcolonialist, decolonialist, post-structuralist and critical realist perspectives. As well as 
Sims-Schouten et al. (2007) discussed above, these include: Freire (Freire, 2005; Freire & 
Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973), Escobar (1992, 1995, 2002, 2004), Andreotti 




scholars provide me with the theoretical tools for conceptualising hierarchical relationships 
of power. Broadly speaking, each challenges the status quo, promoting the need for social 
change through changes in individual and social consciousness (Freire, 2005; Freire & 
Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973; McLaughlin & DeVoogd, 2004). I draw on the 
work of Foucault (1970, 1980, 1982) who allows me to think about how ‘power’ is not just 
hierarchical, but also fluid, in O&G contexts. I also draw on Foucault’s notions of 
discourse, subjectivity, and agency to explore how social investment is constructed 
through language in my participants’ accounts. 
In drawing on a hybrid epistemology in this thesis, my aim is to find “a between space 
situated in an enabling site for working through the stuck places of present [discursive] 
practices” of social investment (Lather, 2006 p. 45). My approach is similar to Jackson 
&Mazzei (2012) who also draw on different conceptualisations of ‘power’ from diverse 
philosophical frameworks, where power “shifts from possession to a relation when moving 
from structural to poststructural frameworks” (p.718). I explain my theoretical framework 
in more depth in Chapter 4. 
The research involved interviews with 20 participants: 17 O&G social investment experts 
from 11 different countries, and three government representatives from two different 
countries in the fields of energy and resources. I also conducted a discourse analysis of the 
guideline documents most commonly adopted by my participants, namely the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards on Environmental and 
Social Sustainability (Torrance, 2012); and the World Bank Group Community-Driven 
Development Principles (WBG, 2002). My analysis of the participants’ interview 
transcripts and guideline documents was informed by Willig’s (2001) understandings of 
Foucauldian discourse analysis, which I explain in more detail in Chapter 5. 
1.4 Definition of terms 
There are a number of key terms utilised within this research that I need to explain from 
the outset. These include ‘social investment’, ‘community’, and ‘experts’. When defining 
each term, my aim is not to ‘fix’ each idea, rather, I provide each definition as a starting 






‘Social investment’ is a term widely adopted by the O&G industry. However, there is a 
lack of consensus regarding the use of this term in reference to companies’ allocation of 
services or resources to local communities. The literature within and outside the O&G 
sector refers to social investment in many different ways. For example, some authors refer 
to corporate social responsibility and social investment interchangeably. Other terms 
include: sustainable development programmes, corporate philanthropy, philanthropy, 
charity, community assistance programmes, and community development programme. In 
this research, I use the term social investment, rather the terms noted above.  
Initially, I had decided to adopt a definition of social investment developed by the Global 
Oil and Gas Association for Environmental and Social Issues (IPIECA). According to 
IPIECA, O&G social investment is the voluntary allocation of services or resources that 
companies make to host communities and/or societies (IPIECA, 2008). The IPIECA guide 
for social investment is the single guide that specifically targets social investment in the 
O&G industry. Major O&G global companies such as Shell, Chevron, BP, ExxonMobil, 
and Statoil are IPIECA members and adopt IPIECA social investment guidelines in 
developing and implementing social programmes in host countries.  
However, IPIECA definition for social investment did not match some participants’ views 
of social investment. Participants’ definitions included compulsory social investment that 
the IPIECA definition did not include. Therefore, in this research social investment is 
defined as the voluntary or mandatory allocation of services or resources that companies 
make to the local communities and/or the wider society in which O&G companies operate. 
Community 
The concept of community is central to the construction of social investment in the O&G 
sector. For this research, community refers to a social group of any size whose members 
often have a common cultural and historical heritage (Watson, 2013), and who reside in a 
specific region located nearby the prospection/production field (for onshore activities) or 




In this research, I focus on social investment in communities that reside within the ‘area of 
influence’ of O&G activities. The term ‘area of influence’ refers to the maximum radius in 
kilometres within which an O&G activity may impact the natural environment and the 
local or host community. The area of influence is divided into direct and indirect areas of 
influence. The area of influence varies according to a country’s government legislation and 
the company’s definition of the area of influence. For instance, when working in social 
investment, I adopted the Amazonian governments’ criteria for direct areas of influence 
(communities residing within a 5 kilometre radius of O&G activities) and indirect areas of 
influence (communities residing within a 15 kilometre radius of O&G activities). Each 
O&G social investment expert who participated in this research worked with a different 
measure and definition of direct and indirect areas of influence. This means that when I 
talk about community, host community, and local community, I refer to a social group of 
any size, whose members often have a common cultural and historical heritage, and who 
are located within an area of influence which varies in size. 
Social investment experts 
In this research, I refer to social investment personnel as experts in social investment. In 
doing so, I acknowledge their rich insights into their roles. Whether in the office, or in the 
field, social investment personnel have theoretical and practical knowledge of social 
investment in the O&G sector, thus, I refer to both groups as experts in social investment.  
A typical role of a social investment expert varies from company to company, however, it 
overlaps in designing and/or implementing social investment within host communities. 
Social investment experts may also be involved with their company’s operational 
procedures for social responsibility, such as the conduct of social impact assessment, 
social risk management and monitoring, social safeguard action planning, communities’ 
resettlement, livelihood restoration of traditional communities (in the case of resettlement), 
public consultation, operation disclosure, and stakeholder engagement planning, among 
other responsibilities.  
1.5 Outline of the research 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 situates social investment in the broader 




project cycles, and illustrates the impacts the industry has had in contemporary society, 
which requires social investments as a mechanism of compensation and/or mitigation. The 
chapter also introduces the World Bank Group and its relationship with the O&G industry 
and social investment respectively, so as to contextualise the guideline documents 
participants chose to guide their social investment work. 
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth overview of the pertinent literature on social investment in 
the O&G sector. Painting a broad picture of social investment in the O&G sector across 
different countries, this chapter describes a range of contexts in which O&G social 
investment programmes fail or succeed in benefiting host societies. 
Chapter 4 is a key chapter as it defines the theoretical approach that informed the research. 
Specifically, this chapter outlines the critical theoretical ideas that informed my data 
collection and analysis, including the concepts of power, discourse, language, subjectivity, 
agency, and power.  
Chapter 5 presents my methodological approach to investigating how experts make sense 
of social investment in the O&G sector. This chapter outlines the research design and 
methods, and discusses the main ethical considerations encountered in the process of 
conducting this research. In the final sections of this chapter, I outline the ways in which I 
coded and analysed the data. I conclude the chapter by discussing reflexivity in relation to 
my role as a researcher (Berger, 2015). 
Chapter 6 addresses research question one: “Which discourses do O&G social investment 
personnel draw on to talk about social investment?” This chapter unpacks the four main 
discourses social investment experts drew on to talk about O&G social investment during 
the research interviews often in concomitant and conflicting ways. Chapter 6 was largely 
based on my book chapter An exploration of social investment discourses in the Oil and 
Gas sector (see Publications, p. vii).  
Chapter 7 addresses research question two: “How are the discourses adopted by the O&G 
participants reproduced in the social investment guideline documents?” This chapter 
examines the two guideline documents that social investment experts referred to when 




documents in light of the discourses identified in Chapter 6, exploring how the four 
discourses of social investment that emerged in the research interviews also appeared in 
the statements, descriptions, principles, and recommendations of the two guideline 
documents.  
Chapter 8 addresses research questions four and five: “What are the experts’ 
recommendations for future O&G social investment, and, which discourses are evident in 
participants’ recommendations for future O&G social investment?” In this chapter, I 
consider the participants’ recommendations as they emerged during the research 
interviews and identify the discourses they drew on to articulate what should change in 
social investment practices.  
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis by revisiting the key research findings in light of the 
research questions and aims. In this chapter, I discuss the implications of my findings for 
social investment in the O&G sector, and identify areas where further research is needed. I 





Chapter 2:  The Study Context 
In this chapter, I situate social investment within the broader O&G sector context. In doing 
so I do not discuss the pros and/or cons of O&G production and consumption. Rather, the 
intention of this chapter is to: (1) illustrate the impacts the industry has had in 
contemporary society, and (2) portray how social investments are conceptualised by the 
O&G industry. Consequently, in order to contextualise O&G social investment, this 
chapter is divided into three main parts. The first introduces the O&G industry and its 
main activities and project cycles, the second focuses on the impacts of O&G activities on 
host environments and societies, whilst the third part discusses international banks and 
their impact on the O&G industry and on social investment respectively.  
2.1 An overview of the O&G sector 
O&G are non-renewable energy sources and have had their reserves heavily depleted by 
excessive production demands. O&G have been crucial players in supplying modern 
society with mainstream energy resources and primary feedstock for basic utilities. For 
example, O&G is used in the production of dyes, detergents, lubricants, fertilizers, 
polyester, nylon, acrylates, polyethylene, and solvents (Devold, 2013; Szklo & Schaeffer, 
2006).  
Historically, the production and usage of oil and natural gas has been noted since 1,000 
BC, when the oracle of Delphi was built (Deffeyes, 2009; Devold, 2013). In 500 BC 
Chinese people used natural gas to boil water and in 1859 AD Edwin Drake drilled the 
first successful oil well, the “Drake Well”, at only 75 feet deep (Allan, 2009). Three years 
later, in September 1861, the same driller, under the so-called “Empire Well” flooded the 
market with an unprecedented 3,000 barrels per day. A month later, in October 1861 the 
“Phillips Well” initially produced 4,000 barrels per day (Deffeyes, 2009; Devold, 2013). 
Fossil fields have been more frequently discovered and used, since 1861. Currently, fossil 
crudes and their derivatives are the main drivers of modern economies and societies. In 




The O&G industry and its entire supply chain play an important role in many national 
economies (Kumar et al., 2011; Szklo & Schaeffer, 2006; Szklo, Machado, Schaeffer, 
Felipe Simoes, & Barboza Mariano, 2006). However, the total known global O&G 
reserves are only sufficient to meet the next 50 years of global production (BP, 2014). 
Given the current demand for O&G, a growing global population, expanding economies, 
and increasing energy demands, it seems likely that for the next 50 years modern society 
will still produce and consume fossil crudes (Kumar et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, several countries, such as Denmark (Lund & Mathiesen, 2009), 
Germany (Bergek, Hekkert, & Jacobsson, 2008; Strunz, Gawel, & Lehmann, 2016), the 
Netherlands (Kern & Smith, 2008) and New Zealand (Roy, 2018) have enacted policies 
aimed at shifting their main energy consumption from fossil crudes to alternative 
renewable resources. This indicates that the lifespan of the O&G sector, and therefore of 
O&G social investment, may be limited to the next 10 to 50 years. However, given the 
likelihood that a full transition to renewables will not take place immediately, for the 
foreseeable future, it will still be important to address the impacts created by O&G 
activities 
O&G Exploration and Production activities create two types of impacts locally: social and 
environmental impacts. According to McPhail and Davy (1998, p. 7), while environmental 
impacts are more successfully addressed by engineering solutions and can be closely 
tracked by environmental assessment, the social impacts - which influence and affect host 
communities’ cultural and natural resources - are “more difficult to manage and resolve”. 
Some of social and environmental impacts have been acknowledged and investigated. 
Examples include the impacts associated with oil pipelines in Sudan operated by China in 
1998 and 1999, the Shell Nigeria operations between 1958 and 1997, and the Komi Usinsk 
Accident, among others (Armiero & D'Alisa, 2012; Goodland, 2006; Okafor, 2007; Rone, 
2003). However, there are other negative impacts created by O&G companies that have 
been poorly reported (Devold, 2013).  
Frequently, O&G social investment is used to compensate for or mitigate the impacts of 
O&G activities in host communities and societies. In this sense, to understand social 




host environments and communities, thus in the sub-section that follows, I briefly explore 
O&G activities and their productive streams. These impacts are elaborated on in section 
2.2. 
2.1.1 O&G project cycles and respective activities 
The O&G production and distribution chain is comprised of three main stages, known as: 
Upstream, Midstream, and Downstream. Figure 2.1. briefly illustrates these stages and 
corresponding major activities. Notably, there are divergent views on where stream 
specific activities occur; this illustration is only one way of representing the O&G value-
chain.  
 
Figure 2.1: O&G production stages and corresponding major activities 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the Upstream stage is also called the Exploration and 
Production phase and it includes prospecting for hydrocarbon deposits by developing 
onshore and offshore seismic and drilling activities. Both seismic and drilling activities 
take place before a field is finally selected (Devold, 2013). The duration and sites of 
Exploration and Production activities are often short and transitory. In this sense, any 
social investment developed within this phase of the O&G exploration would be short-
term, due to the uncertainty of significant hydrocarbon discovery. 
The production phase occurs after the site has been selected and all facilities for 




structures are used in offshore O&G production, which depend on the size of available 
reserves and water depth. O&G onshore rigs2  differ according to reservoir size and 
content. For instance, unconventional substances, such as very heavy crudes and tar sands3 
may need heating and diluents to be extracted or are strip-mined or extracted with steam 
(Devold, 2013). 
Midstream O&G activity involves natural gas treatment, for instance Liquefied Natural 
Gas production (for more detail see Hanson, Miller, and Oblad (1983). Natural gas 
treatment is supplied by (1) a container or tanker in liquid form, (2) regasification plants, 
which are facilities for energy recovery during the regasification phase (Dispenza, 
Dispenza, La Rocca, & Panno, 2009), and (3) O&G transportation systems via pipeline 
structures, and terrestrial and/or sea transportation. 
Downstream activities in the O&G industry are the refining and distribution phases. In this 
segment, the oil and condensates4 are refined in offsite plants. After the crude products are 
processed, their final products are stored and/or sent to distribution terminals. In the 
refining phase, oil crudes go through a fractional distillation at different temperature 
ranges and are transformed into domestic gas; petrochemical feedstock and products; car 
gasoline; jet fuel; kerosene for lightning and heating; diesel fuels; lubricants, waxes, and 
polishes; and asphalt for roads and roofing (Devold, 2013). After the refining process, 
numerous substances are warehoused in transitional tanks, and once transformed into 
commercial products, are loaded onto terrestrial and/or naval vehicles and distributed to 
industries and gas stations (Devold, 2013). 
As illustrated, O&G activities within the three main production stages require massive 
infrastructure and a large contingent of workers. As a result, the direct impacts to nearby 
communities, and the host society as a whole, are unavoidable.  
                                                
2	Rigs are the main structures and equipment used in O&G wells. They include the engine house, the engine, and the 
derrick among other drilling apparatus.	
3	Tar Sand refers to the “dead” oil field (Sorrell, Miller, Bentley, & Speirs, 2010). “The term ‘tar sand’ refers to a 
consolidated mixture of bitumen (commonly referred to as "tar") and sand. Other names used to describe tar sands 
include "oil sands" and "bituminous sands"-(…) After separation of the bitumen from the sand, the bitumen may be 
upgraded to a synthetic crude oil suitable for use as a feedstock for the production of materials such as liquid motor fuels, 
heating oil, and petrochemicals” (Deffeyes, 2009, p. 167).	
4	Condensates are found as an associated gas at oil wells or as Natural Gas Liquids, which are a by-product of Natural 
Gas production. Condensates are usually found as gas in subterranean basins, which condense to liquids at the surface 




2.2 O&G activities and their impact on host environments and societies 
O&G activities have intense direct and indirect impacts on the environment and 
communities and societies that host O&G operations. O&G Exploration and Production 
(E&P) activities create three types of social impacts. The direct impacts, where E&P 
activities influence the lives of people who live near O&G operation; the indirect impacts, 
where O&G activities influence the natural environment, which in turn impact the lives of 
people who depend on that natural environment to survive; and the socioeconomic 
impacts, which direct and indirectly influence the host society and host communities’ 
economy and social dynamics. This section addresses these three types of impacts. 
2.2.1 The direct impacts of O&G activities 
This research focuses on the impacts of Upstream and Midstream activities on host 
communities because they often occur in very remote and ‘sensitive areas’5 and are highly 
likely to directly impact nearby communities (Goodland, 2006). The impacts of 
Downstream activities are also undeniable; however, they were not the focus of my study.  
When an O&G company establishes its field activities, bordering populations have to 
rearrange their ways of living to accommodate a new ideological and socio-economic 
reality. In this process, detrimental relationships between the community and the 
companies might develop, and members of the local communities might feel jeopardized 
by the company’s modus operandi (Goodland, 2006; Selverston-Scher, 2000). For 
example, different views on how the land should be used and treated may result in 
disagreements and potentially violent conflict. Social investments, such as arrangements 
for resettlement and compensatory actions on behalf of the company and government, are 
frequently used to mitigate expected impacts. However, social investment does not always 
address communities’ concerns (Goodland, 2006; Selverston-Scher, 2000).  
One example of acute distress generated by O&G activities in an indigenous territory 
relates to the Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) Caño Limon Oil Pipeline in 
Colombia. The Caño pipeline is an 800-kilometre pipeline that transports 20% of 
                                                
5	A ‘sensitive area’ is defined as somewhere that shelters indigenous or low-income communities, is densely populated, 




Colombia’s total production of Oil crude. The pipeline route was completed in 1986 and it 
overlaps the territory of the U’wa Indigenous people in the Sierra Nevada de Cucuy. 
Although Colombia’s Constitutional Court ruled to reverse the environmental pipeline 
license, the Colombian Council of Sate overruled this decision (Goodland, 2006; 
Selverston-Scher, 2000).  
In 1995, the U’wa people, in response to the Colombian Court decision to renew the 
pipeline licence to operate, threatened to jump off a 1400 feet precipice. The suicide threat 
impacted on the company (Royal Dutch Shell) which withdrew its participation from the 
project (Selverston-Scher, 2000). The pipeline was sabotaged more than 500 times by 
guerrillas and by 1996, the Colombian government was held responsible for 31 tortures, 56 
murders, 44 kidnappings, and 151 illegal detentions related to the pipeline (Goodland, 
2006). In spite of such extensive social impacts, the operational license of the Caño Limon 
Oil Pipeline was extended until 2018 (Goodland, 2006). 
Additionally, Upstream and Midstream activities negatively impact the host communities 
due to heavy inflows of foreign workers on a temporary basis (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012). 
Numerous newcomers increase the demand for products and services and heighten locals’ 
expectations. The growing demand for products and services creates a new influx of 
income and inflates local prices. As a result, members of the host community might strive 
to adjust to this newly fabricated reality. O&G activities can lead to new forms of domestic 
and foreign cheap labour, including human rights violations and prostitution. The number 
of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies often rises in these 
circumstances (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012).  
The onshore Liquefied Natural Gas plant of Sakhalin II at Sakhalin Island in Russia is an 
example of how O&G onshore projects might impact local communities, or cultures, by 
introducing large inflows of newcomers into an area (Norlen, 2005). The LNG Sakhalin II 
pipeline construction introduced 1500 workers into the region and created extensive socio-
economic impacts on Korsakov, the neighbouring city (Norlen, 2005). The impacts 
included an unexpectedly heavy consumption of utilities and services that overloaded the 
local social services. The large inflow of outsiders also drastically increased the numbers 





The local population’s expectations of large-scale employment and income within the 
province were unrealised because Shell failed to hire the local population of Sakhalin and 
to compensate the communities for the social impacts generated (Norlen, 2005). The 
discontentment among the host society increased in 2004 when “another 1500 workers 
arrived, raising the total to 3000. As a result, the local population that originally welcomed 
Sakhalin II now look[ed] at it with increasing antipathy and aggression” (Norlen, 2005, p. 
119).  
Another impact generated by O&G companies in host countries relates to infringements of 
the human rights of local people. The Sudan oil pipeline is a 1600-kilometre oil pipeline 
that passed the Nuer and Dinka people’s territory (Jammeh, 2001). The impact generated 
by the construction of this pipeline was far reaching and created several cases of human 
rights violations (Jammeh, 2001). For instance, the Chinese corporation China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is alleged to have submitted 10 000 Chinese workers to 
inhumane working regimes to complete the pipeline construction within 18 months. 
Goodland (2006) asserts that the Sudan pipeline construction was associated with 
“genocide, Chinese prison labour, and atrocities by the army and of child soldiers” (p. 10).  
Another example of human rights infringement by the use of adult labour and child labour 
was the construction and maintenance of the Yadana Gas Pipeline base in Myanmar. The 
Multinationals responsible for carrying out the pipeline construction were the French O&G 
Company Total S.A. and the American Union Oil Company of California (Unocal). These 
companies were partners with the Burmese military regime, which was tasked with 
creating a militarised corridor alongside the pipeline route, to protect the pipeline and 
create a ‘peaceful’ neighbouring area (Redford, 2006). However, the Burmese military was 
accused of torture, rape, summary executions, forced relocations, and brutal subjugations. 
The local inhabitants, including children, were forced to build the military villages and 
infrastructure without payment. The Burmese military, on the other hand, claimed that 
villagers had volunteered themselves to perform the abovementioned work (Redford, 
2006). 
According to Redford (2006), Total and Unocal were formally informed by their 
consultants about the brutal and inhumane way the Burmese military treated villagers and 




knowledge of [the] abuse” that took place (Redford, 2006, p. 131). Unocal was involved in 
a lawsuit issued by 11 Burmese villagers and subsequently invested in compensatory 
social investments to increase the local populations’ health and education. According to a 
local villager, quoted by Redford (2006) “[…] if there was no pipeline, there would be no 
foreigners. If there were no foreigner, there would be no soldiers, so we could have our 
own… life as we had it before” (Redford, 2006, p. 132).  
The conclusion of the Upstream and Midstream activities in a region may also cause 
negative impacts. Activities such as O&G prospecting and pipeline route construction are 
temporary and require high numbers of workers. When the operation ceases, the workforce 
is generally transferred to other projects in different locales. As a result, the demand for 
products and local services decreases and the new businesses created to attend to elevated 
demands may struggle to survive (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012). Once the project reaches an end, 
workers tend to fly back to their homeland or to the next operational locale, which means 
new families may be deserted. I have witnessed such occurrences following the conclusion 
of Upstream projects in the Amazon region.  
O&G activities also promote indirect impacts. For instance, offshore seismic and drilling 
activities impact the natural environment where communities reside (Ross, 2001). 
Empirical studies (Egyir, 2012; Joyce & MacFarlane, 2001; Norlen, 2005) indicate that 
O&G seismic surveys temporarily interfere with marine mammals’ natural functions, such 
as navigation. Norlen (2005), Stone and Tasker (2006), and Thomson (1995) postulate that 
O&G seismic activities might hinder some whales’ ability to detect socially relevant 
signals, impairing biologically important processes in the case of the Blue Whale and the 
Western Gray Whale. Such harm could lead to the disappearance of such species, 
interfering in the balance of the oceans’ ecosystem. 
An unbalanced oceanic ecosystem thus impacts fishery-dependent communities (O'Rourke 
& Connolly, 2003). Traditional fishery-dependent communities in Brazil claim that there is 
a correlation between seismic surveys and the number of fish and marine mammals near 
offshore drilling bases. According to the fishermen, the number of fish they catch during 
O&G seismic surveys is smaller than when there is no survey being carried out. They also 
claim they see less dolphins swimming near the shore in O&G seismic survey periods 




Di Iorio and Clark (2010) argue that another factor that could upset the ocean ecosystem 
and may impact societies relates to major and minor oil spills and drilling fluid discharge. 
Such discharges may lead to the destruction of the ecosystems, land and water 
contamination, decline and long-lasting damage of fish, marine mammals, and migratory 
birds (Neff, Rabalais, & Boesch, 1987; O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003). Again, the 
destruction of whole ecosystems impact local communities’ lifecycles and cultural 
dynamics (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003, p. 594).  
O&G onshore and offshore activities considerably impact host communities. However, 
there are other negative impacts created by O&G companies that are poorly reported 
(Devold, 2013). These are the economic impacts on countries as a whole. I now turn to the 
impacts the O&G industry may generate in the economy of host countries.  
2.2.2 The socio-economic impacts of O&G activities 
Alongside the direct impacts O&G activities may have on host communities, the O&G 
industry may also impact on a country’s economy and therefore, more directly on its 
community members. Authors such as Cash (2012), Pegg (2006), and Ross (1999) argue 
that O&G investments in resource-rich countries lead to economic paradoxes that hinder 
local economies and stimulate corruption at government level (Cash, 2012; Pegg, 2006; 
Ross, 1999). In what follows, I outline some of the major economic paradoxes and their 
impacts on host societies. 
Ross (1999) suggests that extractive activities generate a form of ‘enclave economy’. This 
happens when heavy flows of foreign capital spurred by petroleum exports and activities 
increase the revenue concentration in O&G and associated industries, creating an income 
distribution unbalance with other niches of a country’s economy. The lack of redistribution 
of income to other segments of the economy hinders the development of domestic 
producers, which widens the nation’s revenue inequality and levels of unemployment 
(Ross, 1999).  
Ackah-Baidoo (2012) argues that enclaves in the economy are inclined to emerge in 
countries where governments are already extremely corrupt and repressive. This is because 




civil institutions that might claim political rights, policymakers “systematically 
marginalise” (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012, p. 153) the population by neglecting programmes that 
will promote economic and social development. The development of an ‘enclave 
economy’ in oil-rich economies is aggravated by the lack of national legislation that 
assures a fair distribution of the revenue generated by the O&G activities.   
Ackah-Baidoo (2012) highlights Angola as a country that has suffered from the 
development of an ‘enclave economy’. The Angolan economy is reliant on oil exports that 
represent 90% of the country’s export revenues and 80% of the government’s revenue (Le 
Billon, 2001). In 2000, the Angolan production of oil surpassed 780,000 barrels per day 
and generated about US$5 billion in gross revenue. In contrast to such wealth, in 2001 
more than 69% of people in both rural and urban areas lived on less than one US dollar per 
day (Le Billon, 2001).  
The disparity between Angola’s in oil export revenue and the extreme poverty faced by the 
majority of its population is due to the oil sector’s ‘enclave economy’. According to Le 
Billon (2001), an enclave emerges because the international O&G companies’ income is 
either repatriated or reinvested within the O&G community, as was the case in Angola. As 
a result, the small amount of oil revenue that the Angolan government use for public 
expenditure is not sufficient to alleviate the population’s deep poverty and high levels of 
unemployment (Le Billon, 2001).  
Adding to the complexity of ‘enclave economies’, Ackah-Baidoo (2012) and Cash (2012) 
argue that resource-rich countries that have low rates of economic barriers might 
experience an economic paradox called the ‘resource curse’ or the ‘paradox of plenty’. The 
‘resource curse’ occurs in parallel with the ‘enclave economy’ and the same cause - heavy 
flows of foreign capital - triggers both economic paradoxes (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Cash, 
2012).  
In the O&G scenario, the ‘resource curse’ is when the host country goes through an 
Oil/Gas production boom and becomes a major exporter and producer of this commodity. 
The O&G export expansion strengthens the domestic currency, making other domestic 
exports, like agricultural products, less attractive and less competitive in the international 




export niches causes their decline. The decline of these exports (1) hinders the advance of 
other domestic exports within the local and international market, (2) results in the country 
importing the products that it once exported, and (3) makes the country’s economy solely 
dependent on one sector, in this case, O&G, increasing its market vulnerability (Ackah-
Baidoo, 2012; Cash, 2012). Oil booms tend to weaken state institutions by making them 
completely subordinate to the extractive sector. Because of all this, Sachs and Warner 
(2001, p. 385) state that “resource abundance tends to render the [other] export sectors 
uncompetitive”. 
The O&G sector is extremely reliant on international markets, which are unpredictable and 
subject to occasional sharp fluctuation. When confronted by this market instability, 
governments that have no protective economic barriers, tend to allocate funds from other 
sectors of the economy into the petroleum sector, pursuing a form of economic protection. 
Such action intensifies the ‘enclave economy’ and economic disparity nationally (Ackah-
Baidoo, 2012; Cash, 2012).  
Additionally, the resource curse may be caused by policymakers’ ‘short-sightedness’ 
(Sachs & Warner, 2001). Resource abundance can create a false sense of security and 
wealth amongst a society and its policymakers, which leads them to lose sight of principles 
of democracy and social development (Sachs & Warner, 2001). One example of a country 
that invested its oil revenues in mechanisms of repression was the Republic of Congo 
which built up the country’s armed forces to “maintain order” (Ross, 2001, p. 335). 
Nigeria is another example of a country that has heavily invested in its military after the 
country’s oil boom, illustrating the ‘resource curse’ and enclave paradoxes (Ross, 1999).  
Another economic paradox that might arise in oil-rich countries is called the ‘rentier 
economy’ (Chari & Kehoe, 2006). In the O&G scenario, the ‘rentier economy’ generally 
develops in states that have large portions of their national revenue stimulated by foreign 
‘renting revenues’ of O&G prospecting and production licensed blocks, pipeline crossings, 
and transit fees. Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab 
Emirates, Libya, and Kuwait are examples of ‘rentier states’.  
Oil renting revenues may be disconnected to a country’s oil export and import economy. 




“resorting to taxation and without running into drastic balance of payments or inflation 
problems” (Mahdavy, 1970, p. 432). At face value, one would consider the free flow of 
taxation generated by oil rental revenues to be the key mechanism for promoting 
development. Surprisingly, steady social development is not commonly found among 
‘rentier states’ (Mahdavy, 1970). 
In the ‘rentier State’ economy, the ‘rent’ represents the country’s main revenue. However, 
this does not mean that the country’s revenue is solely the oil rent (Beblawi, 1987). The 
income accrued from the ‘rent’ is not a result of a productive class, but a consequence of a 
foreign population, or a small fraction of the domestic population, generating the oil 
revenue. One example of a country whose productive population represented a small 
portion of the country’ populace is Iran during the 1970s. By that time, only 30% of Iran’s 
population was economically active, or generating income (Mahdavy, 1970).  
Finally, in the ‘rentier State’ economy, only a few authorities control the revenue 
generated by the rent. In other words, there is limited level of participation in running the 
country and in deciding on the destination and distribution of the oil rent. This system 
supports authoritarian, corrupt and non-transparent governments (Mahdavy, 1970).   
The economic paradoxes generated by intensive oil production and exportation in oil-rich 
countries, such as the ‘enclave economy’, the ‘resource curse’, and ‘rentier economies’, 
suggest that oil exploration and production may hinder a country’s economic and social 
development; negatively impacting the host society. Some economists such as Ackah-
Baidoo (2012), Pegg (2006), Prno and Scott Slocombe (2012), Ross (1999), Ross (2001) 
and Sachs and Warner (2001), have established correlations between limited social and 
economic development in resource-rich countries and oil production. 
For instance, Ross (2001) in his paper Does oil hinder democracy?, implies that there is a 
strong correlation between oil production and a country’s level of democracy. He argues 
that the amount of oil produced in a country is inversely proportional to its levels of 
democracy. In other words, the more oil a country produces, the least democratic it 
becomes. Ross focussed his research mainly in Middle Eastern, African sub-Saharan, and 




Along similar lines, Sachs and Warner (2001) posit that oil production ultimately harms 
economic growth. They suggest that the economic paradoxes generated by O&G activities 
in resource-rich countries leads them to “experience lower innovation, lower 
entrepreneurial activity, poorer governments and lower growth” (Sachs & Warner, 2001, p. 
385). Gylfason (2001) postulates that resource abundance hinders poverty alleviation 
because the heavy inflow of O&G money into the host country may create a false notion of 
income security. This makes host governments shift the focus from investing in “growth-
friendly economic development” (Gylfason, 2001 p. 850) into something that is not vital to 
a country’s basic welfare.  
However, not everyone agrees that O&G activities and revenue hinder development and 
democracy. Institutions such as the World Bank Group fund major O&G activities in 
countries with low indices of human development and high indices of corruption, based on 
the claim that O&G activities promote social development. I turn now to the international 
banks and their participation in O&G activities in resource-rich countries.  
2.3 International banks and their impact on the O&G industry 
O&G companies argue that their participation in resource-rich countries provide host 
nations with national and local development. The report The Wealth Beneath our Feet, 
published by the Taranaki Venture in 2011, discusses O&G activities and their impact on 
Taranaki, New Zealand. The report argues that O&G activities in New Zealand have 
strengthened local economies, promoted capacity building, generated human capital, 
increased the income of domestic employees, and prompted further development of the 
country’s key infrastructure, such as roads and ports (Taranaki, 2011).  
International organisations responsible for financing O&G projects worldwide also support 
O&G Upstream and Midstream activities based on the claim that they promote poverty 
alleviation in resource-rich countries. For instance, institutions within the World Bank 
Group like the International Finance Corporation (IFC), are responsible for investing in 
major O&G Upstream and Midstream projects within socially vulnerable countries. (For 
example, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa where the majority of the population live 
under authoritarian regimes, below the poverty line, and in constant civil war.) The 




exploration and production will promote local development (Pegg, 2006; Smith, Shepherd, 
& Dorward, 2012).   
For instance, the 2004 World Bank Group report Striking a Better Balance: The World 
Bank Group and Extractive Industries emphasises poverty reduction through incorporating 
O&G revenues and social investment into a country’s social fabric. According to the 
World Bank Group, the O&G industry’s investments are important for promoting human 
development in host countries, as follows:  
For many developing countries, oil, gas, and mining are important assets that should play a 
role in supporting economic growth if these countries are to achieve the [Millennium 
Development Goals] MDGs. They can be a source of employment, raw materials and energy, 
revenues, infrastructure and demand for local services and goods (WBG, 2004, p. vii). 
The World Bank Group expresses the view that the revenue generated by the extractive 
industries in host countries makes a direct contribution to poverty alleviation. This is 
because governments may use these financial earnings, such as the petroleum royalties and 
taxes, to fund poverty reduction programmes. Additionally, according to the World Bank 
Group rationale, extractive activities create jobs locally and the income generated enables 
families to overcome poverty. Another view shared by the World Bank Group is that 
resource extraction and production spur the growth of downstream industries and/or other 
niche industries, for example aircraft, transportation, chemical, computer, catering, and 
clothing industries. In turn, these industries generate jobs, increase families’ income, 
strengthen the local economy, and consequently, reduce poverty. Figure 2.2 briefly 
summarises the poverty reduction impacts O&G activities may have in resource-rich 






Figure 2.2: O&G Upstream and Midstream activities and poverty reduction in host 
countries 
Source: Information compiled from Pegg (2006, pp. 380, 381), Taranaki (2011), and WBG (2004). 
As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the World Bank Group argues that the petroleum revenue 
generated by international O&G companies in resource-rich countries diminishes poverty 
locally if companies and/or governments voluntarily allocate part of their revenue to social 
investment programmes that target poverty alleviation and human development. The 
World Bank Group also supports the notion that Extractive industries are “knowledge 
industries” (Pegg, 2006, p. 281) because they introduce advanced technological systems 
that increase the productive capacity of local people and expand economic opportunities 
locally, diminishing local rates of poverty. An example is Norway which has been quite 
successful in developing domestically-based industrial competence in connection with 
Upstream O&G activities (Heum, 2008). 
2.4 Summary 
Although international banks and the extractive industries claim that O&G activities 
benefit the host society, these ‘benefits’ are debatable. The substantial negative impacts of 




2008; Costa & Lopes, 2008; Devold, 2013; Egyir, 2012; Finer, Jenkins, Pimm, Keane, & 
Ross, 2008; Goodland, 2006; Hilson, 2012; IPIECA, 2004; Okafor, 2007; Pegg, 2006; 
Prno & Scott Slocombe, 2012; Raufflet, Cruz, & Bres, 2014; Rone, 2003; Westlund & 
Thurber, 2010). The social impacts of O&G Upstream and Midstream activities are 
multiple, with this chapter outlining some of the major direct and indirect social impacts of 
O&G activities. 
According to the literature, social investments in the O&G sector are mainly a response to 
such impacts in the form of compensation or impact mitigation projects (Gilberthorpe & 
Banks, 2012). However, the literature on O&G social investment demonstrates that the 
way social investment is practised may harm communities. The following chapter explores 
the literature that reports on social investment programmes in the O&G sector and the 
outcomes of such programmes for host communities. This literature suggests that specific 
factors shape whether O&G social investment programmes fail or succeed in benefiting 





Chapter 3:  Literature Review - Social Investment in the 
O&G Sector 
The current chapter provides an in-depth overview of the pertinent literature on social 
investment by the O&G sector, across different countries. Throughout the chapter, I draw 
mainly on peer-reviewed journal articles published from 2000 onwards, most of which 
report on social investment programmes in the O&G sector and their outcomes/impacts on 
the host communities.  
The chapter is divided in three sections. The first, ‘Why do O&G social investments fail?’, 
explores the various contexts in which O&G social investment are likely to fail to benefit 
the host communities. The second section, ‘Why do O&G social investments succeed?’, 
explores the factors that make O&G social investments successful in addressing 
communities’ actual needs and aspirations. The third section, ‘Gaps in the existing 
literature on O&G social investment’, looks at research gaps identified in O&G social 
investment literature and how my research sought to address them. 
3.1 Why do O&G social investments fail? 
O&G activities of prospection and production impact on local environments and host 
communities (Goodland, 2006). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the social impacts are often 
difficult to mitigate and compensate (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Broni-Bediako & Addei, 2010; 
Finer et al., 2008; Obeng-Odoom, 2014). Increasingly, O&G companies use social 
investment as a form of reparation, to minimise reputation damage and to reduce 
operational costs due to community unrest (Idemudia & Ite, 2006).  
Paradoxically, numerous O&G companies implement social investment that harms the host 
society (Frynas, 2000, 2005; Spence, 2011). This section explores five different conditions 
under which O&G social investment may harm society: (1) where companies replicate the 
same social investment concept and design in different contexts; (2) where O&G social 




individuals, (4) where social investment is used as an alternative to government; and (5) 
where it is solely based on philanthropy. 
3.1.1 Replicating the same social investment concept and design in different 
contexts 
Preconceived assumptions of who the local community is and what they need, without 
local consultation, are conditions that lead O&G social investment to fail. The literature 
indicates that social investment is unlikely to benefit host communities if a universal 
agenda of social investment is adopted across different cultural groups. Standardised 
approaches to social investment reflect a lack of awareness of individual host countries’ 
political and economic circumstances and of the possible impacts that a social investment 
might have in a specific context. 
For example, the O&G sector in Papua New Guinea developed a series of social 
investments that were shaped by the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) 
performance standards and the United Nations’ sustainable development principles, rather 
than the specificities of local communities (Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012). This has 
generated a series of ideological and cultural conflicts that negatively impacted local 
individuals’ sense of security (Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012) and hampered the socio-
political exchange networks within and among communities.  
Frynas (2009a) argues that O&G companies are pressured by governments, funding 
institutions, and their own O&G peers to develop social investment in host societies, and 
whilst some companies endeavour to modify social investment to meet local demands, the 
majority do not. In fact, Frynas’ findings suggest that adopting a universal agenda for 
social investment often occurs when small O&G companies replicate successful social 
investment programmes from O&G multinationals (Frynas, 2009a). This is due to 
institutional isomorphism (Frynas, 2009a), or companies replicating what they perceive as 
the successful programmes of other companies in order to be competitive. For instance, 
state owned companies, such as Brazilian Petrobras, Indian Oil, and Kuwait Petroleum, are 
increasingly adopting social investment programme designs developed by western 
European and American companies for their host communities (Frynas, 2009a). 




community whose main economic activity is based on crop farming is an example of 
institutional isomorphism and an example of a social investment that is likely to fail to 
address the needs of the host community. 
Social investment driven by a single ‘model’ is unlikely to result in community-centred 
social investment programmes. O&G companies’ replication of social investments that 
were ‘successful’ in one context may be seen as ‘benefiting’ host communities in another 
context. However, these types of social investment can also be seen as actually harming, 
rather than benefitting, communities due to the disconnection between the social 
programme design and the communities’ perceptions of what they need.  
3.1.2 Solely business-oriented O&G social investment 
O&G social investment fails to benefit society when it is solely business-oriented. Studies 
by Frynas (2005) and Ahmad (2006) suggest that companies’ motivation for initiating 
social investment initiatives are mainly, if not solely, business-oriented. Frynas (2005) 
researching the main reasons behind O&G companies’ decisions to promote social 
investment in host countries worldwide revealed that O&G companies seek “competitive 
advantage … a stable working environment, … managing external perceptions…[and] 
keeping the employees happy” (Frynas, 2005, p. 583). Similarly, Ahmad (2006) found that 
companies mainly develop social investment to enhance “company share price and 
reputation, increase companies sales, attract and retain high-calibre employees, promote 
international business strategies, retain government support, enhance corporate brand 
positioning and help to withstand the impact of a corporate crisis” (Ahmad, 2006, p. 123). 
None of the companies in the studies mentioned above cited ‘benefiting the host 
community’ as a rationale for social investment. This raises the question: how can social 
investment benefit the host community if it does not specifically identify what would 
benefit the community in the first place? Social investment that focuses solely on 
benefiting the firm tends to fail in benefiting its host communities (Frynas, 2005; Van 
Tulder, 2008).  
Two examples highlight how O&G social investment can fail due to a focus on the 




accused of implementing unsuccessful social investment in Equatorial Guinea because of a 
lack of community participation. ExxonMobil donated mosquito nets to the health ministry 
of Equatorial Guinea, but because they were not needed in the region, officials ended up 
exporting the nets to Cameroon (Frynas, 2005). Another non-community-oriented social 
investment was an anti-AIDS campaign in Angola. BP distributed Asian-made condoms 
that turned out to be too small for the men (Frynas, 2005). 
Van Tulder (2008) categorises social investment6 that is solely business oriented as ‘in-
active’ and/or ‘re-active’. In-active social investment’s main objectives are to obtain 
operational advantage and maximise profits, irrespective of a moral code of conduct (Van 
Tulder, 2008). Re-active O&G social investment is mainly developed because of public 
pressure. It is also used as a business strategy to gain political legitimacy and favours (Van 
Tulder, 2008). In-active and re-active social investment creates community dependency 
and enclave beneficiaries7. As noted in Chapter 2, enclave beneficiaries may generate 
intergroup jealousy and conflict within the host community (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012).  
In-active and/or re-active social investment harms the host society if it is used to bribe the 
host government to gain operational advantages (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012). One example of 
O&G social investment is explored by Frynas and Wood (2001) who investigated the 
impacts of oil revenue and activities on the war in Angola. Their study found that social 
investment in Angola was used as a way of channelling money to the government to meet 
the (1) government’s aspirations of winning a civil war, (2) gaining a license to operate, 
and (3) keeping the host communities away from the operation facilities.   
O&G social investment in Angola included charitable donations, weapons deals, and other 
forms of assistance to finance the civil war (Frynas & Wood, 2001). This type of social 
investment is both in-active and re-active. It is in-active because it is exclusively aimed at 
obtaining operational advantage to achieve profit maximisation and it is re-active because 
it involved using bribes in exchange for political legitimacy. 
                                                
6	Van Tulder talks about in-active and re-actives categories of social responsibility. In this research, when referring to 
Van Tulder’s categorisation of social responsibility I use the term ‘social investment’.	
7	As mentioned in the previous chapter, enclave beneficiaries emerge when heavy flows of foreign capital prompted by 
petroleum activities, such as social investment and oil royalties, increase the revenue concentration merely in one 





The O&G approach to social investment in Angola was aimed at solely satisfying O&G 
companies’ business interests, irrespective of any ethical code of conduct. O&G social 
investment harmed the Angolan society. Specifically, it financed a corrupt and 
authoritarian regime that supported decades of civil war (Frynas & Wood, 2001) that killed 
over 20,000 people and generated years of suffering and civilian turmoil (James III, 2011). 
3.1.3 O&G social investment used to benefit a few individuals 
As already mentioned, solely business-oriented social investment can create enclave 
beneficiaries as a way of achieving short-term business goals. This type of social 
investment harms host communities because it addresses the interests of a few (Cash, 
2012; Frynas, 2009b; Frynas & Wood, 2001; Hilson, 2012; Idemudia & Ite, 2006). 
According to Gilberthorpe and Banks (2012) social investment that creates enclave 
beneficiaries “often lead[s] to ill-conceived and highly inappropriate development 
programmes that contribute little to, and achieve a divisive effect on, the social and 
economic security of local communities” (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012 p. 186).  
O&G social investment that lacks transparency often involves the allocation of resources 
to benefit a few individuals, rather than a whole community. This is because social 
investment programmes with low levels of transparency and accountability are open to 
corruption (Cash, 2012; Frynas, 2009b; Frynas & Wood, 2001; Hilson, 2012; Idemudia & 
Ite, 2006). 
Frynas (2009b) and Idemudia and Ite (2006) illustrate this misuse of social investment 
resources to benefit the private interests of a few in Africa. For instance, Frynas (2009b) 
discusses three local communities in Africa settled alongside a gas-pipeline project. The 
company responsible for the pipeline construction established social investment that solely 
benefitted the three community chiefs, causing intergroup jealousy, community unrest, and 
hindering the community-company relationship. Meanwhile, in Nigeria, a few social 
investments failed because of greed amidst local chiefs and disruptive behaviour amongst 
youths due to political inter-group jealousy (Idemudia & Ite, 2006). Accordingly, having 
the whole community involved in the design of the social investment is a way of 




3.1.4 O&G social investment as an alternative to government 
Many companies use social investment to fill gaps left by host governments. Brazil and 
Argentina are examples of places where social investment in the O&G sector has been 
used as a way to meet the countries’ development agendas. In Argentina, the government 
plays an active role in debates around social responsibility and social investment 
programmes (Newell & Muro, 2006). The Argentinian government requires companies to 
invest in broader national development objectives. For instance, the Spanish Repsol has 
developed social investments in Argentina that reflect the local government’s focus on 
supporting employment (Newell & Muro, 2006). Repsol invested in a working cooperative 
for unemployed women, and in biodiesel research and development (Newell & Muro, 
2006).  
Brazil has a very similar approach to O&G social investment. As in Argentina, Brazil’s 
government plays an active role in advocating for O&G social investment that meets 
Brazil’s national development goals. For instance, in 2000 and 2001, Petrobras, the 
Brazilian oil company, promoted social investment in thermoelectric projects that were in 
accordance with Brazil’s development plans for energy self-sufficiency (Frynas, 2009a).  
However, O&G social investment that aligns with the host government’s agenda does not 
necessarily mean it benefits host communities, as government aspirations may not coincide 
with host communities’ needs and aspirations. This commonly occurs in host nations with 
governments that have high corruption indices and low human development indices (Cash, 
2012; Frynas, 2005; Hilson, 2012).  
Additionally, O&G social investment may harm society if it is presented as an alternative 
to government (Cash, 2012; Frynas, 2005; Hilson, 2012) as it creates an unequal balance 
of social power between the firm and government (Cash, 2012; Garriga & Melé, 2004; 
Hilson, 2012). Studies suggest that social investment that appropriates the role of the 
government to provide local social welfare may contribute to a shift in the role of the 
government from being a provider, to a recipient, of social welfare (Cash, 2012; Frynas, 
2005, 2009a; Hilson, 2012). Within this process, the company takes control of welfare 
provision and strategically fosters a relationship of dependency between the company and 




unrealistic expectations of what should be expected of O&G companies; (2) strengthens 
corrupt governments to withhold their participation in development initiatives; (3) raises 
community dependency upon the company’s provision; (4) leaves communities unattended 
in post-production times; and (5) hinders democratic decisions on operational licensing 
because of the unequal balance of power among the firm, government, and local 
community (Cash, 2012; Frynas, 2009b). 
Studies suggest that the best way to approach social investment where there are gaps in a 
government’s provision is through partnerships with the host government and civil society 
(Anderson & Bieniaszewska, 2005; Ite, 2005). In this way, the O&G industry 
acknowledges all actors involved and promotes participatory social investment. Social 
investment that entails a participatory approach involving the government, community, 
and firm is more likely to empower all groups involved and restore or retain the social 
balance of power (Frynas, 2009a).   
3.1.5 O&G social investment solely based on philanthropy 
Corporations within and outside the O&G sector around the world increasingly invest in 
philanthropic programmes. In a philanthropic approach companies are expected to donate 
to augment the host community’s health and stability (Heald, 1970). Philanthropy is based 
on a non-reciprocal, bipartite relationship between the donor and the recipient framed as 
companies’ voluntary expenditure to support local civil causes (Porter & Kramer, 2002; 
Varadarajan & Menon, 1988). 
Thailand, Pakistan, and Nigeria are three countries where O&G social investment is based 
on charitable practices. In Thailand, companies - within and outside the O&G industry – 
see social investment as a form of social contribution, which is embedded in the country’s 
social values of “religious” and “bilateral patronage” (Srisuphaolarn, 2013, p. 62). 
According to Srisuphaolarn (2013), Thai society expects O&G companies to donate to 
“religious causes, scholarships, fund-raising for hospitals, help-the-victims-of-disasters” 
(Srisuphaolarn, 2013, p. 62).  
Likewise, companies in Pakistan develop social investment mainly founded on a ‘sense of 




perceive corporate obligations to society to be contingent upon their size and financial 
performance. That is, in Pakistan, there is a shared assumption that small and non-
profitable companies are exempt from being accountable to the host communities and from 
performing corporate-giving programmes (Ahmad, 2006). Although Thailand and 
Pakistan’s social investment programmes are mainly based on religious values that are 
directly connected to charity, the literature on O&G social investment provides a 
cautionary tale in relation to social investment as charity.  
Critics of Philanthropy have alleged that benevolent articulations of philanthropic 
programmes are inherently patriarchal (Ellwood, 1989; Jessop, 2002b; Murray, 2008; C. 
Murray, 2006). They argue that philanthropic programmes marginalise certain social 
groups of society, fostering the dependency of underprivileged groups on welfare 
resources (Ellwood, 1989; Jessop, 2002b; Murray, 2008; Murray, 2006; Torfing, 1999). 
For example, several companies have been criticised for taking a paternalistic approach 
towards their host communities (Harvey & Bice, 2014; Ite, 2004, 2005), or promoting 
expectations of welfare support (For example see Ellwood, 1989; Murray, 2008; Murray, 
2006; Torfing, 1999). The culture of dependency generated by solely charitable social 
investment can be seen as creating unrealistic expectations amongst beneficiaries 
(Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2005). Philanthropy gradually shifts from gift to duty. 
This is because continuous charitable actions may take the form of an implied ‘rent’. This 
implicit ‘rent’ is often assumed to be a form of exchange for the company to continue to 
explore in the host territory - irrespective of the firm’s legal license to operate (Idemudia & 
Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2005). 
In the history of O&G social investment in Nigeria, O&G companies, such as Shell, began 
developing social investment on a charity basis, through a programme called Community 
Assistance (Ite, 2004, 2005). This programme addressed areas of water and sanitation, 
health care, voluntary training, education, agriculture, micro-credit and business 
development, and infrastructure (Ite, 2004, 2005). Ite’s research shows how the 
Community Assistance initiative fostered a ‘culture of dependency’ and encouraged the 
local community to depend on O&G charity, rather than empowering locals to overcome 




To fight this culture of dependency, Shell shifted its corporate-giving culture toward a 
community-oriented approach. This approach prompted the local community to develop 
their own community development plan (Ite, 2004). Shell’s decision created a catalyst for 
the community to shape social investment based on their realities and needs. 
Another view of charity as an obstacle to meaningful social investment is presented by Le 
Billon (2001). In some countries, legislation exempts firms and individuals from paying 
taxes if they are performing charitable actions. According to Le Billon (2001), charity may 
insulate the host government from the tax revenue that would otherwise benefit society. 
Host countries that rely on companies’ charitable actions to provide the host society with 
social welfare tend to have high levels of corruption, which means they are not likely to 
transfer the tax revenue to social programmes (Ross, 1999, 2001).  
This section has explored five different scenarios that may lead O&G social investment to 
fail and harm communities. Programmes that replicate the same social investment concept 
and design in different contexts, that share the oil revenue with a few individuals, that are 
used as an alternative to the government, and that are solely based on philanthropy are 
likely to harm host communities. However, the literature on O&G social investment also 
identifies the conditions under which O&G social investment may benefit society. I 
explore these in the following section. 
3.2 Why do O&G social investments succeed?  
According to some research, O&G companies can play a big role in benefiting their host 
communities (Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2005). This section explores the conditions 
under which this is possible. These are: (1) where O&G social investments are 
community-oriented, and (2) where O&G social investments address issues of local 
governance.  
3.2.1 Community-centred O&G social investment 
O&G social investments may be successful if they are community-oriented. ‘Bottom-up’ 
social investment design is the main predictor of a successful social investment (Frynas, 




development plan based on their experiences, talents, and knowledge empowers 
communities and significantly reduces their dependency on companies for economic 
development (Ite, 2004).  
For example, Shell in Nigeria has adopted a bottom-up social investment design through a 
long history of social investment programmes, dating back to 1960. For around 20 years, 
Shell developed a top-down approach towards social investment in the Niger Delta. 
However, the people from the Niger Delta – 20 million people within the nine states of the 
federation – continued to live in poverty. Further, the communities that ‘received’ the 
social investment benefits became highly dependent upon the investment resources. With 
time, the communities incorporated the resources derived from Shell’s assistance 
programme and began perceiving the programme’s resources as operation ‘rent’, rather 
than as ‘gifts’. After 20 years developing community assistance programmes, since 1998, 
Shell changed its strategies towards social investment in the Niger Delta. Shell created the 
Community Development approach that entailed “the full participation of population 
segments of the communities” (Ite, 2004, p. 6). Within this approach, Shell also developed 
partnerships with different social actors, such as NGOs and other development agencies, to 
address poverty. Community participation was a key determinant in ensuring that Shell’s 
investment benefited the host community, therefore significantly reducing levels of 
poverty in the region (Ite, 2004). 
Similarly, ExxonMobil and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline social investments were notable 
“for [their] attention to local concerns, company-community dialogue and social-economic 
investments” (Chen, 2007, p. 24). This had not always been the case, for during the 
beginning of the 2000s, the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project encountered a series of 
difficulties. ExxonMobil shifted its social investment approach when the Chad government 
used ExxonMobil’s oil revenues on military expenditure. ExxonMobil reduced the social 
investment revenue that was provided directly to the Chad government, and increased the 
social investment spending in programmes designed with the participation of host 
communities. For instance, the company held 1,200 public consultation meetings to 
determine its investment within the host communities (Chen, 2007) and spent US$8 





O&G social investment is more likely to succeed where it is meaningful for local 
community (Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012). Social investment is meaningful to host 
communities if the communities inform the project’s design and implementation 
(Blowfield & Frynas, 2005). Communities may espouse values that are different to those 
held by the firm (Blowfield, 2005). Cultural and value differences have to be taken into 
consideration in order to ensure that social investment is meaningful for the host 
community (Blowfield, 2005; Blowfield & Frynas, 2005; Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012).  
Anderson and Bieniaszewska (2005) undertook a study in the Faroe Islands, an 
autonomous group of small islands in the North Atlantic with a population of around 
47,000 inhabitants. Oil prospection began in the Faroe Islands at the beginning of the 
1990s. In 2001, the Faroe Islands government issued Clause II-13 that stated oil 
explorations were subjected to oil companies providing employment, education, and 
research opportunities to locals (Anderson & Bieniaszewska, 2005). According to 
Anderson and Bieniaszewska (2005), BP conducted research exploring the “social 
necessities” (p. 5) of the country. BP designed its social investment in the Faroe Island 
based on (1) social audits as a form of community engagement; (2) social, legal, 
environmental, and technological analysis; and (3) risk mitigation assessment. After 
consulting with the locals, BP developed social investment in areas of poverty alleviation 
and environmental preservation (Anderson & Bieniaszewska, 2005). According to 
Anderson and Bieniaszewska (2005), O&G social investment in the Faroe Island has 
fostered a positive relationship with the host communities because it respected the unique 
socio-economic context, local culture, and values of the host communities.  
Garcia and Vredenburg (2003) argue that O&G companies operating in countries with 
different values, customs, and institutional organisations should adjust their managerial 
behaviour to the demands of the host country. Their study describes the work of Pacalta, a 
Canadian oil exploration company that began operations in Ecuador in 1997. Pacalta 
implemented a management strategy that fostered a ‘sound’ relationship with host 
communities. Engaging with the communities that lived nearby the operational area 
through an NGO funded by Pacalta, called Fundacion Nan Paz, they developed the 
following community-centred social investments: Centre for Technology Transfer, System 




initiatives, and coffee producers’ initiatives. According to Garcia and Vredenburg (2003), 
Pacalta developed a successful approach to social investment in Ecuador because it was 
based on the demands and reality of the host communities. 
A participatory approach to social investment is crucial to its success, as exemplified by 
the Faroe Islands and Ecuador social investment studies. However, Frynas (2009a) argues 
that the involvement of the beneficiaries of the social investment in planning social 
investment projects is still limited or non-existent in many cases. This lack of community 
involvement in O&G social investment results in limited sustainable benefits to 
communities (Frynas, 2009b). Further, as noted earlier, a lack of community participation 
in O&G social investment potentially fosters a mentality of dependency by the host 
community (Frynas, 2005).  
Frynas (2005) believes that a lack of community participation in companies’ decision-
making around social investment is due to a lack of development experts working in O&G 
companies. Studies suggest that there is a disconnection between social investment 
development goals, and expertise within the O&G industry (Blowfield, 2005; Blowfield & 
Frynas, 2005; Frynas, 2005). The literature on social investment in the extractive industries 
reveals that the majority of O&G social responsibility experts are not from the social 
science field (Banks, Scheyvens, McLennan, & Bebbington, 2016; Frynas, 2005; Harvey, 
2014; Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006). For this reason, social investment programmes often 
do not have facilitators with the relevant skills to engage in community participation, 
which may hinder the development of social investment that actually address 
communities’ needs. 
As already mentioned, Pacalta, conducted social investment in Ecuador, its host nation 
(Garcia & Vredenburg, 2003). The Pacalta Fundacion’s personnel were social science 
experts whose objectives went beyond operational objectives (Garcia & Vredenburg, 
2003). According to Garcia & Vredenburg, (2003), these experts have placed local 
indigenous voices, values, and customs at the centre of a participatory development-
focused approach to social investment. They argue that this approach was central to 




3.2.2 Transparent and accountable O&G social investment 
Bad governance, corruption and lack of transparency are directly related to poverty 
(Ackah-Baidoo, 2012). Corrupt and authoritarian regimes may jeopardise O&G goals of 
poverty reduction (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Cash, 2012; Ite, 2005), whilst lack of government 
involvement hampers long-term poverty reduction.  
Studies suggest that O&G industries can assist host nations in addressing macro-level 
governance issues such as revenue transparency and accountability via their own social 
investment practices (Blowfield & Frynas, 2005; Frynas, 2009a). Studies recommend that 
social investment should focus on assisting the country’s governance processes to operate 
transparently before developing and implementing social programmes (Blowfield & 
Frynas, 2005; Frynas, 2005, 2009a, 2010). However, Frynas (2010) argues that most O&G 
companies are reluctant to play a role in the host government’s governance role.  
Nevertheless a few companies have faced the challenge, and now play an important role in 
strengthening the host government and assuring the success of its social investment 
(Frynas, 2010). For instance, in 2001 BP made public information of payments to the 
Angolan and Azerbaijan governments in respect of production-sharing contracts, taxes and 
levies (Frynas 2010). By making public all payments - voluntary and mandatory - made to 
the host government, O&G companies aimed to benefit host countries in fighting 
corruption (Frynas, 2009b). Social investment derived from either voluntary, tax or royalty 
schemes are more likely to be fairly distributed by a government whose governance is 
participatory, transparent, accountable, honest and fair.  
In the following section, I outline some ‘gaps’ in the existing O&G social investment 
literature, in order to situate my own research.  
3.3 ‘Gaps’ in the existing literature on O&G social investment 
While considerable research has examined how O&G social investment may harm or 
benefit the host society, there are also several areas where further research is needed. 
Currently, there is little published that explores the views and understandings of O&G 




Officers (CEOs), instead of the experts that develop social investment on the ground. This 
research contributes to the current literature on O&G social investment by analysing the 
multiple discourses that social investment experts draw on to talk about social investment, 
and considering how these discourses may influence social investment practices and host 
communities. 
Furthermore, the impact of a country’s governance in determining the success of O&G 
social investment is also under-researched. Little published work considers O&G social 
investment experts’ views of the role of the host country government in assisting O&G 
companies to implement social investment effectively. In part, this research explores social 
investment experts’ perceptions of host governments’ roles in O&G social investment. 
Despite the existence of literature on O&G social investment, it appears that limited 
attention has been given to fully understanding the implications of guideline documents 
that social investment experts use to implement social investment in host communities. 
The literature that does address guideline documents in the O&G sector (Lozano, 2013; 
Raufflet, Cruz, & Bres, 2014) appears to focus on annual reporting and not on the ways in 
which the guidelines construct social investment. Further research about the role of O&G 
social investment guidelines in the implementation of O&G social investment is necessary, 
hence the focus of this research on the discourses evident in guideline documents that refer 
to social investment. 
3.4 Summary 
A critical review of the current literature on social investment in the O&G sector suggests 
that social investment may fail, or succeed, depending on its capacity to address 
communities’ needs through listening to community stakeholders and respecting 
communities’ unique cultural characteristics (Ahmad, 2006; Anderson & Bieniaszewska, 
2005; Hess, Rogovsky, & Dunfee, 2002; Newell & Muro, 2006). In this sense, O&G social 
investment can be seen as a social construct. This means that it should vary according to a 
region’s historical, political, social, economic and cultural contexts, and business systems. 
The way social investment is conceptualised and developed in a specific locale should be 
different from other locales. In this sense, social investment based on universal designs 




political, and economic dynamics, and the relationships between governments and 
communities. It may also increase communities’ dependency upon O&G resources, which 
may reduce communities’ capacity to solve their won challenges. 
This chapter has identified some existing gaps in the research literature on O&G social 
investment. My research aimed to address these by analysing social investment experts’ 
understandings of social investment and the practicality and impacts of guideline 
documents on social investment practices. My research also examined how social 
investment experts viewed the role of government in O&G social investment and how 
government personnel understood social investment in the O&G sector. In the next 





Chapter 4:  Theoretical Framework 
Throughout this thesis, critical theoretical perspectives guide my thinking around power 
hierarchies and development. I draw on poststructural theoretical perspectives to consider 
how power, discourse, subjectivity, and agency appear in social investment experts’ 
narratives. These provide the tools for challenging taken-for-granted assumptions about 
O&G social investment and considering how it might be reimagined. 
Three main sections comprise this chapter. The first defines my understandings of ‘power’ 
in reference to the work of several critical theorists including Freire, Escobar, Andreotti, 
Shrestha, and Foucault. The second explains my use of ‘discourse’ as a way of examining 
understandings of O&G social investment discourses that emerge in social investment 
experts’ narratives and social investment guidelines. Finally, the third section discusses the 
concepts of subjectivity and agency as they inform my understandings of participants’ (and 
own) positioning in relation to social investment practices.  
4.1 Power 
In this section, I explain how I draw on the work of Freire, Escobar, Andreotti, Shrestha, 
and Foucault to conceptualise power in this research. Each conceptualises power slightly 
differently, but together, they provide me with critical tools for thinking about power 
hierarchies and power fluidity in relation to O&G social investment. 
4.1.1 Power in the work of Freire 
In the work of Freire, power is negotiated in a dialectical relationship between the 
oppressed and oppressors (Freire, 2005; Freire & Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973; 
McLaughlin & DeVoogd, 2004). Power, however, is not limited to the oppressors, 
meaning that the group/individual being oppressed have the power to resist and react to 
oppression. In Freire’s work, questioning and/or challenging offers the means to cross the 
“terrain of power” (Jones, 1999, p. 306). By questioning and/or challenging the status quo, 




Typically, Freire’s understandings of power involve challenging any oppressive 
dimension, for instance by comprehending and thinking beyond the information provided 
on a printed page. Thus, readers can engage in critical and active reading by questioning, 
examining, and disputing what they have read (McLaughlin & DeVoogd, 2004), thereby 
providing a vehicle to cross the threshold of the “terrain of power” (Jones, 1999, p. 306). 
In doing so readers gain a voice through which they can fully participate and challenge 
patterns of power in their relationship with the author. Because critical and active reading 
involves more than deciphering codes (McLaughlin & DeVoogd, 2004) and understanding 
language, Freire provides a vehicle for me to comprehend and challenge a range of 
“diverse beliefs, positions and understandings” in social investment policies and practice 
(McLaughlin & DeVoogd, 2004, p. 139). 
Furthermore, we readily accept that some groups in society are relatively powerful 
compared to others, with powerful groups having a vested interest in maintaining their 
power (Macdonald et al., 2002). The group subjected to others’ power is generally 
unconsciously contained by its condition (Freire & Mellado, 1973). Sometimes, powerful 
groups “cannot find in this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or 
themselves” (Freire & Mellado, 1973, p. 21) from this long-standing relationship. As a 
result, powerful groups tend to exhibit what Freire calls ‘false generosity’ (Freire & 
Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973). False generosity refers to the conscious or 
unconscious efforts of powerful groups to provide other groups with the impression of a 
beneficial relationship. The underlying objective of this relationship is, however, to 
preserve the pre-existing power relations. According to Freire (Freire & Macedo, 1995; 
Freire & Mellado, 1973), false generosity occurs in welfare programmes that foster a 
culture of dependency in their recipients. False generosity is mostly implicit and subtle and 
is characterised by the absence of strategies that enhances beneficiaries’ independence.  
In this research, I use Freire in two ways. First, to investigate whether, through social 
investment, participants have established and maintained a relationship with their host 
communities through coercion via O&G social investment, as framed within Freire’s 
notion of power; and second, to analyse how experts, when representing a powerful group, 
make use of social investment as a tool of false generosity. Freire’s ideas (Freire & 




identify and challenge veiled fragments of oppression. Social investment, for instance, can 
be a source of oppression if all parties are not provided with transparent information and 
space for participation. Guideline documents can likewise represent a source of oppression 
that disempowers certain parties by excluding them from the decision-making process, as 
investigated in Chapter 7. 
As a tool of false generosity, social investment represents a neo-colonial8 form of power 
and thus the works of Escobar (1992; 1995; 2002; 2004), Shrestha (1995), and Andreotti 
(2011), help further develop my theoretical framework.  
4.1.2 Power in the work of Escobar, Andreotti, and Shrestha 
This research is also informed by Escobar (1992; 1995; 2002; 2004), Shrestha (1995), and 
Andreotti’s (2011; see also Andreotti & Dowling, 2004) critical perspectives of 
development and capitalism. Escobar (1992; 1995; 2002; 2004) argues that development is 
a social construction which serves Eurocentric domination by big business and nations. It 
is a construct used to justify ‘developed’ nations and/or institutions’ dominance over the 
‘developing’ nations and/or groups (Escobar, 2002; Rahnema, 1991). Within this 
understanding, development is seen as a mechanism of control. Development is 
strategically - discursively and materially (in economic terms) - constructed by western 
nations as a new form of colonialism (Escobar, 2002; Rahnema, 1991).  
Escobar’s (1992; 1995; 2002; 2004) account of development as a mechanism that 
determines what and who should be treated as ‘underdeveloped’ corresponds with 
Shrestha’s experience of development. Shrestha (1995) draws on his own personal 
biography to illustrate the impact development had in his life when he became ‘conscious’ 
of ‘lacking development’: 
So, poor and hungry I certainly was. But underdeveloped? I never thought – nor did anybody 
else – that being poor meant “underdeveloped” and lacking human dignity. True there is no 
comfort or glory in poverty, but the whole concept of development (or underdevelopment) was 
totally alien to me (Shrestha, 1995, p. 105). 
                                                




According to Shrestha (1995) development is a construct produced and reproduced across 
time and space to lead the way to a “monolithic culture of materialism, which stigmatises 
poverty and the poor” (Shrestha, 1995, p. 103).  
Andreotti (2011) uses the term ‘modernity’ rather than development but her ideas are also 
helpful here. Andreotti (2011) refers to modernity as a global hegemonic model of power 
based on principles of capital accumulation. In Andreotti’s terms, development can be seen 
as framed by the “coloniality of power” (Andreotti, 2011, p. 383), or articulation of race, 
labour, space, and people according to the economic demands of ‘developed’ nations 
(Andreotti, 2011). In this sense, development can be seen as akin to European colonialism; 
where once there were colonies, now there are countries that need development (Mignolo, 
2012).  
Escobar (1992; 1995; 2002; 2004), Shrestha (1995), and Andreotti’s (2011; see also 
Andreotti & Dowling, 2004) critical understandings allow me to consider how economic 
power circulates among social investment experts, government experts, and communities 
in ways that entrench and disrupt relations of domination and oppression. They also inform 
my consideration of investment as a means for enacting neo-colonial ideals, for example 
the development of ‘others’, and capital accumulation (Crush, 1995; Gibson-Graham, 
2003). They also allow me to critically consider the possible impact of this social 
investment in host communities. Later in this thesis, I consider how power might be 
exercised differently through social investment practices, or whether it is possible to 
engage in social investment in ways that are not dominating or coercive. In this regard, I 
also draw on Foucault’s work.  
4.1.3 Power in the work of Foucault 
To Foucault (1980), power is a fluid and productive network which runs through all forms 
of social relations. In Foucault’s work, the exercise of power does not necessarily involve 
“coercion, prohibition, or domination over others by an individual or group...” (Walshaw, 
2007, p. 20). Power is exercised and practised, rather than possessed (Foucault, 1970, 
1980, 1982; Hall, 2001; Walshaw, 2007). Individuals are the vehicles of power and human 
relations enable power to circulate (Foucault, 1980, 1982; Hall, 2001; Walshaw, 2007). 




“invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended” in society 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 99).  
A Foucauldian approach is based on the assumption that asymmetric and contradictory 
power relations establish subjects’ relationships, which reflect an unbalanced distribution 
of rights and duties (Cameron, 2001; Foucault, 1970, 1980, 1982). Foucault’s work 
provides me with the tools to question and interrogate social investment experts’ dual 
positioning as they work within/against constraints (Lather, 2006). In this thesis, I consider 
the role of social investment experts as subjects who may act for communities, but who are 
also subjected to broader economic realities, for example who are compromised, bounded, 
and constrained by neo-colonial and/or capitalist institutional expectations. In doing so, 
this research aims to highlight the contradictory power relations inherent in O&G social 
investment. In the following section, I use Foucault to explore understandings of discourse 
as offering theoretical tools for recognising how contradictory relations of power emerge 
through language.  
4.2 Discourse 
A Foucauldian approach is based on the assumption that subjects are contradictory by 
nature because their worldviews are influenced by different and sometimes contradictory 
discourses (Cameron, 2001). Discourse, through a Foucauldian-informed poststructural 
lens, refers to how written, spoken, visual, and gestural language constitutes social 
practices and contributes to everyday lives (Bloor & Bloor, 2013; Fairclough, 2001; 
Gavey, 1997; Willig, 2001). Consequently, discourse as interpretive statements articulated 
through language, constructs objects and ‘subject positions’ in particular ways (Gavey, 
1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1994).  
To Foucault (1970, 1980, 1982) power is established through discourse, and both 
discourse and power are tied to the building of knowledge (Pennycook, 2001). 
Foucauldian understandings of discourse and power are based on the notion that discourse 
does not refer to language as a mere system of symbols, but as a product of social 
relations, practices, and organisations in different times in history. However, according to 
a Foucauldian perspective, it is inappropriate to consider discourse as a mere reflection of 




reconstructing identities and relations as discourses are enacted (Pennycook, 2001; 
Walshaw, 2007). 
Language is a form of discursive production (Starks & Trinidad, 2007). Language reflects 
society’s dynamic and often conflicting social practices, which in turn also alter language 
meanings. Language meanings vary according to an individual’s, political, historical and 
cultural context and to the discourses they adopt (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2002). Language 
is not exclusively referential (Cameron, 2001), or a “transparent” tool to describe “the real 
world” (Davies, 1990, p. 342). Language is never neutral and impersonal, but rather, it 
constructs people’s identities and everyday practices. However, language is never solely 
one’s own. For instance, when the speaker produces language, semantic structures, 
accents, and symbolic views (Davies, 1990, 1991), it belongs not only to the speaker but 
also to the listener, who will make use of his/her own interpretative schemata to make 
sense of the message conveyed (Davies, 1990, 1991).  
The way language is structured and/or pictorially expressed may reveal multiple and multi-
layered concurrent discourses (Davies, 1991; Gavey, 1997). These discourses are not 
necessarily complementary, they may be conflicting and in a process of transformation 
(Hartman, 2015). Discourse, as a product of language construction and utterances, is in 
constant motion. From a Foucaudian perspective, there is no such thing as ‘natural’ or 
‘universal’ discourses, but rather dominant discourses that strongly influence decisions and 
discursive practices (Davies, 1991; Foucault, 1970; Gavey, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 
1994).  
Some discourses are so deep-seated in a society that they are taken-for-granted as 
‘common sense’ (Willig, 2001). These are difficult to challenge because they reflect 
entrenched and shared assumptions. However, dominant discourses may change over time 
if alternative discourses become accepted in a wider society (Willig, 2001). In this thesis, I 
consider how language is used in relation to social investment, by highlighting dominant 
and counter discourses that emerge in O&G social investment guidelines and experts’ 
narratives. 
Discourses are shaped by institutional ways of organising, regulating, and managing social 




They are located within complex webs of social relations and institutions (Macdonald et 
al., 2002; Willig, 2001). Discourses are therefore socially constructed and shaped by 
people and their actions, which are embedded within broader societal contexts (Ainsworth 
& Hardy, 2004; Fairclough, Mulderrig, & Wodak, 2011).  
A critical Foucauldian-informed approach provides the tools to consider both what is said 
and not said in interviews and documents relating to O&G social investment. In drawing 
on Foucauldian notions of discourse, I aim to identify both dominant discourses of social 
investment, and those that are “[run] between and sometimes [collide] with them” 
(Foucault, 1970, p. 30). I am also interested in the connections and disconnections between 
the discourses evident in interviews and the guideline documents, which are not interpreted 
here as mistakes (Jackson & Mazzei, 2008). Rather, the whole interplay of discontinuity 
and differences is what constitutes the objects, while simultaneously transforming it 
(Foucault, 1970). However, I cannot have a broader understanding of participants’ 
discursive understandings and practices of social investment without considering their 
subjectivity and agency. I turn to these two concepts now.  
4.3 Subjectivity and agency 
Poststructural concepts of subjectivity and agency allow me to consider the fluidity of 
participants’ understandings of social investment and themselves as actors within the O&G 
sector. These concepts also allow me to investigate how social investment staff understand 
and make sense of their own work in an industry where corporate discourses also direct 
their work.  
The term ‘subjectivity’ denotes how selves are both acting subjects and constructed within 
broader discourses that shape their lives and work (Davies, 1990, 1991; Macdonald et al., 
2002). Subjectivity carries a dual meaning; the subject is the doer, the agent of the action, 
and is also subjected to other people’s actions and/or discourses (Davies, 1990, 1991). 
Poststructuralists recognise the fact that people may occupy multiple positions 
simultaneously, being able to act agentically while complying with, or being subject to, 




People’s subject positions may vary depending on the power relations within which they 
are situated (Gavey, 1997). From a poststructuralist perspective, the self is not fixed, but 
constructed through language and other systems of meaning (Macdonald et al., 2002). In 
these terms, ‘subjectivity’ recognises people’s lived realities as “fragmented, inconsistent 
and contradictory” (Gavey, 1997, p. 465). This is because the subject is always embedded 
in multiple discourses that may promote different subject positions concurrently (Gavey, 
1997).  
In this research, I understand social investment experts as making decisions that are 
influenced by broader discourses that construct the O&G industry and those within it in 
particular ways. For example, workers in the O&G industry are shaped by the institutional 
rules of each company; the cultural and political context of the countries where the O&G 
company is located, as well as where it is headquartered; and broader discourses about 
each company’s goals, including profitability and social investment (Butler, 2011; Nairn, 
Higgins, & Sligo, 2012). Participants’ subjectivities and practices as social investment 
experts also govern/shape/influence notions of social investment. Participants’ 
understandings and practices of social investment therefore both construct and are 
constructed via institutional understandings of social investment. 
Social investment experts’ work may be constrained by institutional discourses, but they 
may also work “within/against” (Lather, 2006, p. 44) them. This may lead to new ways of 
understanding social investment. Lather (2006) argues that dominant discourses become 
authoritative through multiple repetitions. ‘Ruptures’ in these repetitions may generate 
opportunities for new discourses to emerge. When analysing participants’ narratives of 
social investment, I pay attention to how participants’ interview discussion reveals both 
dominant and/or alternative discourses of social investment, or possibilities for 
constructing O&G social investment differently (Jones, 1991).  
‘Agency’ is a concept that allows me to consider how social investment personnel may 
construct social investment outside dominant discourses, despite their positioning within 
O&G companies driven by profit. The term agency captures how individuals can be seen 
as agents or people who can act within/against specific constraints, and who are active in 




O&G staff draws on may reflect ‘what is’, while also contributing to a shift from “what is 
to what might be”. This thesis endeavours to document such complexity.  
According to Davies (1991), ‘agency’ may refer to individuals’ compliance or constraint in 
regards to particular dominant discourses. Agency represents an individual’s ability to 
recognise discursive constructions and to consciously comply with and/or resist, challenge 
and change them. Poststructural understandings of agency invest the subject with authority 
and the capacity to act to make changes, for example recognising an individual or group of 
individuals might introduce a “counter-discourse” that will challenge and potentially 
replace dominant ones (Davies, 1991, p. 51). 
By positioning social investment experts (including myself) as agentic, in this thesis, I 
recognise the possibility of acting upon discursive constructions which constitute us, and 
social investment, in specific ways (Andreotti & Dowling, 2004; Bacchi, 2005; Davies, 
1990, 1991). In other words, my aim is to open up new possibilities for understanding and 
enacting social investment. At the same time, I aim to explore the dominant discourses that 
shape social investment experts’ work, and how they/we make sense of our work 
within/against these. We “may have access to powerful ways of being that are not the 
result of normative judgement from within the dominant discourses made by those 
positioned powerfully within them” (Davies, 1991, p. 45).  
4.4 Summary 
A critical positioning in this research aims at both documenting and challenging the status 
quo in relation to O&G social investment (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2002; Macdonald et al., 
2002). In the reminder of the thesis, the theoretical concepts of power, discourse, 
subjectivity, and agency provide me with the tools necessary to explore and challenge 
taken-for-granted assumptions about O&G social investment. These tools also allow me to 
consider the complex role of the social investment experts included in my study. 
In the following chapter, I explain how I applied the theoretical perspectives discussed to 
the research process. Specifically, I outline my research design and the methods adopted to 
the discourses that emerged in interviews with O&G social investment experts and in 




Chapter 5:  Methodology 
In this chapter, I outline the methodological considerations underpinning my qualitative 
research design, including the formal ethical procedures undertaken and the main ethical 
dilemmas encountered in the process of conducting this research. I then describe the 
qualitative data collection methods used, including my strategies for recruitment, followed 
by how I conducted, transcribed, and analysed the interviews. Finally, I draw on principles 
of reflexivity (Berger, 2015) to recount my journey as a social investment expert and  
researcher, and reflect on how these roles have shaped my research objectives, and my 
epistemological and theoretical perspectives.  
5.1 Methodological considerations 
In this study, I set out to understand how O&G social investment experts understand and 
practice social investment in the O&G industry by exploring the discourses embedded in 
their narratives. As noted in Chapter 4, I drew on a range of theoretical perspectives to 
frame my research questions:  
1. Which discourses do O&G social investment personnel draw on to talk 
about social investment?  
2. How are the discourses adopted by the O&G participants reproduced in the 
social investment guideline documents?  
3. What are the experts’ recommendations for future O&G social investment?  
4. Which discourses are evident in participants’ recommendations for future 
O&G social investment?  
My research questions and aims, together with my theoretical framework, led me to adopt 
a qualitative research design (Creswell & Poth, 2017).  
A qualitative approach is often adopted in projects concerned with gaining better 
understandings of the world through “interacting with, emphasising … and interpreting the 
actions and perceptions of its actors” (Brockington & Sullivan, 2003, p. 57). Thus the 




2002). Qualitative data analysis explores the different meanings people give to the events, 
processes, and structures of their lives (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Krauss, 2005; Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldana, 2013). In my research, I am also interested in how these 
understandings connected to the broader O&G social investment context.  
My exploration of participants’ understandings and experiences of social investment in the 
O&G sector was underpinned by a poststructuralist view that there is no final ‘truth’ to be 
found (Foucault, 1970; Potter & Wetherell, 1994). Instead, my research aimed to 
understand the relationships between discourses and institutions (for more see Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997;  and Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004), such as between social investment 
experts and companies, and host government and host communities. My standpoint in this 
thesis, is that the discourses evident in the data connect with broader corporate institutional 
practices, providing insights into how the working lives of social investment experts are 
organised, regulated, and administered (Willig, 2013). In this thesis, I explore the 
discursive resources experts draw on “to constitute themselves as subjects” (Macdonald et 
al., 2002, p. 143) and consider experts’ meaning-making in relation to the discourses 
evident in guideline documents. I therefore designed a project where in-depth research 
interviews and document analysis were the main methods of data collection. A 
Foucauldian discourse analysis (as outlined by Willig, 2001) informed how I read the 
interview transcripts and the guideline documents. The following sections describe how I 
recruited my participants, selected the documents, and analysed the discourses that 
participants drew on to talk about social investment in the O&G sector.  
5.1.1 Consent and recruitment 
My first step was to obtain approval from the University of Otago (UO) Human Ethics 
Committee to conduct this research. In order to gain approval, I submitted detailed 
information regarding the research’s objectives and design, along with the anticipated 
interview questions (see Appendix C and D), information sheet (see Appendix A and B), 
and the consent form (see Appendix E) for participants. The consent form noted 
participants’ rights to withdraw from the research at any stage, and that anonymity was 
assured to all participants and their companies. I return to the importance of anonymity in 




Along with applying to the UO Human Ethics Committee, I also engaged in consultation 
with the Ngai Tahu Research Consultation Committee. This committee provides the 
framework for a mandated consultation process with Māori (local indigenous people) in 
relation to research. It manages the consultation process, while acknowledging the needs 
and aspirations of Ngāi Tahu for Māori development (Research Consultation with Māori 
webpage, nd).   
5.1.2 Informed consent and anonymity 
A key condition for obtaining research approval from the UO Human Ethics Committee is 
that research subjects are fully informed about the nature of the research and agree to 
voluntarily participate. This is known as informed consent (Christians, 2000). Informed 
consent was sought via letter, email, or LinkedIn InMail messages accompanied by an 
information sheet (see Appendix A and B). The participants gave their consent either by 
signing a consent form, providing written consent by email, or recorded oral consent by 
Phone/Skype before the interview took place. Most of the interviews (90%) were 
conducted either via telephone or Skype calls (a free of charge software that facilitates 
audio and/or video conference calls throughout the world) (Allan, 2009; Hanna, 2012).  
Anonymity was a key condition of ethics approval, with several participants worried about 
their anonymity being jeopardised in case details of countries and/or their gender were 
revealed. This was a major consideration because of the very specific O&G social 
investment scenarios in particular countries. For example, when discussing the anonymity 
of countries, one participant recommended “you could mention that it is a European 
country, an European Union country” (P19 social investment expert).  
Similarly, when discussing gender anonymity, a participant mentioned that “it is going to 
be obvious the person who you are working with, because there are not many women 
working for the O&G industry and doing this job” (P7 social investment expert). In order 
to guarantee participants’ anonymity, throughout this thesis I abstain from mentioning 
participants’ gender and countries of origin in addition to the more obvious protection of 
not naming participants’ companies and roles. Furthermore, the pronouns used to refer to 
                                                




participants were combined: he/she as s/he, or his/her (possessive form), as their. Finally, I 
use codenames to ‘name’ all 20 participants: P1, P2, P3 etc.  
5.1.3 Ethical dilemmas 
Two ethical dilemmas shaped the research process, which were not an obvious part of the 
UO ethics procedure. The first entailed the relevance and ethics of using the words “ethical 
and unethical” in reference to social investment. Although there is literature in the social 
investment field which labels specific forms of social investment as unethical, I opted to 
avoid such labels. My decision was based on the fact that my participants were directly 
involved with O&G social investment. The research experts, including myself, have, at 
times, adopted discursive practices (sometimes unconsciously) that the literature would 
frame as unethical. I was therefore aware that any attempt to frame certain types of social 
investment as unethical could potentially harm the participants. In order to avoid falling 
into this trap, I invited participants’ perceptions of whether the social investment they were 
involved in was successful and/or unsuccessful.  
The second dilemma that I faced related to cultural and linguistic differences when 
collecting and analysing data. For this research, government leaders from different 
countries were invited to participate. The interview questions and invitation letters were 
the same, but I translated them into different languages. Although languages share some 
similarities, most are structured differently from each other (Whaley, 1996). Consequently, 
representatives of one country’s government complained that some of the questions were 
rude due to their straight-forwardness and colloquial references when dealing with high 
status members of government. In order to avoid further conflicts, I apologised and altered 
the interview questions and invitation letter and then sent the letters to people of that 
country to check for suitability and respectfulness of the letter. Once I had their approval, I 
again recruited and interviewed participants from the government of that particular 
country.  
5.2 The research design 
The research involved four phases of data collection: Phase 1 was a pilot of the interview 




on social investment policy makers, whilst Phase 4 targeted government officials from two 
different countries.  
5.2.1 Population from which participants are drawn 
In Phase 1, participants were drawn from my own professional network of people who 
work with social investment in the O&G sector. In Phase 2, participants were O&G 
companies’ social investment experts/experts within and outside my professional network. 
In Phase 3, participants were experts who developed, provided consultation and guidance, 
and/or audited social investment for O&G companies.  
Participants in Phase 2 were asked during the research interview to define the guideline 
documents they used to inform their own social investment practices. For instance, if 
participants in Phase 2 stated that their actions in social investment were being shaped by a 
particular set of guidelines, then experts from the relevant institution that developed the 
guidelines were recruited in Phase 3. Participants from Phases 1, 2, and 3 are referred to as 
‘social investment experts’ in this research. The data collected through the interviews 
carried out in Phases 1, 2, and 3 were considered in this research to be ‘immediate data’ as 
the interviews provided empirical evidence that addressed the research questions 
(Mathison, 1988). 
In Phase 4, participants were drawn from governmental agencies involved in O&G policies 
in at least two different countries that possess different bodies of O&G legislation, with 
respect to social investment. Phase 4 participants are referred to in this research as 
‘government experts’. The information collected in Phase 4 was considered to be 
‘contextual data’ as it did not directly address the research questions (Mathison, 1988). 
However, it is through contextual data that I was able to ‘compare’ social investment 
experts’ narratives against the information derived from other contextual sources 
(government experts’ interviews and guidelines documents). The four phases provided rich 
data from a range of perspectives. Table 5.1 summarises the populations from which 






Table 5.1: The research phases and population from which participants are drawn 
Phase Population  
1  
(Pilot phase) 
The researcher’s professional network of people who work with social investment in the 
O&G sector  
2 O&G companies’ social investment experts/experts within and outside the researcher’s professional network 
3 Experts within and outside the O&G sector that work with the guideline documents mentioned by Phase 2 participants  
4 Government representatives in the fields of energy and resources  
 
5.2.2 Recruiting participants 
In this research, 80 people from 20 different countries were invited to participate. The 
countries were spread through South, Central and North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, 
and Oceania. Five people were invited to participate in Phase 1, 64 in Phase 2, five in 
Phase 3, and six in Phase 4.  
I mainly used LinkedIn as my recruitment tool as it is an online business-oriented social 
networking service. I began the recruitment process firstly by creating an online LinkedIn 
profile detailing my main work experiences and PhD research proposal, and included a 
professional photo (a headshot). With this LinkedIn profile, I recruited participants 
confidentially via private messages (a form of online chat forum with your professional 
network), or LinkedIn private InMail (a paid service where you can interact with 
professionals who are within your network spectrum, but are not connections).  
In the LinkedIn recruitment message/InMail body message I (1) introduced myself, (2) 
listed the research objectives, (3) explained that no harm would come to anyone declining 
to participate, (4) guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity, and (5) invited the 
participants to take part in an interview by Skype or telephone call. Through this process I 
aimed to establish an initial rapport with the participants by sharing with them my 
professional background in the O&G industry.  
When I positioned myself as an O&G ‘expert’ in the recruitment message, I was aware of 




(Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 655). For instance, interviewers that are considered insiders are 
more likely to understand the complexity and the nuances of the language and phenomena 
under investigation (Zavella, 1993). At face value, insiders may also have an easier time 
gaining access to a community similar to their own. However, the disadvantage of being 
considered an insider by the participants is that it may create ethical dilemmas on the basis 
of researchers’ institutional positioning and political sympathies (Zavella, 1993). This 
means that as a researcher, I would have to constantly negotiate my status as a member of 
the community and my assumptions about social investment. In addition, insider 
researchers often feel constrained by being accountable to the community they are 
researching, carrying the implicit responsibility to construct an analysis that sympathises 
with the group’s interests (Zavella, 1993). To address this issue, I adopted practices of 
reflexivity. For example, I kept field notes and shared research experiences and 
impressions with other PhD candidates and my supervisors, so as to critically analyse my 
position as an insider researcher. I explore reflexivity in more detail below. 
5.2.3 Period of recruitment 
The process of recruitment lasted from April 2015 to June 2016, although I conducted one 
interview in January 2017. Within the recruitment period, 46 people showed interest in this 
research, however only 20 actually participated. Some people expressed their appreciation 
for having been invited to participate, but declined their contribution either because they 
felt they did not have enough experience in social investment, or because they had been 
away from the field for too long. Other participants showed an interest in participating in 
initial LinkedIn message /InMail conversations, but would not set a date or share their 
Skype or telephone contact details. With these participants, I sent up to three follow up 
LinkedIn messages/InMails, whilst the participants who did not reply at all simply 
received the initial recruitment message and one follow-up email.  
5.2.4 The research participants 
A total of 20 participants from 11 different countries took part in this research. Three 
participants were involved during Phase 1, 12 during Phase 2, two during Phase 3, and 
three during Phase 4. Participants’ countries were based in the following continents: 




provides a summary of the research participants’ involvement phase, number, codename, 
and relevant inclusion and exclusion criteria. For anonymity purposes, the countries and/or 
continents of each participant are not included in the table.  
Table 5.2: The research phases and participants 
Phases Number of participants 
Participant 
codenames Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
1 
(Pilot phase)  
3 P19, P18, P16 
Within the researcher’s professional 
network. Participants had to have more 
than three years of work experience in 
O&G social investment  
2 12 
P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, 
P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, 
P11, P12 
More than three years of work experience 
on O&G social investment 
3 2 P20, P15 
More than three years working for an 
organisation developing one of the 
guidelines mentioned by Phase 2 
participants 
4 3 P13, P14, P17 Government representatives in the fields of energy and resources  
 
Participants in Phase 1 piloted the research interviews and provided research advice (such 
as research topic, recruitment and the research questions) before wider data collection 
commenced. The criteria for selecting Phase 1 participants were that they had more than 
three years of experience working in social investment in the O&G sector. Three 
participants took part in this phase. Phase 1 participants’ discursive understandings and 
practices of social investment were included in the analysis phase.  
Phase 2 focused on O&G social investment experts, with twelve participants taking part 
who had worked in O&G social investment for three years or more. Phase 2 participants 
were either O&G companies’ employees or employees of third-party contractors of O&G 
companies, and their roles ranged from experts to consultants/advisors of social 
investment.    
Two participants took part in Phase 3 who had worked with at least one of the guideline 
documents mentioned by Phase 2 participants, for a minimum of three years. Phase 3 
participants’ roles entailed developing and/or updating the guidelines and providing advice 




Phase 4 involved O&G government officials from two different countries. Three 
participants took part: two government representatives from one country whose O&G 
legislation does not contemplate social investment as a condition for an operational 
license, and one from a country that legislates for social investment as a condition for a 
license to operate. All government representatives that were interviewed worked in the 
field of energy and resources.  
5.3 Conducting the interviews 
In order to understand how my participants made sense of social investment, I conducted 
in-depth conversational interviews. These allow for a dynamic exchange of ideas based on 
pre-structured, open-ended questions (Trainor & Graue, 2013). I adopted digital 
technology (Skype) to collect data based on the following reasons: (1) it reduced travel 
costs, (2) addressed time differences between countries, and (3) increased flexibility for 
the interviewee and interviewer (Hanna, 2012; Hooley, Wellens, & Marriott, 2012). The 
disadvantage of using digital technology for interviewing participants was the impersonal 
approach between the researcher and participant, when compared to face-to-face forms of 
research interviewing.  
Although I tried to establish rapport with the O&G people through the language I used in 
emails, my tone of voice in Skype and telephone calls, and via interview questions 
(DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006), the use of digital technologies might have hindered 
further rapport with participants. According to Fontana and Frey (2000) a good rapport is 
vital for recruitment as it entails trust and respect for the interviewee and of the 
information shared (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). Rapport is also established when 
interviewees feel they are in a safe and comfortable environment where they can share 
personal experiences (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). In my research, a more personal 
approach to data collection could have, (1) increased the number of research participants, 
and (2) made interviewees feel more comfortable during interviews. Further, during the 
interview phase, one-on-one interaction with the research participants could also have (3) 
provided access to further cues through attention to the participants’ body language, and 
how this reinforced or contradicted participants’ verbal language (Fairclough, 2001, 2013; 




Participants were interviewed in different languages, including languages that were not 
their first language. In order to guarantee anonymity, the languages participants used in the 
interviews are not identified. This decision has not affected the analysis of my findings 
because discourses were analysed based on discursive constructions (as elaborated in 
section 5.3.3), rather than on the organisation of text, morphology and syntax (Fairclough, 
1992). 
The Phase 1 open-ended interviews ranged from 30 minutes to one hour and revolved 
around a series of questions that explored the participants’ perceptions of social investment 
in O&G sector, and the research design, and elicited their recommendations for the 
research design, research field, and recruitment process (for recommendations from P16, 
P18 and P19, see Appendix F). 
Participants in Phases 2, 3, and 4 participants took part in semi-structured interviews 
(Appendix C and D) and questions were made available to all participants before the 
interviews took place. Each interview lasted for approximately 40 minutes (with few 
exceptions) and were audio-recorded (with two exceptions) and transcribed. One Phase 1 
interview was not audio-recorded but notes were taken.  
After each interview, I took fieldnotes of my perceptions of how the interview went my 
fieldnotes added a reflective data to each interview transcript that allowed me to 
contextualise some of the participants’ (non) responses and interactions. Each interview 
was unique, although I followed a similar sequence of interview questions. The way I 
participated in the interviews - through making comments and expressing personal views - 
changed over time from April 2015 to January 2017, as demonstrated in my following 
fieldnote examples.  
The following excerpt from my fieldnote reflection from the first interview in April 2015 
(Phase 2) indicates how I perceived one participant’s response as being influenced by my 
positioning during the interview. 
The interview happened in a great atmosphere. P1 was very comfortable about sharing his/her 
ideas and impressions. Nonetheless, I was a bit nervous and I frequently interrupted him/her to 
talk about my own experience. My positioning annoyed me because I had the feeling that I 




However, a reflection from an interview conducted in February 2016 indicated a shift in 
my way of conducting the research interviews. 
Today I felt terrible! The interview wasn’t so great! I felt that I did not make P5 comfortable 
during the interview. I was trying to be quieter and I think I was just too quiet. He/she just 
wasn’t at ease and the interview didn’t flow… 
By January 2017, my approach was more relaxed, which seemed to make the interviews 
flowed more effectively. Here is another excerpt from my fieldnotes. 
Today I felt more confident about not relying on the interview questions, and the interview 
resembled a friendly, but deep conversation. After the interview was finished, I checked the 
audio and my actual interview questions and I realised I had covered it all! Impressive! For 
future interviews, I will NOT read the questions, ever again! 
I am aware that my reflections do not necessarily reflect the participants’ perceptions and 
that writing about my interpretations of the interview without asking for my participants’ 
perception makes my interpretation partial (Nairn, Munro, & Smith, 2005). Nonetheless, 
my fieldnotes reveal the challenges of establishing rapport during the interviews and how 
this seemed to be affected when I was too silent or too talkative. Rapport did not 
necessarily depend on giving my personal views, rather it involved making the participant 
as comfortable as possible by acknowledging their participation and creating a sense of the 
value to their contributions (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). 
5.3.1 Transcribing the interviews 
I transcribed all but two of the interviews myself. Two interviews were transcribed by a 
professional transcriber. Transcribing is a powerful act of representation (Oliver, Serovich, 
& Mason, 2005), and by transcribing the interviews I had conducted, I revived the 
interviews and was able to interpret the significance of pauses, silence, and laughter, as 
well as what was said. By the end of the interview transcription phase, I had memorised 
big segments of interviews and the authorship of each segment. This made the process of 
data analysis less complicated. 
While transcribing, I attempted to reproduce the transcript as accurately as I possibly 
could.  Nonetheless, I was aware that even the most accurate transcript is far from neutral 




Oliver et al. (2005), some of the transcription conventions recreate problems of 
representation in the transcript, such as the conventions representing interactions. For 
instance, despite various transcription convention, features of people’s voice tone, and 
body language are still missed and this may hinder readers’ deeper understanding of 
representation of interviews (Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  
I opted to focus on the participants’ narratives as a whole, rather than transcribing every 
second-to-second sequence of recorded data, thus pauses of five seconds or longer and 
laughter were added to the transcript. Silence may represent an important aspect of social 
practice , although it is repeatedly neglected and frequently linked to interviewees’ non-
participation (Zembylas & Vrasidas, 2007), as what is said tends to be privileged, rather 
than what is not said (Nairn et al., 2005). Analysing both dimensions of an interview (what 
is said and unsaid) may provide important information about the power relations between 
the researcher and the participants, and/or their levels of comfort in discussing different 
topics (Nairn et al., 2005).  
Laughter is also often overlooked in qualitative research (Grønnerød, 2004). Laughter may 
provide information about the relationship between interviewer and interviewee and the 
subtle changes of subject positioning during an interview (Grønnerød, 2004). Among 
many factors, laughter may reveal resistance to a topic, and/or accommodation of 
nervousness or stress (Grønnerød, 2004). 
The transcribed interviews were offered to all participants, who were free to change, 
delete, or add information in their interview transcript. Some of the participants made 
changes to the transcripts. These were mostly deletions of classified or repeated 
information and grammatical corrections.  
5.3.2 Selecting the guideline documents 
Two social investment guidelines documents were selected for analysis as they were 
documents that participants drew on to guide their social investment practices. A few 
participants named particular institutions - instead of guidelines documents - as a source of 
guidance. For example, one participant named a particular country’s regulatory institution 




practices. S/he explained that although the institution did not directly refer to a specific 
document, it provided workshops and seminars that guided company social investment 
practices. Table 5.3 provides a list of all the documents and institutions that experts 
referred to as guidelines. Table 5.3 also specifies the number of participants who chose 
each of the identified documents. Some participants chose more than one document to 
support their social investment practices. 
Table 5.3: Documents that guide O&G social investment practices 
                                                
10 Institution, foundations, and companies group (translated) 
11 GIFE Governance Indicators (translated) 
Guideline developer/ Institution Guideline Documents/Institutions Number of Participants 
International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) 
IFC Performance Standards on 
Environmental and Social 
Sustainability 
7 
The World Bank 
(World Bank Group) Community Driven Development 7 
Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) GRI 2 
Ethos Ethos Principles 2 
Host Countries Local Legislation 2 
The Global Oil and Gas 
Association for Environmental 
and Social Issues 
(IPIECA) 
IPIECA - Guide to Successful 
Sustainable Social Investment 2 
Anglo American Rural Planning and Appraisal 2 
Global Compact 
(GC) GC 1 
Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) O&G Sector Supplement 1 
Grupo de Institutos Fundações e 
Empresas10 
(GIFE) 
Indicadores GIFE de Governança11  1 
Instituto Brasileiro de Petróleo 
(IBP) IBP 1 
International Bank for 
Reconstitution and Development  
(IBRD) 
IBRD 1 
Harvard Business Institute Harvard Business Institute 1 
Chevron M4P - Making Market Work for the Poor 1 
Social Accountability 
International Accountability SA 8000 1 
Equator Principles Equator Principles 1 
The Society of Petroleum 
Engineers The Society of Petroleum Engineers 1 
International Council on Mining 







As Table 5.3 indicates, the most frequently adopted documents were the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability and the World Bank Group’s Community-Driven Development Principles. 
In this research, I refer to these documents as The Performance Standards and The 
Community-Driven Principles, respectively. In Chapter 7, I present an in-depth analysis of 
these two documents. 
5.3.3 Analysing the interview transcripts and social investment guidelines 
In this research, I initially adopted a general inductive approach to data analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Inductive analysis is a detailed reading and re-reading of the data in order to 
identify recurring concepts and themes (Thomas, 2006). In other words, it is the process of 
organising the data so that it is not constrained by a specific coding frame or analytic 
preconception (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Although I adopt an inductive approach to 
organise my data, I am aware that I cannot free myself from my own theoretical and 
epistemological positioning and that data is not coded “in an epistemological vacuum” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84). I therefore recognise that in many cases I ‘foreshadowed’ 
some of the thematic organisation that emerged from the analysis of transcripts and 
guideline documents. Because my research questions focussed on identifying the 
discourses embedded in social investment experts’ narratives, I initially looked for the 
themes that emerged from participants’ talk of social investment when analysing data. 
Themes such as ‘top-down’, ‘social compensation’, ‘license-based’, and ‘participatory 
approaches’ were preliminary themes that emerged from the initial analysis which 
informed my identification of the four broader discourses of social investment which I 
elaborate on in Chapter 6. 
The process of inductive coding entails a close reading of the documents in a search for the 
multiple meanings that are embedded (Thomas, 2006). Meaningful units, or the discursive 
formations (Willig, 2001, 2013) of the text provides the conditions “for reflections and 
elaboration of specific discourses which thereby host the statements which construct the 




While I acknowledge the material conditions and impacts of O&G operations (for example 
see Sims-Schouten et al., 2007), my focus in this thesis is on how social investment is 
discursively constructed by social investment experts and guidelines.  I therefore adopted a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis informed by Willig's (2001) approach, which enabled me 
to analyse the multiple underlying discourses embedded in social investment guidelines 
and social investment experts’ responses. According to Willig (2001), Foucauldian 
discourse analysis pays particular attention to the relationship between discourses and 
institutions. In this way, discourses are not simply framed as ways of writing or speaking, 
but as institutional practices. Institutional practices, in turn, organise, regulate, and manage 
social life (Willig, 2001, 2013). 
My analysis of the discourses in the interviews and guideline documents was based on 
Willig’s (2001) six stages for analysing discourse. The first stage, entitled ‘discursive 
constructions’ entails the identification of the ways a discursive object is constituted in the 
text. A discursive object is mainly constructed by “shared meaning, rather than lexical 
comparability” (Willig, 2001, p. 115). Willig (2001) states that, although a discursive 
object may not be lexically referred to in the text, it may still be constructed within the 
text. For example, participant P9 never referred to social investment as a form of bribery in 
their interview, however, the way s/he talked about social investment, as in - “… several 
projects sometimes use social investment like a tool, ok? For compensation strategy or to 
give, or to influence leaders ok?” (P9) - still constructed social investment as a bribery, 
revealing bribery as a discursive object.  
Examples of discursive objects in my research included: (1) social investment in the O&G 
sector, (2) discourses of social investment, and (3) experts’ recommendations for particular 
social investment practices. These discursive objects were related to my research 
questions. My first research question (which discourses do O&G social investment 
personnel draw on to talk about social investment?) linked to the first discursive object: 
social investment in the O&G sector. My second research question (how are the discourses 
adopted by the O&G participants being reproduced in the social investment guideline 
documents?) linked to another discursive object: discourses of social investment. My third 
and fourth research questions (what are the experts’ recommendations for future O&G 




future O&G social investment?) linked to experts’ recommendations for particular social 
investment practices.  
The second phase, entitled ‘discourses’, unpacks the different ways a discursive object is 
constructed within wider discourses (Willig (2001). For instance, when analysing the 
discursive object ‘social investment’ in Chapter 6, I analysed how broader discourses of 
social investment shaped the different discursive constructions of social investment.  
The third phase, the ‘action orientation phase’, is when the analyst investigates how 
different constructions of the object are deployed (Willig, 2001). One example of the third 
phase can be seen in Chapter 7, when I further my analysis of the different constructions of 
social investment that emerged in the guideline documents. 
The fourth phase, the ‘positioning’ phase, analyses the subject positions that a discursive 
object offers. I analyse the different subject positioning of social investment experts in all 
my finding chapters, Chapters 6, 7, and 8. In these chapters, I consider the multiple subject 
positions and power relations inherent in social investment discourses and practices. 
The fifth phase is entitled ‘practice’. This stage focuses on the relationship between 
discourse and practice. One example of the fifth phase can be seen when I analyse experts’ 
recommendations. In Chapter 8, I unpack the different ways participants’ 
recommendations shaped different practices of social investment.  
The sixth phase, called ‘subjectivity’, refers to the analysis of the relationship between 
discourse and subjectivity. This stage traces the effects of the different and multiple 
subject positions that emerge in participants’ accounts and whether these subject positions 
open up or close down opportunities for action (Willig, 2001). I engage in Phase six where 
I consider how participants discussed alternative constructions of social investment (in 
Chapter 6, 7, and 8).  
The guidelines and interviews were also investigated via a process of crystallisation. 
Crystallisation is a technique that provided me with a more holistic view of the research 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Flick, 2009; Hemming, 2008). According to Denzin and Lincoln 
(2011), the metaphor of qualitative research is the crystal - and not the triangle. This is 




only three dimensions. It is, therefore, through the process of crystallisation that I explored 
the multiple dimensions that emerged from analysis of the relationship between from 
different discursive understandings and practices of social investment. In this research, 
crystallisation occurred through the analysis of contextual data (Government experts’ 
interviews and the selected guideline documents), which were filtered through knowledge 
gleaned from social investment experts’ interviews (Mathison, 1988). 
5.4 The research field – Reflexive accounts 
From a poststructuralist perspective, people are embedded in discourses; these people 
include the researcher and the research participants (Grant & Giddings, 2002). I adopted 
practices of reflexivity in order “to better represent, legitimize, or call into question [my] 
data” (Pillow, 2003, p. 297). Reflexivity signposts the researcher’s ‘bias’ in relation to the 
object of research as a result of their individual subjectivity and life experience (Haraway, 
1988). Ideally, reflexivity focuses on the researcher’s epistemological and ontological 
viewpoints and the research outcomes (Pillow, 2010). Although reflexivity permeates all 
phases of the research (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004) it is not a process adopted by all 
qualitative researchers (D’Cruz, Gillingham, & Melendez, 2007).  
According to Pillow (2010, p. 271; also see Pillow, 2003) reflexivity should entail the 
process of uncovering and challenging researchers’ taken-for-granted viewpoints. In 
Pillow’s (2003; 2010) terms, researchers should ‘map’ their understandings and attitudes 
throughout the research process. By doing so, a resource that researchers can reflexively 
draw on is created. There are three main practices of reflexivity that researchers can adopt, 
which are (1) keeping a research log, (2) writing field notes, and (3) journaling (Lincoln, 
Lynham, & Guba, 2011; Miles & Huberman, 1984; Miles et al., 2013; Pillow, 2010). 
I engaged in the three practices of reflexivity by taking notes on my own positioning in 
relation to the data collection and analysis phases. I also documented my research process 
and progress from when I applied to the UO ethics committee to when I wrote my 
concluding paragraph in Chapter 9. I also kept a research journal that I constantly 
consulted to make my research decisions. Revisiting these notes allowed me to question 




from my emotions and values, or from an empirical consideration of the participants’ 
narratives and the guideline documents.  
In this research, I adopt ‘reflexivity’ in relation to my position as someone who has 
worked with O&G social investment and who now researches social investment in the 
O&G sector. My intentions of recounting my journey as a social investment expert were 
not to use this platform as a confessional tale, where I endlessly reflect upon my own 
experiences (Pillow, 2003). Rather, my intention is to provide an account that will reassure 
the reader that my findings are systematically contaminated and that “this contamination 
with my own lived experiences results in rich and complex understanding” (Pillow, 2003, 
p. 183) of how experts experience O&G social investment.  
This reflexive exercise also aims to raise awareness of what is influencing my ontological 
and epistemological beliefs in relation to social investment, and how these beliefs led me 
to adopt a critical theoretical approach, as outlined in Chapter 4. This reflexive exercise 
also increased my awareness of what was influencing my methodological decisions as a 
researcher (Dowling, 2006). By unpacking my own processes of decision-making in this 
research, I am also examining the political constructions that inform this research 
(Dowling, 2006). In other words, when I identify myself with my research participants and 
topic, I am constantly aware of how my values and perceptions are impacting the research 
process which allows for a more in depth understanding of my interpretations (Cohen, 
Manion, & Morrison, 2013; Dowling, 2006; Pillow, 2003, 2010).  
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I outlined my qualitative research design and methods, described the 
formal ethical procedures, and summarised the main ethical dilemmas I encountered in the 
process of conducting this research. I then outlined the qualitative data collection methods 
used, including my strategies for recruitment, how I conducted, transcribed, and analysed 
the interviews; and selected and analysed the guideline documents. 
In this chapter, I attempted to provide a careful and accurate description of my research 
methodology to provide a basis for theory building that informs policy and practices 




The three following chapters describe my research ‘findings’. In Chapter 6, I consider 
participants’ understandings of social investment. I pay particular attention to the main 
discourses social investment experts drew on in their accounts. In Chapter 7, I explore the 
discourses the participants drew on when discussing social investment, and relate these to 
the guideline documents. In Chapter 8, I examine the participants’ recommendations for 
social investment practices, and how these relate to the discourses of social investment 




Chapter 6:  Social Investment Discourses in 
Participants’ Interviews 
In this chapter, I aim to address research question one - which discourses do O&G social 
investment personnel draw on to talk about social investment? - through unpacking the 
main discourses social investment experts drew on to talk about O&G social investment. I 
acknowledge that for some in the O&G field, the discourses that I discuss in this research 
may seem too specific or idiosyncratic in relation to broader discourses of social 
responsibility in the O&G sector. Others may perceive the identified discourses as a 
critique of the industry’s approach. My aim is to examine the myriad discourses operating 
in the interviewees’ narratives when they discussed O&G social investment.  
Notably, discourses of social investment may be internalised and unacknowledged by 
many in the industry. As a result, my analysis of discourses of social investment may be 
read by some as a critique of the O&G industry (as discussed in Chapter 5). I am currently 
outside the industry and therefore not personally constrained by institutional discourses or 
expectations of key stakeholders in the O&G sector12. At the same time, many of my 
participants considered me an ‘insider’ when they shared their experiences and 
understandings of social investment. Therefore, as an insider-outsider researcher, in this 
chapter I work to maintain a reflexive approach to detach myself in order to provide 
careful but less partial analysis. 
In my research, O&G and government participants drew on four dominant discourses 
when they talked about O&G social investment. I describe these discourses as working on, 
working around, working for, and working with discourses of social investment. In their 
use of working on discourses of social investment participants described company-centred 
and top-down understandings of social investment. Working around discourses emerged in 
participants’ accounts of social investments developed to serve O&G operational interests. 
Working for discourses were evident in participants’ discussion of social investment 
                                                
12	Other factors that lead me to carry out in-depth and critical analyses of my research data derive from the critical 




designed to meet the host government’s social-economic agenda. In drawing on working 
with discourses, participants constructed social investment practices that were community-
centred and participatory.  
In this chapter, I argue that O&G social investment is most effective in assisting host 
communities if framed in relation to working with discourses. Nevertheless, in social 
investment experts’ narratives, working with communities was not a simple or linear 
process. Rather, it required hard work and long-lasting partnerships based on the 
establishment of trusting relationships between the company, local communities, local 
civil society groups, NGOs, and host governments. 
When discussing social investment, some O&G participants drew on one discourse, while 
others drew on multiple discourses, sometimes in apparently contradictory ways. However, 
in this chapter, for analytic purposes, I focus on each discourse separately. What follows is 
an overview of how the four discourses emerged in my research interviews. While 
describing each of the discourses and how they appeared, I also discuss the contradictions 
that emerged in the participants’ narratives. I begin with working on discourses. 
6.1 Working on discourses 
Working on discourses appeared in all of the interviews. Participants drew on working on 
discourses of social investment when they talked about social projects where power 






Figure 6.1: Working on discourses of social investment 
As Figure 6.1 illustrates, social investment based on working on discourses was company-
centred. This means that working on social investment focussed on meeting the best 
interests of O&G companies. Social investment grounded in working on discourses sought 
(in the words of many of my participants) to enhance the company’s brand reputation and 
‘bribe’ communities and governments. According to my participants, examples of this 
form of social investment included one-off donations of a particular good (such as a power 
generator) and money and gifts-in-kind to a particular political party.  
Figure 6.1 also indicates that social investment based on working on discourses was non-
participatory. The O&G company retained full control of the selection and implementation 
of the social investment programme. In contrast, communities and governments had no 
part in deciding or shaping the social programmes, which restricted community and 
government agency. Communities and the government were only the recipients of the 
‘benefits’ of O&G social investment, not partners in decision making. 
Additionally, working on social investment did not comply with a code of ethics (see 
Figure 6.1). Rather, companies could be seen as harming the host society by increasing 
communities and government’s dependency upon the resources provided, which creates 




also been historically constructed in negative moralistic ways according to Ferguson 
(2013, 2015). In this thesis, it is not my intention to make a moralistic claim against 
dependency when unpacking broader discourses of social investment. I do acknowledge, 
however, that the notion of dependency often reflects hierarchical relations of power, 
which impact communities when O&G social investment is introduced. Nevertheless, I am 
aware that companies may rhetorically use fears of dependency to justify avoiding fully 
committing to a corporate-community relationship according to community expectations 
(Ferguson 2013, 2015). 
The following examples illustrate how participants drew on working on discourses when 
discussing social investment, while critiquing top-down approaches to social investment. 
Participants’ narratives revealed considerable opposition to social investment framed as 
working on communities. The following excerpt from a social investment expert’s 
interview discussion illustrates such resistance:  
There is one [type of social investment] that is actually a form of bribery, because it is the 
easiest way to do, right? This is when companies unfortunately use donations, such as building 
a soccer field, or a school […] This has happened in [names country] where a company built a 
library and five years later, when I went back to the country, I went to see the library and the 
roof was missing and the windows had been stolen and that is basically because the 
community had never assimilated [the library]. This was a gift, which was idealised by the 
company, but it was never seen as a real necessity [by the community]. They [the community] 
never valued it (P11, translated).  
Another social investment expert echoed similar views: “I think that many companies see 
SI [Social Investment] as a charitable donation and that is a completely wrong approach. It 
raises expectations of communities and also leads to no outcome” (P3). 
Social investment based on charity and one-off donations increases communities and 
government’s dependency, which is likely to harm society (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Ite, 
2004, 2005). The quotes above reveal participants’ reservations regarding social 
investment in the form of one-off, top-down gift giving. Although participants, such as 
P11 and P3, expressed explicit disapproval of social investment conceptualised in terms of 
working on communities, contradictions also emerged when they drew on working on 




narratives, two social investment experts talked about social investment programmes that 
they had found rewarding: “In about two or three weeks that we spent in the area it was 
like God came down to save the people” (P4);  
If I had to categorise them, to me those are like the best types of social investment because you 
are really investing in humans, human beings. You know you are giving them, giving an 
individual knowledge, a skill, a trade (P10). 
In both excerpts, the participants clearly intended to ‘do good’ and to assist local 
communities. However, apparently, they had not followed any specific ethics codes to 
verify the impact generated by the social investment. Further, the participants’ accounts 
revealed that power was not exercised bilaterally. Rather, the participants positioned 
companies as like “God” (P4), and as keepers of “knowledge, a skill and a trade” (P10). In 
doing so, these participants positioned the company as agents of ‘development’. In other 
words, in the excerpt above, the participants’ companies were positioned as superior 
entities that knew best. 
Within working on discourses, power is operating in a dialectical relationship between 
companies and communities, where the company can be seen as occupying an ‘oppressive’ 
role, in Freirean terms (Freire, 2005; Freire & Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973). In 
my research, the interviewees both critiqued working on discourses in relation to O&G 
social investment, and took up such discourses when discussing O&G social investment.  
Working on discourses purport to be ‘doing good’ while maintaining hierarchical power 
relations with the host community. As discussed in Chapter 4, social investment within 
such relations of power can be seen as involving acts of ‘false generosity’. Powerful 
groups, such as O&G companies, have vested interests in maintaining power (Macdonald 
et al., 2002) and “cannot find in this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or 
themselves” (Freire & Mellado, 1973, p. 21) from the relationship. The term ‘false 
generosity’ (Freire & Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973) refers to the conscious or 
unconscious efforts of powerful groups to provide other groups with the impression of a 
beneficial relationship. 
Framing a company as superior to the host community (and the host government) could be 




host-society relationship. Such an imbalance could then be further explored and 
strategically used so that social investment becomes a mechanism of domination and 
control (Davis, 1973; Fleming et al., 2013). Where social investment is grounded in 
working on discourses, companies may discursively and materially construct social 
investment as a way to obtain business advantage. 
In the excerpts included above, participants either referred to top-down, company-centred 
social investment with disapproval (as illustrated by P11 and P3), or unintentionally (as 
illustrated by P4 and P10). However, one interviewee talked openly about social 
investment that involved a top-down and company-centred approach, irrespective of any 
ethical considerations. When I asked how s/he understood social investment, P9 replied: 
Because in fact when I walk into several projects sometimes they use social investment like a 
tool, ok? For compensation strategy or to give, or to influence leaders ok? So, in fact that is 
what the objective of social investment. Do you understand me? (P9, social investment expert).  
Here, P9 noted that some social investment was used as a tool to ultimately influence 
leaders. Implicit in their comments is an acknowledgement that social investment 
constructed in terms of working on discourses did not address the best interests of the host 
community. Rather, they positioned working on social investment as a form of bribery. 
Fleming et al. (2013) note that the use of such forms of social investment fuels a profound 
cynicism in relation to social investment ideals and the activities of large enterprises. 
Instead of supporting communities, corporations use social investment as an instrument of 
control and exploitation in the name of profit (Davis, 1973; Fleming et al., 2013). 
However, the majority of my interviewees revealed an awareness of the risks of ‘top 
down’ (working on) social investment, and positioned themselves in opposition to this type 
of social investment, particularly where used as a substitute for the government. For 
example, one interviewee said, “You have to explain that the company is not here to 
undertake the responsibility of the government” (P1 social investment expert), apparently 
debating his/her position in this regard.  
On the other hand, later on in the interview, P1 acknowledged that the company could take 
some of the government’s responsibility if the government did not have the means to 




The situation is very tough and because of the financial crisis and I am very worried that these 
people [in the local community] will be the most affected by the crisis because of … the 
government, who won’t be able to fight for or support them. So, at the end of the day I am 
happy to help in this situation (P1, social investment expert). 
Although P1 understood that the company was not there to perform the role of the 
government, s/he saw value in the company supporting the community if the government 
was unable or unwilling to do so. 
Another interviewee expressed concerns about governments not being able to fulfil their 
roles in host societies. P4 suggested that O&G companies had an important role to play 
where government was weak:  
They [social investments] are found in areas where governments and governors are very weak 
all over the world. Just check it from South Africa to far away Russia, Sakhalin to Kazakhstan, 
you know all those places all around the world, where you have big oil reserves nowadays they 
are countries that there is weak government, there is weak public infrastructure. And there is 
corruption and there are a lot of problems and it becomes very very important for the O&G to 
able to contribute to the development of the local communities around where they operate. 
Even if they may not be able to develop the whole country (P4, social investment expert). 
P1 and P4’s narratives suggest genuine concern for the host community in cases where 
government fails to assist them. P1 considered social investment as a way of 
supplementing a government’s provision in delivering social goods. Working on 
discourses tended to justify O&G company activities in terms of government failure, but at 
the same time, those who spoke in this way also highlighted their concerns about O&G 
companies performing the role of the government. Arguably, experts could have used an 
apparent lack of ‘good government’ as justification for social investment strategies that 
provided competitive advantage. However, in my research, some social investment experts 
described cases where top-down approaches involved performing the role of the 
government, but out of concern for communities, not as a strategy to obtain business 
advantage.   
O&G social investment that compensates for lack of government fosters the host 
community and government’s reliance on the O&G sector for their wellbeing, resulting in 
their - communities and governments’ - willingness to welcome O&G activities (Cash, 




themselves socially accountable for the host society, beyond the host government’s legal 
expectations, as a source of political empowerment. In this way, social investments created 
social dependency upon O&G provisions, which could threaten the division of power 
between public and private institutions (Davis, 1960, 1973; Garriga & Melé, 2004). 
Contradictions, however, surfaced when participants debated against and/or argued for 
social investment based on working on discourses. One example is when participants 
censured a top-down and company-centred approach at the same time that they portrayed 
themselves the keepers of ‘knowledge’ and ‘development’ when referring to social 
investment programmes they found rewarding. Other contradictions that emerged in 
participants’ use of working on discourses revealed alternative ways of thinking about 
social investment, for example, as working around, working for, and working with 
communities. I discuss working around discourses next. 
6.2 Working around discourses 
Participants drew on working around discourses of social investment when they discussed 
social projects that were company-centred. However, working around discourses of social 
investment differed from working on discourses because they referred to community 
participation in the social investment design. Where participants drew on working around 
discourses they acknowledged that communities could impede O&G operations, 
conferring communities power to interfere in O&G matters, such as the design and 
delivery of social investment programmes. In this vein, both actors (companies and 
communities) exercised agency and power in developing social investment (as Figure 6.2 
reveals). Social investment grounded in working around discourses was used to prevent or 
compensate operational impacts that harmed communities, so the power balance between 
the company and communities was lopsided, meaning that although there was a degree of 
power-sharing, communities still had limited participation in decision-making and the 






Figure 6.2: Working around discourses of social investment 
In my participants’ accounts, social investment constructed through working around 
discourses was framed by the company’s code of ethics and the host country’s legislation 
(see Figure 6.2). Yet, the government had no participation in the design and/or 
implementation of O&G social investment. The government’s role in this type of social 
programme was to ensure that the company and communities were ratifying the country’s 
legislation whilst implementing social investment. 
In my participants’ accounts, social investment constructed through working around 
discourses represented an instrument for impact/risk mitigation and/or compensation. 
Arguably, this approach to social investment makes O&G companies highly dependent 
upon the investment outcomes. This is because social investment shaped by working 
around discourses ideally establishes a social license to operate (as my analysis goes on to 
demonstrate). Communities are then moderately dependent upon the social investment 
resources, without which communities would not be able to avoid or mitigate the impacts 
generated by the O&G activity. In my study, examples of these forms of social investment 
were health programmes (such as HIV prevention programmes) and safety inductions for 
communities living near operational areas. The following analysis outlines participants’ 




In the interviews, four participants explicitly talked about social investment as a way of 
obtaining a social license to operate. The following quotes illustrate how the social license 
to operate appeared in participants’ accounts: “I think it’s [social investment’s] integral to 
what we call a social license to operate […]” (P5, social investment expert); “I think it is 
good and right that they [O&G companies] do something and that [it] has a community 
support and that it gives them, you know, social license in, local areas” (P14, Government 
expert); and, 
Well it’s optimum to say that [social investment] is part of the social license to operate, I 
mean, I am sure you heard that in your research [laughs]. But I see [it] as an integral part of 
doing business in an extractive industry (P10, social investment expert). 
In working around discourses, my participants established a direct parallel between social 
investment and a ‘social license to operate’. According to Gunningham, Kagan, and 
Thornton (2004), the social license to operate relates to voluntary activities companies 
develop to have host communities welcoming O&G operations within the direct and 
indirect area of influence (see Chapter 1). To do so, companies often use social investment 
as a way to meet their host society’s expectations and avoid community actions that could 
thwart operations. In this regard, when asked to clarify what s/he believed to be a social 
license to operate, P8 explained how companies may use social investment in a way that 
avoids conflict with the host community and consequently, financial losses:  
The social license to operate … some companies, in my view, develop [social investment] to 
avoid taking over a great amount of legal liability [for damage to the community], which could 
lead to interruptions in operations. I think it’s a lot to do with mitigating conflicts. These 
[social investments] are actions taken to avoid future problems that may impact the operations 
and consequently impact [the company’s] finance (P8, social investment expert, translated). 
Hence, P8 clearly constructed social investment as a preventive mechanism that mitigates 
legal costs. In P8’s segment, social investment mainly served the operational interests of 
the company. However, although as with working on discourses, working around 
discourses related to defending the interests of the company, working around discourses 
also constructed social investment as ideally benefitting the community, for example: 
So in our company social investment, we are doing social investment because it is part of our 
general business principles that we aim to be a good neighbour by continuously improving the 
way that we contribute directly or indirectly to the general wellbeing of the community. And 




social investments relates to a second aspect, which is about enhancing the benefits to local 
communities. So we are doing social investment because it is what we believe it is the right 
thing to do in the local communities we operate in (P7, social investment expert). 
Another social investment expert presented similar ideas: 
There is also [what I call] strategic investment, which is a way to make sure that the interests 
of the company are met at the same time that it generates local opportunities [for the 
community] in the long run (P11, translated). 
P7 and P11 talked about two elements of social investment: to look after the interests of 
the company and to benefit communities. Morrison (2014) asserts that, in order to gain a 
social license to operate, there should be “an equitable balance, or harmony, between 
different societal interests that allow a specific activity to continue and to thrive” 
(Morrison, 2014 p. 2). When talking about a social license, P7 and P11 also referred to 
social investment as an involving mutually beneficial relationship between companies and 
communities. 
However, the understanding that social investment should seek an operational license, 
whilst benefiting the community is contradictory. This is because obtaining social 
operational license through social investment is constructed by company-centred 
discourses (as Figure 6.2 illustrated), meaning that the operation license is the driver of the 
social investment programme. Company-centred concerns may not always align with 
community concern (as noted in Chapter 2). Consequently, within working around 
discourses, company-centeredness can constrain social investment’s capacity to benefit 
host communities.  
The ideal of achieving a balance between communities and businesses’ interests (see P7 
and P 11, and Morrison 2014) may not be realistic when you consider that O&G 
prospection and production activities impact host communities in the first place 
(Goodland, 2006; Norlen, 2005; Redford, 2006; Selverston-Scher, 2000). Arguably, there 
is a fundamental unbalance in the company-community relationship, which is likely to 
shape social investment programmes that aim to primarily benefit O&G companies. 
In my study, within working around discourses, the social license to operate also related to 




proportion of the company profits, thereby ‘benefitting’ communities. A couple of 
participants explain this below:  
Our business operations, or our business planning or just our way of operating has to involve 
giving something to a place where [we] are deriving profits and I think that even if we have 
our oil prices, you know, going down, and the problems that they [O&G companies] are facing 
now… it can be argued that companies still are the big ones, the larger ones are still for the 
most part profitable. I think it is just a central way of just doing business that you got to invest 
something in countries where you are coming to take something from (P10, social investment 
expert). 
P10 talked about benefiting the community through compensation. Compensation implies 
making up for someone’s loss and/or damage. A construction of social investment as 
compensation can be seen as an intention with a view of programmes aimed as benefiting 
communities, since company actions are associated with mitigating (compensating for) 
harm. Additionally, although not explicitly, P10’s narrative indicated a level of 
‘apprehension’ about companies taking the community’s natural resources and generating 
impacts through O&G operations without compensation, as in “you got to invest 
something in countries here you are coming to take something from” (P10 social 
investment expert). 
Similarly, working around discourses were also found in narratives that described social 
investment as a way to manage or mitigate the risks of O&G operations. Participant P3 
explained her/is role: “And so social investment was one of my key role[s]. [I had to] 
understand those risks and putting the right strategy for mitigation of risks as well as of 
execution of strategy” (P3, social investment expert). Another participant, also gave an 
example as to how social investment could be used to ‘cushion’ the impacts of O&G 
activities:  
Well some of them (social investments) are very important to cushion the effects of O&G 
operations. And I give you one quick example: when you go to an area, a community in a river 
in [names country], where the means of transportation is water… You do navigation on rivers 
for travel and trade. If you’ve been in O&G operations, then, you will have big vessels 
travelling the same narrow waterways with small community vessels. So we definitely have to 
do something around [a] marine safety campaign. But it [safety campaigning] also happens to 




P4 aligned social investment with safety procedures. While P4 talked about how O&G 
social investment could be used to mitigate the impacts of O&G activities, s/he also 
mentioned that such social investment was not a legal requirement: “We call it social 
investment because we recognise that some of the investment that you do to benefit the 
communities and the local area where we operate, some of them are voluntary, which is 
normal Corporate Social Responsibility” (P4, social investment expert). 
P4’s acknowledgement that some social investment was voluntary introduced another facet 
of working around discourses. Often social investment under working around discourses 
was developed through a voluntary scheme, where a company’s social investment goes 
beyond legislative compliance (Gunningham et al., 2004; Morrison, 2014). Participants’ 
quotes suggested that their concern with benefiting the community reflected: (1) 
acknowledgement of the dangers and impacts of O&G activities, and (2) how they did not 
entirely agree with some of the companies’ activities. Yet, as O&G company employees, 
participants were constrained by institutional discourses and practices within the broader 
O&G realm. In order to work ‘within/against’ dominant institutional discourses (Lather, 
2008), participants looked for alternative ways to deal with tensions between their own 
beliefs and company practices. For example, in the excerpts above, some participants saw 
social investment as a compensatory arrangement that allowed for their own ‘peace of 
mind’, regardless of a country’s legal requirements for O&G operations.  
Participants also challenged social investment used for legal compliance purposes. Some 
drew on working for discourses to speak about social investment developed in response to 
legal requirements. I turn to working for discourses now. 
6.3 Working for discourses 
Participants drew on working for discourses of social investment when they discussed 
social projects developed to meet a legal requirement. In this form of social investment, 
social programmes were used by the State to complement its development efforts. In this 
case, O&G companies had to develop social investment according to the government’s 
instructions and demands in order to secure an operational license. In this sense, power 





Figure 6.3: Working for discourses of social investment 
As Figure 6.3 illustrates, in my interviews, where participants drew on working for 
discourses, governments retained full control of the selection and design of social 
investment. In contrast, O&G companies and communities had no part in deciding or 
shaping the social programmes, which apparently restricted O&G companies and 
communities’ sense of control over the social investment programme.  
Arguably, social investment conceptualised under working for discourses tends to increase 
governments and communities’ levels of dependency upon O&G resources (see Figure 
6.3). Government depends on O&G social investments to address its’ developmental 
agenda and communities depends on O&G social investments to have access to basic 
social services provision. However, O&G companies are not dependent on the social 
investment resources and/or outcomes, which means that as long as O&G companies 
implement the social programme, a legal operational license is secured. In my study, the 




power lines in a specific region. The following analysis describes participants’ 
understandings of social investment constructed through working for discourses. 
Working for discourses positioned social investment as providing the host community with 
‘social goods’ in response to legal requirements. During an interview, P7 illustrated how 
his/her company had responded to both the government and local community’s demands:  
So we have to provide 8.5 million to the local government for social investment 
programmes… That was a condition of getting that particular permit… In addition to that, we 
do our own social investment, so up to the end of this year we will have spent 5 million, so we 
have to give 8.5 million to the local municipality and we also spent 5 million ourselves (P7, 
social investment expert). 
P7’s accounts of social investment as a means to obtain a particular permit were exclusive 
to the legislation of that specific host country. However, not all countries legislate for 
O&G social investment as part of providing operational permits, as noted by one 
government expert in my research: “But I think in general in [names country], at the 
government, the national government approach is not to force or compel companies to 
undertake social investment or particular, you know, development that is outside their 
corporate interest …” (P14). S/he explained that the reasons for his/hers country’s 
abstention from having social investment as an operational requirement: “Because we 
think [O&G companies] will do it [social investment] anyway … you know, it’s not only 
is it right, but it’s smart to get buy in and support from the communities” (P14). 
P14 indicated that the country s/he represented had no interest in compelling O&G 
companies to develop social investment. This could be due to this particular country 
implicitly expecting O&G companies to do it voluntarily, since it was “the smart and right 
thing to do” (P14). P14’s quote indicated in their country the government saw social 
investment as an additional, strategic mechanism that O&G companies used if they were 
smart enough to obtain community buy in. 
Working for discourses also revealed compulsory approaches to social investment. 
However, participants talked about a paradox between social investments designated 
‘voluntary’, yet still arbitrated by state-owned companies, based on the government’s 




response when s/he was asked about the level of government interference in social 
investment:  
What we have is not a legal compliance it is a voluntary compliance … this company, which is 
a big group of companies, they belong to the government, but to a lesser degree, so the 
government doesn’t so far influence a lot the decisions. But like I said, we are going to have 
the [names major sports event] in [names country].  So that is ok, if the government makes my 
task … to allocate some funds for these people [local athletes], [this] would make the country 
benefit from these people, from the image and everything (P1). 
Although P1 acknowledged that some social investment is ‘voluntary’ rather than a matter 
of compliance, s/he still had to respond to the government’s request. Other social 
investment experts also talked about compulsory versus voluntary social investment. For 
P2, social investment that was mandatory was not as rewarding as voluntary social 
investment, as s/he put it:  
Outside the [O&G] industry, I developed [social investment] actions... that were very 
rewarding. ... [names the institution] was an institution that derived from a private initiative 
and was totally voluntary. These experiences were very rewarding because we could, in fact, 
think and develop proposals that would impact people’s life significantly (P2, translated). 
P2 went on to define rewarding social investment as social investment where s/he could 
participate in the project’s planning and development stages. However, according to P2, 
mandatory (legally required) social investment does not allow much space for a 
participatory approach in designing the social programmes.  
An alternative view of social investment constructed it in terms of partnership between the 
company, government, communities, and other stakeholders13. All of the interview 
participants in my study constructed such an approach as the ideal approach to social 
investment. I discuss this below in terms of working with discourses. 
6.4 Working with discourses 
When participants talked about social investment based on working with discourses, they 
referred to their ideal understanding of social investment. Participants drew on working 
                                                
13	The meaning of ‘stakeholder’ in relation to O&G operations will vary according to the type of theoretical perspective 
on Corporate Social Responsibility a company adopts. However, a general understanding of stakeholder is “a group or 




with discourses of social investment when they talked about social projects to assist local 
communities within their own developmental efforts. Working with social investment was 
community-centred. The participants drew on working with discourses in reference to 
social investment where multiple actors, including local communities, O&G companies, 
NGOs, civic society organisations, and the government, took part in the decision-making, 
design, and implementation phases. Ideally, power was equally distributed and all actors 
exercised agency within the social investment programme (Figure 6.4). Participants talked 
about social investment within working with discourses as non-linear and complex, as 
depicted in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Working with discourses of social investment 
As Figure 6.4 illustrates, in the participants’ account, social investment constructed in 
relation to working with discourses was framed by the company’s code of ethics, the host 
country’s legislation, international principles of sustainable development, and human 
rights (see Figure 6.4). All actors had a role to play in guaranteeing the sustainability of 




As Figure 6.4 indicates, within working with discourses, O&G companies, communities, 
and governments have low levels of dependency upon the social investment outcomes and 
resources. This is because this form of social investment is not (1) tied to a social or legal 
license to operate; and it does not (2) represent a substitute for government provision. My 
participants gave examples of social investment based on working with discourses, such as 
initiatives that enhanced communities’ capacity to develop within their areas of expertise 
(for example in crop farming methods).  
The following analysis discusses how my participants drew on working with discourses 
when discussing social investment. Through their use of working with discourses, 
participants revealed that their ‘ideal’ forms of social investment were developed through a 
participatory approach where all parties were empowered and heard. When asked about 
whom should be involved in such an approach to social investment, P3 stated:  
I think that I am looking at both civil society groups as well as it could be many different 
multinationals, aid agencies, it could be financial institutions as the World Bank, IFC, IPIECA, 
or whoever is involved in this project. So, I think that I am looking at very much as broad 
sector, but if I narrow down, it might just mean, [the] focus would be government, civil society 
groups or community-based organisations where these organisations are established and then 
just O&G companies (P3, social investment expert). 
Working with discourses differed from working around discourses in that social 
investment was seen as ideally reflecting the community’s interests. Through their use of 
working with discourses, participants constructed a view that multiple stakeholders should 
be involved in designing and implementing social investment (such as the government, 
development agencies, and NGOs); and companies should engage in dialogue with a wide 
range of stakeholders and ensure that managerial decision-making is informed by such 
dialogue. When asked about ‘rewarding’ social investment, P10 mentioned the importance 
of having stakeholders fully engaging in developing social investment: 
What is required to make a good one [social investment] is real involvement from all sides, 
community participation, you know some volunteerism, … in addition to the money and the 
people that are paid to do it, but you know, it requires, like a community spirit to really 
undergird any project, to make it last, to make it acceptable, to make it sustainable.  So more of 
that is needed here and in most places I’ve worked, … it is still something that everyone 




P10 suggested that good social investment required genuine engagement from the 
company, the community, and the people being paid. Nonetheless, obtaining such 
engagement was not an easy process. For instance, P4 recounted some of the difficulties 
s/he felt when trying to shift the focus from a top-down company-oriented approach, to a 
participatory community-oriented approach:  
We move to the point where we get [the community] to participate in [the social investment 
process]… Um, so getting this simple process done is always very, very, challenging. Because 
the moment you say that there is an opportunity of a contract in your community, who is going 
to do this work for you, we will fund it, then one single team before becomes divided. 
Everyone wants to do the job and to have the contract done and score it. And in many times 
you create a lot of tensions in the communities. And we now have to start managing these 
tensions as well (P4, social investment expert). 
Although, participants drew on working with discourses to articulate their ‘ideal’ type of 
social investment, P4’s quote indicated that developing community-centred social 
investment is not simple. Although P4 attempted to develop a participatory approach to 
social investment, s/he still adopted working on discourses when discussing about how 
s/he approached the community. It is clear from their interview excerpt that social 
investment had already been designed prior to engaging with the community; the 
community would only implement it. P4 highlighted how developing working with 
discourses do not necessarily operate in isolation from other discourses of social 
investment and developing participatory social investment programmes is a complex 
undertaking.  
Another participant, P3, also described how complicated participatory approaches can be 
in practice: 
If O&G companies have [a] most beautiful social investment strategy, an effective execution 
of that strategy depends on number of different factors. There are still issues where companies 
just face up to a number of challenges, which are beyond their control and just would be 
beyond their responsibilities. So that is one issue: just clarity around role responsibilities. Who 
does what and what is the time frame. Secondly, I think it is to do with capability of partner 
organisations. And third is the sustainability of these projects so, many companies just come in 
and they set up very high level strategies, social investment strategies, and most of the time 
they miss the opportunity. We are all excited, we implement it and we do it with good will but 




creates a sense of instability… because it becomes a major challenge [to make social 
investment last] (P3, social investment expert). 
P3’s account indicated how complex it could be to work with companies in developing 
social investment. In addition, P3’s excerpt inferred how challenging it is to achieve 
meaningful social investment partnerships where multiple stakeholders are involved. P3 
highlighted how vital it was to have companies allocating the right expertise to each 
programme. P3 suggested one answer to the challenges P4 identified in taking up a 
working with approach to social investment, namely, that conflicts could have been 
lessened if decision-making processes were already established that allowed multiple 
stakeholders to work together to benefit the whole community.  
In my participants’ accounts, the level of O&G social investment success seemed to 
depend on its capacity to respect the particularities of specific host communities. Other 
researchers also emphasise the impact of listening to local communities, and also local 
civic organisations and/or NGOs about the best ways to design and develop social 
programmes locally (Baskin & Gordon, 2005; Hess et al., 2002; IPIECA, 2004, 2008; ISO, 
2010). How businesses should contribute to society depends on a nation’s culture, 
historical background, and business practices (Srisuphaolarn, 2013). Effective 
(participatory) O&G social investment in one country is likely to be different from O&G 
social investment in another country (Srisuphaolarn, 2013). The following segment of an 
interview illustrates this well: 
I still think there is a danger that, you know one size tends to fit all a little too much on the 
social investment side because countries are so different. I think there are a lot of similarities 
but you can’t just say, you know, we are working in Africa, this approach works the same in 
Congo as it does in Nigeria and so, there is a greater need I think to have more specific tailored 
guidelines that are even country or almost project type specific … It can be very frustrating, 
you know, … and a lot of experts will come and I try not to fall into this trap, you know, just, I 
know other people could call me on it, you know, come into a place to say, I am, you know, 
‘this is how we did it in Nigeria and it worked there so let’s use the same thing here’, you 
know, in [country where participant is based]. And [I] think that is the real recipe for disaster 
[laughs] (P10, social investment expert). 
P10 highlighted the potential for social investment programmes to fail when companies 
that tried to apply the same ‘participatory’ model to different contexts. P10’s comment that 




investment methodologies to different contexts are likely to be ineffective. Social 
investment based in attempts to reproduce the same model exemplifies ‘institutional 
isomorphism’, or to companies replicating what they perceive as the successful 
programmes of other companies in order to be competitive (Frynas, 2009a). This type of 
social investment is likely to fail to address the needs of the host community because the 
community, who best knows about their needs, is not consulted. Social investment will 
necessarily vary from place to place (Srisuphaolarn, 2013).   
Social investment constructed through working with discourses reflects the understanding 
that social investment should empower communities through a genuinely participatory 
approach. Such an approach requires partnership between civic organisations, government, 
local stakeholders, and the company. In addition to that, working with discourses reveal a 
concern with adapting to the local culture and dynamics of each community. 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have presented an analysis of the interviews with O&G social investment 
and government experts. I identified four dominant discourses which emerged in the 
interviews, describing these as working on, working around, working for, and working 
with discourses. Most participants’ accounts drew on all four discourses, revealing tensions 
and contradictions in the way they and their companies constructed and enacted social 
investment. Participants both took up, and resisted, working on discourses and suggested 
alternative ways of conceptualising social investment. Alternative conceptualisations were 
revealed through working around, working for, and working with discourses.  
According to my participants, O&G social investment is likely to be most effective in 
assisting host communities if framed in relation to working with discourses. This is 
because social investment that entailed a participatory approach involving collaboration 
between the government, community, company, and other stakeholders could better 
address the interests of the local community, empower all groups involved, and restore the 
social balance of power (Frynas, 2009a) .  
However, as evident in the participants’ narratives, working with communities was not 




partnership that went beyond the company and host community relationship. Such 
partnership was based on trusting relationships, and engagement between the company, 
local communities, local civic groups, NGOs, and local government.  
Although this study was small in size and scope, it usefully highlights the contradictory 
nature of O&G social investment, and the complex position of social investment 
personnel, particularly when their personal views are at odds with institutional policies and 
practices. The following chapter explores whether and in what ways the four discourses of 
social investment appeared in the main guideline documents adopted by social investment 
experts. Specifically, I investigate how the four discourses of social investment appeared 
in the guideline documents statements about their descriptions of social investment, and in 





Chapter 7:  Discourses of Social Investment in Guideline 
Documents 
In this chapter, I address research question two: how are the discourses adopted by the 
O&G participants reproduced in the social investment guideline documents? In my 
research interviews, participants reported that guideline documents were a source of 
information that helped shape their understandings of ideal practices in O&G social 
investment. In this chapter, I focus on the guideline documents social investment experts 
highlighted as those they most frequently drew upon to guide their O&G social investment 
implementation. 
In this chapter, I analyse the guideline documents in light of working with, working on, 
working around, and working for discourses highlighted in the previous chapter. 
Specifically, I investigate how these discourses appeared in the guidelines’ statements, 
descriptions, principles, and recommendations. In particular, I am interested in 
understanding whether participants’ complex discussions of social investment derived 
from these guideline documents, or in whether and what ways the guidelines seemed to 
shape experts’ narratives and O&G social investment practices.  
I first contextualise the documents and provide possible justifications for experts’ preferred 
guideline documents. I subsequently investigate how working with discourses were 
entangled with other discourses of social investment in the guideline documents. I 
conclude the chapter by arguing that the participants’ complex discussion and sometimes, 
contradictory, of O&G social investment was also reflected in the guidelines that they 
drew on in developing social investment policies and practices. 
7.1 Contextualising the guideline documents 
In my interviews with social investment experts, I asked them to identify the main 
documents that guided their social investment practices. The most frequently mentioned 
documents were the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards on 




Community-Driven Development Principles (WBG, 2002) (for the full list of the 
documents participants adopted to guide their social investment practices, see Chapter 5). 
In this chapter, I refer to these documents as the Performance Standards and the 
Community-Driven Principles, respectively. By briefly contextualising these widely 
adopted guideline documents (based on the social investment experts’ perspectives), I also 
provide possible justifications for the experts’ selection of the IFC Performance Standards 
and the Community-Driven Principles. 
Most participants chose the guidelines established by the World Bank Group over the 
guidelines developed by the O&G sector, such as the IPIECA Guide to Successful 
Sustainable Social Investment and/or the GRI O&G Sector Supplement, to guide their 
O&G social investment practices. Participants’ preference for the World Bank Group/IFC 
guidelines over other documents within the O&G sector may reveal experts’ involvement 
in projects subjected to the banks’ funding regulations. However, during the interviews - 
when participants named the banks’ documents - experts did not mention whether their 
companies had projects funded by the World Bank Group.  
Both the IFC Performance Standards and the World Bank Group Community-Driven 
Principles are documents produced by the World Bank Group14. The World Bank Group 
represents the major investor in O&G Upstream and Midstream projects worldwide (for 
more information on World Bank Group funding of O&G activities see Razavi, 1995). The 
World Bank Group’s funding of O&G activities is often justified by the claim that O&G 
exploration and production promotes local development of human resources (Pegg, 2006; 
Smith et al., 2012). O&G upstream and midstream activities require large-scale 
infrastructure and a large contingent of workers. Consequently, the direct impacts on 
nearby communities are usually unavoidable (for more details see Chapter 2). Funding 
institutions within the World Bank Group are certainly aware of the impacts of large-scale 
O&G projects (Smith et al., 2012). As co-funders, these banks also share responsibility for 
such impacts and have, therefore, provided safeguard policies to borrowing institutions, 
such as O&G companies. 
                                                
14	The World Bank Group is composed of five institutions: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for 




The IFC Performance Standards is one example of a safeguard-policy document. The 
Performance Standards comprise a framework for managing companies’ environmental 
and social risks while implementing potentially high impact projects within and outside the 
O&G sector (IFC website, n.d.). Companies funded by the IFC that do not comply with the 
Performance Standards may suffer IFC’s imposed penalties.  
The World Bank Group Community-Driven Principles, although not a safeguard policy 
document, was developed by the World Bank Group in partnership with the United 
Nations to encourage clients, such as O&G companies, to adopt poverty reduction 
principles. The Community-Driven Principles is the ninth chapter of the first volume of the 
Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies, published by the World Bank Group in 
2002. This sourcebook aims to provide a framework for programmes designed to tackle 
poverty in low-income countries (WBG, 2002). Although the Community-Driven 
Principles is not a compliance instrument, the World Bank Group highly recommends that 
companies adopt these Principles (WBG website, n.d.).  
World Bank Group Community-Driven Principles aims to reduce poverty, which means 
that whenever it refers to ‘communities’, it refers to ‘the poor’. Because the social 
investment experts in my study had chosen this specific document to guide their 
interactions with communities, and social investment, in the remainder of the chapter, I 
read the ‘poor’ as referring to ‘community’. However, I am aware that not all communities 
affected by O&G operations are impoverished 
I now demonstrate how participants’ social investment ideals expressed via working with 
discourses relate to the banks’ stated ideals for companies’ actions. In the following 
segment, I briefly define working with discourses and investigate how they emerged in the 
guidelines’ statements, descriptions, principles, and recommendations.  
7.2 The guideline documents and working with discourses of social investment 
As noted in Chapter 6, working with discourses reveal a construction of ‘ideal’ social 
investment as developed through a community-centred, participatory approach. However, 
a participatory approach to social investment, multiple actors take part in the decision-




power is equally distributed and all actors exercise agency over the social investment. The 
Performance Standards and the Community-Driven Principles present text segments that, 
at face value, advocate for a participatory framework when referring to companies’ social 
investment. The following is an analysis of how these discursive fragments seem to 
illustrate elements of working with discourses in the two documents, but do not 
consistently reproduce these discourses. 
The Community-Driven Principles advocates for a participatory approach in social 
investment design, implementation, and maintenance. The document not only specifies 
communities’ involvement as central in the process of developing and implementing social 
investment, but also additional actors such as “local or municipal government, the private 
sector, civil society and central government” (WBG, 2002, p. 303).  
The Community-Driven Principles recommend that social investment should “build 
participatory mechanisms for community control and stakeholder involvement” (WBG, 
2002, p. 323). The way stakeholders should be involved in social investment is illustrated 
in the suggestion that “private support organisations may be NGOs or private firms… their 
role is to help reach communities, form or strengthen CBOs [Community Based 
Organisations], and support CBOs in the process of CDD [Community-Driven 
Development]” (WBG, 2002, p. 313). The document acknowledges that different 
stakeholders, such as private firms and NGOs, have a role to play in social investment, but 
stresses that communities come first as “CDD requires community control of investment 
and management decisions” (WBG, 2002, p. 309). According to the Community-Driven 
Principles, companies’ business aspirations should not drive social programmes, as the 
following excerpt illustrates: “partnership arrangements in which the key investment 
decisions … are made primarily by a support organisation [such as private firms] cannot 
be described as community centred” (WBG, 2002, p. 309).  
The Community-Driven Principles aim to promote “control of decisions and resources to 
community groups” (WBG, 2002, p. 303) by means of “strengthening and financing 
community groups, facilitating community access to information” (WBG, 2002, p. 303), 
and capacity “to build social capital” (WBG, 2002, p. 303) which the documents argue has 
a “positive effect on household welfare” (WBG, 2002, p. 308). The World Bank Group 




resources to community groups in order to overcome poverty. In this sense, its 
fundamental principles are closely aligned with working with discourses of social 
investment focussed on empowering local communities.   
The Community-Driven Principles state that “the most appropriate institutional 
arrangement [for social investment] in any particular country will depend on the specific 
circumstances of that country, or region or location” (WBG, 2002, p. 315). Respecting and 
incorporating the local knowledge, culture, and contexts are principles that also underlie 
working with discourses of social investment. According to the Community-Driven 
Principles, that companies should respect and welcome ‘difference’ when developing 
social investment.   
Along similar lines, the IFC Performance Standards recognise that companies should 
approach communities with “easily accessible information, which is in culturally 
appropriate local language(s) and format and is understandable to Affected Communities” 
(Torrance, 2012, p. 4). The IFC also deploys working with discourses of social investment 
when it refers to programmes being accessible to host communities and delivered in a 
culturally appropriate way. 
Within working with discourses, social investment is constructed as ideally empowering 
community voices through a participatory approach. Nonetheless, according to my 
participants (see Chapter 6), a participatory approach to social investment can be 
problematic because it requires partnerships with organisations that have different agendas. 
In other words, the assumption that it might be possible to engage in a dialogue where all 
parties speak the same language and hold similar expectations may be problematic. The 
Performance Standards and the Community-Driven Principles do not acknowledge the 
tensions and other obstacles that companies might encounter when adopting a participatory 
approach to social investment. This in itself introduces another obstacle for experts who 
draw upon the guidelines for implementing their ideal social investment. Faced with 
dilemmas in practice, experts may end up questioning their own practices rather than 
recognising that these dilemmas pre-exist, but are not addressed in the guideline 
documents. It is perhaps not surprising that the participants in my study expressed 




of enacting social investment in practice are not explicitly addressed in any of the analysed 
documents.  
Aside from the practical dilemmas of developing participatory social investment, further 
tensions and contradictions are evident in the guideline documents. In the following 
sections, I illustrate how the Performance Standards and Community-Driven Principles 
draw on competing discourses of social investment. In particular, I focus on the guideline 
documents’ use of working on, working around, and working for discourses of social 
investment. I also consider the connection between participants’ discussion of social 
investment and the ways social investment is constructed in the guideline documents. I 
begin with the working on discourses. 
7.3 The guideline documents and working on discourses of social investment 
Both the Community-Driven Principle and the Performance Standards occasionally drew 
on working on discourses when referring to a company approach to social investment. As 
noted in Chapter 6, participants drew on working on discourses of social investment when 
they talked about social projects where power relations were one-way and top-down. In 
working on discourses, power was not constructed as bilateral; but rather, companies were 
portrayed as the keepers of knowledge and agents of development. In top-down 
approaches to social investment, local communities had very limited participation in 
designing and implementing social programmes, and O&G companies were positioned as 
superior entities.  
Working on discourses are evident in the IFC Performance Standards where communities 
are mentioned in relation to project planning. The IFC Performance Standards’ excerpt 
below describes how clients (for example O&G companies) should approach host 
communities. Although the document recommends that the affected community should be 
informed of the project’s execution, the document does not specifically include the 
community as a participatory body in the decision-making and design processes of the 
project:  
Client will provide Affected Communities with access to relevant information on: (i) the 




any risks to and potential impacts on such communities and relevant mitigation measures; (iv) 
the grievance mechanism (Torrance, 2012, p. 13). 
In this excerpt, the community is portrayed as the recipient of the information and the 
project, but is not expected to participate in the project’s design and delivery. The power 
balance is lopsided. The company exercises decision-making power over the project and 
the community, which is only informed of the project. For instance, the possibility of a 
community’s opposition to the investment project is not acknowledged as a major 
impediment to the project’s implementation.  
According to the Performance Standards, the sole occasion on which communities may be 
involved in project design is when the company, government, or contracted organisations, 
like third party organisations, identify specific environmental/social risks or impacts 
associated with a particular activity. Two cautions follow: the first is that the company 
may not be able to map all impacts generated by its O&G activities without prior 
consultation with the local community, whilst the second concerns who will survey the 
impacts/risks of certain O&G activity. Many governments and companies may identify 
particular impacts and not others as a way to meet their own corporate agenda. The IFC 
Performance Standards do not specify the best actors to identify social and environmental 
impacts. In this way, the document does not prevent organisations from imposing their 
own agenda when identifying social/environmental risks and impacts. 
To counterbalance communities’ lack of participation in companies’ social investment, the 
IFC Performance Standards advise companies to develop a stakeholder engagement plan, 
focussed on the project’s risks and impacts and “tailored to the characteristics and interests 
of the affected communities” (Torrance, 2012, p. 13). In this sense, the IFC apparently 
proposes a community-centred approach to engagement with communities. However, this 
advice is focussed on the risks and impacts of the operations, meaning that such an 
approach is inherently company/operation-centred. A paradox arises when an inherently 
company-centred approach is re-presented discursively as community-centred. Rhetoric 
does not match practice and such a paradox is likely to generate a sense of cynicism about 




Within the same section, the Performance Standards assert that “disclosure of relevant 
project information helps affected communities and other stakeholders understand the 
risks, impacts and opportunities of the programmes” (Torrance, 2012, p. 13). Informing 
communities about the risks, impacts, and opportunities of the operational programmes is 
an example of a top-down approach, and does not necessarily allow space for community 
agency. In other words, ‘participation’ only when “disclosing information” (Torrance, 
2012, p. 13) might not be sufficient to galvanise communities’ voices to inform the 
project’s design and implementation. Additionally, communities’ perspectives are not 
actively invited nor is their active involvement facilitated. 
Accordingly, the IFC’s suggested approach is top-down, demonstrating the prominence of 
working on discourses, and in tension with its concurrent emphasis on community 
participation. If the IFC’s recommendations for community consultation and participation 
were put into place beyond the disclosure of information, (for example when a company 
begins designing their project and during all phases of the project’s implementation) then, 
perhaps, social investment outcomes could be truly participatory. This is because 
communities’ knowledge, views, and needs would be shaping the programme’s design and 
implementation. 
On the other hand, the IFC attempts to contain or ameliorate communities’ voices and 
agency through the establishment of a “grievance mechanism for affected communities” 
(Torrance, 2012, p. 15). This mechanism is intended to “receive and facilitate resolution of 
affected communities’ concerns” (Torrance, 2012, p. 15). Nonetheless, the IFC does not 
specify who should mediate the conflicts between company and communities, leaving the 
power of regulatory decision-making to companies. Companies themselves tend to 
arbitrate in the case of grievances, which is unlikely to lead to impartial problem solving.  
The IFC Performance Standards are not the only guideline document that utilises working 
on discourses while also referring to a participatory approach. The World Bank Group 
Community Driven Principles also adopts working on discourses when referring to a 
working with approach, as in the following extract:   
When poor communities are trusted to drive development and are given appropriate 




people, but to facilitate their active and on-going role in rolling out poverty reduction efforts 
(WBG, 2002, p. 307). 
The extract above adopts an authoritative discourse that positions the company as a 
superior body. For example, here the Community-Driven Development Principles implies 
that the ‘poor’, or materially deprived communities should submit to the company’s 
assessment of communities’ capacity to achieve their own development. According to this 
guideline document, the funding organisation is responsible for establishing “simple rules 
and strong incentives, supported by monitoring and evaluation” (WBG, 2002, p. 321) to 
prompt communities’ development. These Community-Driven Development segments do 
not recognise the (poor) communities as equal partners with O&G companies. On the 
contrary, the segment proposes a hierarchical approach, where the companies are 
positioned as superior to communities (the poor). In this case, rhetoric used by the 
Community-Driven document reinforces the powerful roles funding institutions – such as 
big enterprises – have in host communities. ‘Development’ is positioned as the means to 
justify ‘developed’ nations and/or institutions’ dominance over ‘developing’ nations or 
poor people, as informed by the critical perspectives explored in Chapter 4 (Escobar, 1992, 
2002; Shrestha, 1995). In the Community-Driven Principles development can be read as a 
new form of discursive and material (economic) colonialism (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; 
Escobar, 2002; Shrestha, 1995; Rahnema, 1991).  
Hierarchical relations are also demonstrated in the Community-Driven Principles, which 
establishes alternative institutional arrangements to drive community development. Within 
this arrangement, the main actors for promoting development are the government, NGOs, 
and/or private organisations. The following quotes, extracted from Table 9.1 of the World 
Bank Group document, indicate the actors responsible for a community-driven approach:  
Local government mobilises the community with the help of contracted NGOs or private firms 
employing facilitators; 
NGO/private firm contracted by central fund/government provides capacity building and 
training support to CBOs [Community Based Organisations]; 
National program oversees mass information campaigns to solicit community demand and 




In the above excerpts, the community does not mobilise development; rather, it is a 
receiver of development, needing training and clarification, and solicitation to allow O&G 
social investment to occur. Although the World Bank Group’s Community-Driven 
Principles aim at promoting development by engaging multiple actors, in the segments 
provided above, the community is not considered an initiator of development. On the 
contrary, affected communities – or the poor – are constructed as passive recipients of 
development. Such hierarchical constructions reproduce power imbalances, revealing 
working on discourses of social investment. The following section focuses on how 
working around discourses are deployed in the IFC Performance Standards and the World 
Bank Group Community-Driven Principles. 
7.4 The guideline documents and working around discourses of social investment 
Working around discourses are grounded in the assumption that social investment should 
be implemented in order to mitigate the social risks and impacts of O&G projects. Working 
around discourses are evident in the following excerpt from the IFC Performance 
Standards: 
The Performance Standards are directed towards clients, providing guidance on how to 
identify risks and impacts, and are designed to help avoid, mitigate and manage risks and 
impacts as a way of doing business in a sustainable way, including stakeholder engagement 
and disclosure obligations of the client in relation to project-level activities (Torrance, 2012, p. 
1).  
The IFC Performance Standards focus mostly on recommendations for company-
community engagement - or ‘stakeholder engagement’, - in cases of high-risk and 
impactful projects. The technical term for company-community engagement in the O&G 
sector is community engagement (IPIECA, 2008). Community engagement refers to the 
relationship established between companies and communities and their effect on 
individuals and groups on a day-to-day level (IPIECA, 2008). 
The phrase ‘community engagement’ gives the illusion of a community focus, when 
implicitly ‘engagement’ is understood as constructed as based on the company’s terms. 
The IFC Performance Standards, for instance, recommend that community engagement be 




resource to communities’ needs and realities. Compensatory and risk mitigation measures 
are often implemented through social investment.  
The IFC segment above suggests that, if based on the Performance Standards guidelines, 
social investment could be working as a substitute for community engagement. 
Community engagement and social investment are, however, distinctively different 
(IPIECA, 2008; Moshkina, Trickett, & Trafton, 2014). Community engagement focuses on 
the relationship between the company and host communities on a daily basis, whereas 
social investment refers to the transfer of resources and/or expertise from O&G companies 
to host communities (IPIECA, 2008). In this research, most of the participants have chosen 
the IFC Performance Standards to guide their social investment practices. The adoption of 
this particular guideline to support O&G social investment practices may indicate that 
participants could be using social investment as a substitute for community engagement as 
well. This suggests that (in line with the IFC documents) participants may be establishing 
their relationships with host communities via social investment programmes, instead of 
genuine community engagement mechanisms. Furthermore, issues concerning O&G 
operations, which include disclosure of information, compensation action, risk mitigation 
actions, and blocks licensing, plus perceived community ‘development’ needs are 
addressed through social investment, and not by genuine participatory mechanisms of 
community engagement. 
Compensation and risk mitigation actions are extremely relevant and necessary in the 
O&G sector. However, other components of community engagement, such as to 
“empathise, to listen, learn and share” knowledge and/or information with communities 
(IPIECA, 2008), are also key to positive engagement between O&G companies and 
communities. Yet, these components are not mentioned in the IFC Performance 
Standards. Notably, there is a risk that social investment, when used as a substitute for 
(participatory) community engagement, could backfire against the O&G company. This is 
because social investment may lead to communities’ feeling frustrated due to social 
investment programmes failing to address communities’ actual needs and desires (see 
Chapter 8).  
The IFC Performance Standards and the World Bank Group Community-Driven 




communities. The Community-Driven Principles defines company-community 
relationships in relation to actions of collaboration, while the Performance Standards 
frame it through actions of compensation. The Community-Driven Principles advocate for 
partnerships in “CDD [Community-Driven Development] … [which] treats poor people 
and their institutions as assets and partners in the development process” (WBG, 2002, p. 
303). In contrast, the IFC Performance Standards do not focus on partnerships. Rather, the 
company-community relationship is conceptualised in terms of mitigation and/or 
compensatory claims, for example, “IFC requires its clients to apply to the Performance 
Standards to manage environmental and social risks and the impacts so that development 
opportunities are enhanced” (Torrance, 2012, p. 2). Actions of risk mitigation and/or 
compensation imply that the company should indeed relate to host communities, but not 
necessarily through collaboration, as inferred in the Community-Driven Principles. 
The paradox between a focus on collaboration versus compensation in relation to the 
community-company relationship indicates conflicting political understandings of how 
companies should relate to their host societies. Companies may construct social investment 
through discourses of collaboration and participation and/or through discourses of 
compensation and company-focussed interests. Social investment developed under risk 
mitigation and/or compensatory claims is mainly focussed on how to compensate or 
mitigate company impact and harm. O&G compensation can only be meaningful if 
communities shape and/or inform the process by which compensation approaches are 
determined or deemed acceptable. Communities are the ones impacted, and so they are the 
only ones who can say if a specific impact can be compensated or not.  
Additionally, the IFC document establishes that private companies should tailor their 
relationship with communities in terms of communities’ vulnerability. It states, “where 
individuals or groups are identified as disadvantaged or vulnerable, the client will propose 
and implement differentiated measures so that diverse impacts do not fall 
disproportionately on them and they are not disadvantaged in sharing development benefits 
and opportunities” (Torrance, 2012, p. 9). The IFC implies that the activities funded by the 
IFC inherently generate development benefits and opportunities for host communities. 
Such a notion is contentious and serves the interests of funding institutions and O&G 




operational activities, for example, as not enhancing development and promoting 
opportunities.  
The IFC above also implies that companies should implement differentiated actions in 
order to reduce the vulnerability of already vulnerable peoples when in contact with high 
risk and impactful activities. The understanding that O&G companies develop 
differentiated and affirmative actions to increase opportunities for the most disadvantaged 
is contradictory. A contradiction emerges when O&G social investment is framed as a way 
to reduce the vulnerability of underprivileged communities and at the same time that the 
O&G company’s activities have heightened social vulnerability.  
In the following extracts, the IFC gives additional examples of operational activities that 
create local vulnerability and provides recommendations to minimise these impacts: “… 
The client will avoid or minimize the potential for community exposure to water-borne, 
water based, and vector borne diseases, and communicable diseases that could result from 
project activity”, and, “The client will avoid or minimize transmission of communicable 
diseases that may be associated with the influx of temporary or permanent project labour” 
(Torrance, 2012, p. 29). These segments recommend companies adopt measures that 
reduce or compensate for the impacts generated by corporate operations. Through such 
extracts, the IFC document recognises the need for corporate intervention to compensate 
for impactful activities. However, such acknowledgment accepts the idea that land and 
wellbeing can be bought with money and/or compensatory social programmes. Money-
focussed understandings of social compensation, although treated as universal, derive from 
a neoliberal set of principles of corporate self-interest and profit maximisation (WBG, 
2004, p. vii). These values may differ to a community’s expectations that companies 
should act ethically and avoid generating any harmful impacts (Blowfield & Frynas, 2005; 
Crush, 1995; Gibson-Graham, 2003; Gibson-Graham, 2006). 
Capitalist assumptions and values, when taken for granted as universal laws, can 
compromise the well-being of local communities and the natural environment (Blowfield 
& Frynas, 2005; Crush, 1995; Gibson-Graham, 2003; Gibson-Graham, 2006). One taken 
for granted neoliberal assumption is that capacity-building types of social investment 
enhance a community’s wellbeing. According to my participants, capacity building 




further in Chapter 8). Capacity-building social investment is also highly recommended by 
the World Bank Group Community-Driven Principles: 
Invest in capacity building at local and municipal government levels. To support CDD 
[Community-Driven Development] effectively on a large scale, local governments need to 
have access to qualified personnel and to finance, planning and monitoring systems. Capacity 
can be built internally or it can be accessed via partnerships and contracting arrangements with 
private sector firms or NGOs capable of supporting local and municipal governments (WBG, 
2002, p. 312). 
Key to this growth is a demand for their [communities’] services, at sufficiently attractive 
terms, over several years. Capacity building and training support are important, but more 
important is the power of market demand in inducing social entrepreneurs to create support 
organizations (WBG, 2002, p. 312). 
The taken-for-granted understanding that capacity building inherently benefits the host 
community derives from a neoliberal perspective (Crush, 1995; Gibson-Graham, 2003; 
Gibson-Graham, 2006). Training the host community to be employed in O&G activities 
serves the dual purpose of benefitting the company whilst appearing to provide 
‘opportunities’ to local communities. On the other hand, it may also generate ideological 
conflicts that cannot always be anticipated. For example, indigenous societies whose 
traditional politics are not based on market relations may not benefit from such an 
approach (Ellwood, 1989; Jessop, 2002a, 2002b; Murray, 2008; Torfing, 1999).  
The understanding that communities and companies have to liaise with each other in order 
to create job opportunities – and foster development – also fosters a shift of responsibility 
for creating jobs from the government to O&G companies and communities. Such a shift 
of responsibility can be seen in two ways; first it shifts responsibility from the State on to 
the company, and second, it shifts responsibility from the State to communities. As noted, 
O&G social investment may harm society if it is presented as an alternative to government, 
as it shifts the role of the government from being an active to a passive provider of social 
welfare (see Blowfield & Frynas, 2005). In this sense, the Community-Driven document 
may be incentivising a shift of responsibilities that, according to the literature on O&G 
social investment, may not be beneficial for communities in the long run.  
On other hand, paradoxically, the Community-Driven document also stresses the role of 




managed through collective actions at the community level. Public goods that span many 
communities or that require a large, complex system are often better provided by local or 
central government” (WBG, 2002, p. 304). In this segment, the Community-Driven 
Principles recognise the central role of the government in social investment programmes, 
which, discursively, brings social investment closer to a participatory approach.  
The Community-Driven Development document also acknowledges the importance of 
having the government actively involved in social investment programmes: “When local 
governments interact with communities and informal groups in a participatory way, it is 
possible to achieve economies of scale in producing and providing goods and services that 
could not be achieved by CBO [Community Based Organisation] operating individually” 
(WBG, 2002, p. 322). However, social investment experts in my research complained 
about the lack of government participation in designing, implementing and maintaining 
social programmes (I consider this further in Chapter 8).  
The following section will focus on how the two guideline documents draw on working for 
discourses. 
7.5 The guideline documents and working for discourses of social investment 
Working for discourses underpin social investment developed under legislation. Within 
these discourses, the company is expected to provide social services and/or goods in order 
to obtain or maintain an operational license. Working for discourses promote the 
understanding that businesses should serve society and integrate social demands and 
values in to their business strategies. Furthermore, these discourses position social 
investment as an instrument to assist the government in delivering social goods in order to 
meet its development agenda. 
Neither the World Bank Group nor the IFC guidelines directly mention that companies 
should fund social investment programmes as a response to a legal requirement. The only 
segment that indirectly relates to working for discourses is the IFC Performance 
Standards’ extract that acknowledges companies’ investments may be subject to the 
national law: “In additional to meeting the requirements under the performance Standards, 




this segment does not imply that the social investment is a compliance mechanism, and no 
other segment in the IFC and World Bank Group guideline documents make reference to 
private social investment subject to legal requirements. On the other hand, the guideline 
documents introduce an alternative understanding of working for discourses of social 
investment, to that revealed in participants’ interviews (see Chapter 6). Community-Driven 
guidelines in particular claim that communities, instead of companies, may financially 
assist the government in delivering social goods: 
Mandatory contributions have been shown to be important in building community ownership, 
helping to ensure that cost- and service level are not distorted by external grants, and 
ascertaining through willingness to pay that services respond to real demand – all of which 
contribute to greater sustainability (WBG, 2002, p. 319). 
In the above excerpt, mandatory community financial contributions are imposed on 
communities who are the recipients of social projects. The Community-Driven document’s 
use of working for discourses articulates expectation that communities contribute to social 
investment and therefore aid their government in delivering/managing its social agenda. 
The following World Bank Group Community-Driven Development Principles excerpt 
illustrates how community contributions are expected to foster or fund social investment 
and reduce government expenditure in delivering social services: “Contributions from 
beneficiaries [communities] and local actors toward initial start-up costs and the recurrent 
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of services can help reduce the burden on scarce 
public resources and improve sustainability of service” (WBG, 2002, p. 319). In working 
for discourses, social investment represented companies’ compulsory social investments to 
assist the government deliver social goods in order to meet its development agenda. The 
Community-Driven Development Principles has introduced another facet of working for 
discourses. In this alternative construction of working for discourses, communities, not 
companies, were the ones compulsorily responsible to financially contribute social 
investments in order to assist governments deliver its social development agenda. 
However, ultimately, communities might not have the financial resources to be an equal 





The four discourses of O&G social investment that emerged in my research interviews, 
also appeared in the IFC Performance Standards and the World Bank Group Community-
Driven Development Principles. In my analysis, I have demonstrated how working with, 
working on, working around, and working for discourses of social investment were 
operating in the guidelines’ statements, descriptions, principles, and recommendations. 
Participants’ discussion of the complexity of social investment, seem to reflect the 
guideline documents’ complex and contradictory deployment of the four discourses of 
social investment.  
Most of the participants preferred two of the World Bank’s general investment guideline 
documents over other O&G social investment documents, which suggests that the World 
Bank’s agenda has had a direct impact on O&G social investment. The participants’ use of 
conflicting and multiple discourses of social investment likely reflects contradictions in the 
guideline documents, again indicating the complex realities within which they work.  
O&G personnel are influenced by many different agendas from community groups, the 
O&G industry, and national and local governments. Asymmetric, contradictory and multi-
leveled power relations reflect an unbalanced distribution of rights and duties among 
governments, companies, guideline agencies and communities (Cameron, 2001; Foucault, 
1970, 1980, 1982). On the other hand, social investment personnel can still be agentic and 
construct social investment outside these dominant discourses despite how they are 
positioned by companies and official guidelines. In this sense, guideline documents and 
company managers do not annul participants’ agency to act within/against specific 
guideline and company constraints, and to construct themselves as experts accountable for 
their work in social investment (Davies, 1991) 
The IFC guideline document, for instance, focuses mostly on engagement between 
companies and communities in terms of compensation and risk mitigation. This means that 
the guideline document may be referring to social investment as a substitute for 
community engagement. In turn, participants who drew on the Performance Standards for 
their social investment practices could be using social investment as a substitute for 




O&G sector because they represent endeavours to safeguard host communities. However, 
other components are also important if companies are to establish long-lasting, 
participatory relationships with communities. Social investment should be one mechanism 
that assists and complements community engagement, rather than a substitute to 
community engagement. 
My analysis of the four discourses of social investment in the guideline documents has 
indicated that both fail to acknowledge the tensions and other obstacles that companies 
might encounter when adopting a participatory approach to social investment. This is 
likely to lead to dilemmas for experts who draw upon the guidelines when implementing 
social investment. Faced with dilemmas in a supposedly problem-free practice, experts 
may end up questioning their own practices, rather than recognising the complexity of 
their positioning or the contradictory discourses in the documents that guide their 
practices. Ideally, at the very least, guideline documents should acknowledge some of the 
key challenges inherent in designing social investment, and thereby prepare experts for 
engaging with the possible challenges that may arise when designing and implementing 
social investment.  
A second consideration has to do with the guidelines’ discursive claims to a community-
centred approach, despite drawing on working on and working around discourses of social 
investment. The claim of community-centred actions in company-centred policies risks 
generates corporate cynicism and heightens communities’ distrust of O&G social 
investment.  
A third consideration has to do with the paradox between social investment developed 
through collaboration versus as compensation, revealing conflicting political 
understandings of how companies relate to their host societies. Companies may construct 
their social investment through discourses of collaboration and collective interests, and/or 
through discourses of compensation and self-oriented interests. Working with discourses of 
social investment could construct alternative ways of approaching social investment for 
impact compensation, which may contribute more respectful and humble forms of social 
investment (Cash, 2012; Frynas, 2005, 2009a; Hilson, 2012) (I return to this point in 




The fourth consideration concerns the taken-for-granted understanding that funding 
institutions know what is best for communities. Specifically, the Community-Driven 
Development Principles draw on working on discourses when they refer to funding 
institutions, such as private companies, international banks, governments, and NGOs as the 
planners of development programmes. Although referred to as a central actor, community 
is discursively constructed as the passive recipient of development initiatives.   
The fifth and final consideration, relates the guideline documents’ discursive claims that 
communities and companies have to liaise with each other in order to create job 
opportunities. Research suggests that such claims risk provoking a shift of responsibility 
for creating jobs from the government to O&G companies and communities. Literature 
suggests that O&G social investment may harm communities if presented as an alternative 
to government provision, for example, of basic social welfare. Future research is needed 
that explores how the guideline documents may actually be influencing responsibility in 
resource rich nations and how this impacts host communities. 
The following chapter explores some of the main recommendations for O&G social 
investment that emerged in my study. Government representatives’ narratives are also 







Chapter 8:  Participants’ Recommendations for O&G 
Social Investment 
In the current chapter, I address research questions four and five: what are the experts’ 
recommendations for future O&G social investment, and, which discourses are evident in 
participants’ recommendations for future O&G social investment? In order to answer these 
questions, this chapter addresses participants’ recommendations for O&G social 
investment. Participants’ recommendations were discussed during the research interviews 
and indicated their understandings of what should change in social investment practices. 
The participants, (including O&G and government experts) highlighted four main practices 
of O&G social investment should receive particular attention. These practices included: (1) 
considering the purpose of social investment, (2) engaging with the community, (3) 
engaging with the government, and (4) engaging with the company. The participants made 
specific recommendations in relations to each practice.  
This chapter is divided into four main parts that analyse participants’ recommendations for 
each practice of the social investment noted above. When analysing participants’ 
recommendations, I also focus on the discursive tensions and contradictions inherent in the 
interview discussions. In doing so, I aim to identify both the strengths, and the gaps, in 
participants’ recommendations and additional possibilities for change. 
8.1 Considering the purpose of social investment 
In this section, I investigate participants’ recommendations about the purpose of social 
investment and how to put identified goals into practice. When considering the purpose of 
social investment, participants talked about social investment as, ideally, more than a 
social license to operate. According to the participants, social investment should assist 
companies’ host communities to ‘achieve development’ whilst serving business’ needs for 
a specialised labour force. Participants inferred that social investment should be 
‘community-centred’ and focussed on fostering capacity building within communities. 




prioritising business interests over communities’ interests. I now examine experts’ 
recommendations in relation to the purpose of social investment. 
8.1.1 Social investment beyond a social license to operate 
In their recommendations for social investment practices, participants suggested the need 
to go beyond a social license to operate. As P15 posited: 
Well, from research, what we’re seeing is a trend of, beyond the traditional business objectives 
of social investment, you know which would be to improve a company’s reputation, image and 
improve local support to the operations, you know social licence to operate (P15 social 
investment expert emphasis original). 
Here, P15 seemed to draw on working with discourses. However, s/he drew on elements of 
working on discourses later in the interview when giving examples of how to go beyond a 
social license to operate, saying “we’re seeing companies using social investment … in 
science, technology, engineering and maths” (P15, social investment expert). Here, P15 
notes how companies decided on which fields to invest in based on their own workforce 
needs. P15 advocated moving beyond a social license to operate, while still adopting 
elements of working on discourses of social investment. 
Elsewhere, P15 again drew on working with discourses. In the following quote, s/he 
recommended that O&G companies look at how social investment could assist the host 
country in achieving “sustainable development”. However, here elements of working 
around discourses of social investment are also evident: 
So I don’t know if you’ve looked at the potential implications of the sustainable development 
goals at all in your research but there’s a potential that this could have implications for 
expectations on companies in terms of social investment. So it’s a new agreed language of 
development for the next 15 years. So we’re sort of seeing this trend towards companies 
reflecting back to their approach to social investment and telling how it could better serve the 
business. 
In the excerpt above, P15 strategically drew on discourses of sustainable development for 
social investment as a way of justifying social investment based on companies’ business 
interests. P15’s focus on the “implications of the sustainable development goals” indicates 
her/his apparent adoption of working with discourses of social investment. However, P15 




Like P15, other participants discussed the purpose of social investment as being to benefit 
both company and communities. However, some participants positioned social investment 
in terms of communities’ capacity building. The next section explores participants’ talk 
about capacity building programmes as a way of benefiting both the country and the 
business. Again, participants drew on multiple discourses of social investment in their 
accounts. 
8.1.2 Investing in communities’ capacity building 
Most social investment experts also discussed capacity building programmes as a way to 
achieve meaningful social investment. The following quotes illustrate participants’ social 
investment ideals. In this regard: “I think that for me it is education and capacity building” 
(P3); “to implement a scholarship scheme to build the capacity of the local human 
resources” (P6); and “[ideally social investment includes] programmes that really deal with 
human capacity, like training, skills development” (P10). The above quotes are examples 
of participants recommending that a strategic social investment approach is capacity 
building.  
Capacity building is a concept found in sustainable development literatures (Eade, 1997; 
Simmons, Reynolds, & Swinburn, 2011; Simpson, Wood, & Daws, 2003). However, in 
my study, experts positioned capacity building as serving the twin interests of both 
communities and business. This is arguably at odds with the sustainable development 
literature, which does not position capacity building in relation to the business’ agenda 
(Eade, 1997; Simmons et al., 2011; Simpson et al., 2003). In this section, I investigate 
how, in my research, participants recommended for investing in capacity building 
programmes as a way to meet the interests of both the community and the company. 
Since the 1980s, capacity building has been considered by the World Bank Group and the 
United Nations as key to sustainable development (Eade, 1997). According to Simmons, 
Reynolds, and Swinburn (2011), there are myriad definitions of capacity building. In 
sustainable development literature, capacity building is the process by which communities 
leverage their assets or strengths in order to improve wellbeing (Simmons et al., 2011;  
Simpson, Wood, & Daws, 2003). To Simpson et al. (2003) ideally, capacity building 




and reciprocity; create social networks; and galvanise a culture of openness and learning 
(Simpson et al., 2003). To scholars concerned with sustainable development, capacity 
building towards development is a process that inherently focuses on communities’ 
needs/demands and addresses the social, political, and economic spheres of host 
communities (Eade, 1997; Simmons et al., 2011; Simpson et al., 2003). A view of capacity 
building as focussed on communities’ needs/demands, and foster communities’ sense of 
efficacy, trust, and reciprocity aligns with working with discourses of social investment.  
One example of a participant who positioned capacity building in relation to a community-
centred approach was P7. In the following quote, P7 acknowledged that social investment 
in their company was used to meet the demands of the company. However, s/he talked 
about a shift that their company made in its social investment in order to attend to the 
communities’ needs: 
So it [scholarship] doesn’t have to be directly connected to a particular discipline. Originally, 
when we had this programme, it used to be connected to courses that sort of related to our 
business, so engineering, health and safety courses. But now, we have opened it up so the 
students can apply for any of the courses they want and they can do that through the normal 
university application process (P7, social investment expert). 
P7 talked about the tension between social investments meeting the O&G industry’s 
demands and the communities’ needs. P7 illustrated how the company overcame this 
tension by shifting the company’s social investment priorities towards what the 
community needed. The reasons behind this shift in the company’s social investment 
agenda were justified in the following way: 
We moved away from it [giving scholarships that were connected to courses related to O&G 
activities] because, first of all, the region we are working in is a very small rural area. It’s got a 
population of 9,000 and so actually the number of people who were pursuing engineering 
courses were just very low and so therefore, the number of people who under the original 
criteria could apply was also low, so we really wanted to spread it out and make it inclusive.  
In fact, one of our principles is inclusiveness (P7). 
P7 asserted that her/his company’s shift - from being company-oriented to being 
community-oriented – was also linked to principles of inclusiveness. Her/his company 




meant structuring the social investment according to the community’s needs, and not the 
company’s demands for a work force. 
Other experts also focussed on communities’ needs as a focus of O&G social investment. 
P3, for instance, mentioned that social investment should be developed: “first depending 
on community strengths and their needs. That should be very much as their own choice 
and you need to work in partnership with communities to understand what those needs 
are”. However, at the same time, P3 also prioritised social investment that developed local 
capability as a way of meeting the O&G industry’s demands, as the following quote 
indicates:  
But [when the company’s] got [a] massive undertaking and where you have made [a] 
commitment to maximising local content and there is no local capability developed, to 
participate in O&G activities then you definitely need to prioritise just your capacity building 
efforts and focus by all means should be on O&G (P3, O&G). 
The above segment reveals a paradox. P3 emphasises the need to prioritise the O&G 
industry’s demands, while at the same time, developing social investment focussed on 
community needs. Such a paradox illustrates the complex ways some participants 
negotiated both working around to working with discourses of social investment, based on 
companies, and their own, priorities. 
However, not all participants posed this paradox when talking about capacity building 
social investment. For instance, P6 talked about their company’s focus on capacity 
building programmes as solely meeting business demands: 
The oil found in my country is offshore; and offshore exploration needs very good technical 
knowledge. So in our case, engineers were brought from elsewhere to come and work, and my 
company decided to implement a scholarship scheme to build the capacity of the local human 
resources. The company has also established [a] Technical Training Centre where individuals 
and companies can go for O&G Technical Training (P6, social investment expert). 
P6’s company exclusively focussed on meeting the company’s demands for a specialised 
work force. In the excerpt above, P6 drew mainly on working on discourses, revealing a 
top-down, hierarchical approach to social investment. P6’s excerpt demonstrates that, for 
some participants, capacity building is a mechanism solely used to provide O&G 




between serving the interests of the company versus the communities, P6’s comments, 
“implement a scholarship scheme to build the capacity of the local human resources”, can 
be read as endeavouring to imply that solely company-centred approach also benefits 
communities.  
Arguably, companies that maintain a company-centres focus while claiming that they seek 
to empower communities risk promoting a profound cynicism about the ideals and 
activities of social investment (Fleming et al., 2013). To Fleming et al. (2013) social 
investment often reflects a paradox: the more a company proclaims its social investment 
principles and benefits, the more likely cynics interpret this as an indication of a 
company’s ambition for profit accumulation According to Fleming et al. (2013) social 
investment is often more about adding value to the firm than to the community. 
Nevertheless, in my research, the experts repeatedly recommended that social investment 
be community centred, and provide space and opportunities for communities’ sense of 
ownership of an investment project.  
Such conflicting views of social investment were again observed in participants’ talks of 
how to engage with communities. The following section presents a contradiction between 
participants’ understandings of the purpose of social investment and the methodologies of 
how social investment should be developed. 
8.2 Engaging with the community 
This section focuses on participants’ recommendations for engaging with the community. 
When developing social investment, participants recommended that O&G companies 
engage with the community via principles of participation, community empowerment, and 
ownership. These principles can be seen as reflecting working with discourses of social 
investment. However, my participants also revealed working on when describing how they 
engaged with the community. In this section, I consider how company-community power 
relations shaped communities’ needs and ‘local knowledge in my participants’ account.  
Engaging with the community refers to participants’ recommended practices of joint 
decision-making involving both community and the company. The subsequent interview 




Yeah, I think the most important [recommendation] is really engagement with the community. 
I think the most successful projects I’ve seen has been where there was joint decision making 
where there was really room, anticipatory planning and processes put in place (P12, social 
investment expert). 
P12’s excerpt revealed her/his beliefs that community engagement was vital to achieving 
success in O&G social investment. P12 also assumed that poor community engagement 
resulted in the lack of “thorough stakeholder engagement, and no buy in commitments and 
joint planning with the community” (P12, social investment expert).  
Participants recommended engaging with communities in two ways: the first was in 
relation to community empowerment, whilst the second related to managing communities’ 
expectations. In the first, experts talked about a participatory approach towards O&G 
social investment as something that should promote a community sense of empowerment 
and ownership over the social investment project. In the second, the experts talked about 
the importance of managing community expectations and the implications of these 
expectations when they are generated by the absence of government provision of social 
welfare on a local level. In the following section, I elaborate on how my participants 
referred to both ways of engaging with the community. 
8.2.1 Community empowerment  
For O&G participants, community empowerment happened when the community took 
ownership of the social investment. Community empowerment frequently appeared in the 
participants’ interviews as the outcome of what participants called a “true participatory 
social programme” (P8, translated original). According to P8, there were social investment 
projects that were called ‘participatory’, which required the attendance of community 
members in the project’s committees, but which were ultimately not participatory or 
empowering.  
P8’s account concurs with Hickey and Mohan’s (2004) criticism in regards to participatory 
approaches that do not empower the community. According to Hickey and Mohan (2004), 
so-called participatory programmes fail to empower the community when the community 
does not feel they own the design, delivery, and development of the project. Social 




Top-down approaches of social investment are rooted in working on discourses of social 
investment.  
P8 mentioned that s/he faced difficulties “with projects that are called participatory but are 
not necessarily participatory they may involve one or two people, but soon there will be no 
[community] ownership of the project” (P8, social investment expert, translated). 
According to P8, “a social project is only considered participatory when its final product 
promotes [community] empowerment” (translated). In expressing a critical understanding 
of social investment, P8 drew on working with discourses of social investment. However, 
critics of social investment state that even participatory social investment can shape 
communities’ decisions in favour of the company’s interests (see for example Hickey & 
Mohan, 2004; Mosse, 2001). 
Mosse (2001) argues that government and donor institutions are not passive facilitators of 
local knowledge production and planning. Governments and international donors, such as 
international banks and O&G companies, have increasingly facilitated communities’ 
‘participation’ in social investment (Mosse, 2001). However, these institutions’ underlying 
interests of “greater productivity at a lower cost, efficient mechanisms for service delivery, 
or reduced recurrent and maintenance costs” (Mosse, 2001, p. 17) place demands on social 
investment programmes. In this sense, community empowerment through participation can 
be shaped and directed by corporations and companies’ social investment processes. 
Donors and government agendas may implicitly influence social investment design, 
promoting a paradigm shift from a participatory approach to a top-down model of social 
investment (Mosse, 2001). Top-down social investment draws on working on discourses of 
social investment. This type of social investment fails to confront power relations and 
tends to depoliticise an inherently political process, turning participation into a technical 
approach towards development (Hickey & Mohan, 2004).  
However, in my research, one social investment expert, P4, did not use working on 
discourses of social investment when s/he inferred that companies had to step back from 
parts of the project design and planning in order to accommodate a participatory approach 




What we now do is: we provide more than enough time ahead of when the community 
programme is going to be executed to make sure the conversations happen. So if the 
conversation takes one year before the community set to and now agree and are happy with all 
the accommodations and come to a decision on who should do the work for them and who 
should benefit from it. We were just official. So what we have learned is how the framework 
that allows for more than enough time for very congruent transparent allocation in the 
community. At the end of the day, they go through the tension and through the pains and 
through the arguments and then they will come to a consensus. At that point, we step in (P4, 
social investment expert). 
In P4’s account, the company stepped back and gave the community time and space to 
organise their own approach towards social investment. According to P4, the community 
took over the project’s design and delivery and dealt with its inherent tensions and 
conflicts by negotiating its own domestic politics before the company stepped into the 
process. Only after the community had decided upon the framework and logistics of the 
social investment would the company step into the process. P4 commented on how 
communities exercised ownership by means of negotiating the project’s framework and 
power relations. In discussing her/his company’s actions, s/he drew on working with 
discourses of social investment.  
Another participant who drew on working with discourses of social investment to articulate 
her/his social investment ideals was P10. In the following quote, P10 asserted that O&G 
companies have to acknowledge that communities know what they want from the social 
investment and how they want it undertaken: 
I had learnt from this [experience], … we don’t really have the best ideas at all, you know, 
most times we don’t have the best idea of what the community needs, but almost always the 
community themselves know. … And so, these farmers in upper [country] told us very clearly 
what they wanted and how they wanted it. And fortunately everyone was receptive and so the 
project changed … they didn’t need experts to come in and tell them, you know, how they 
should be farming (P10, social investment expert). 
In the above excerpt, P10 engaged in a reflexive account of an experience that shaped 
her/his understanding that communities know best what they need. P10 acknowledged the 
importance of letting communities’ voices shape the social investment design and 
implementation to enhance the community’s sense of empowerment and ownership of 




There was also another project on draft [risk] mitigation, where we used participatory rural 
appraisal and planning and we really looked at not just the demographic protocol of the 
community, but what is the local community’s coping mechanism in terms of draft [risk 
mitigation plan] and then you realise that the people themselves actually already have solutions 
and coping mechanisms and if you do not consider those and work along those and then 
include them in the participatory planning process, that there is often no buy in and then you 
will have no commitment from the community to be part of it (P12 social investment expert). 
P12’s recommendations for O&G social investment included eliciting the communities’ 
own resolutions and coping mechanisms as a way of enhancing the community’s sense of 
ownership of the investment. 
According to Mosse (2001, p. 19) “local knowledge reflects local power”; in other words, 
knowledge is shaped by power relations (Foucault, 1982). According to Mosse (2001), 
communities’ ‘local knowledge’ is shaped by dominant local groups and by investors’ 
criteria. The presence of dominant local groups and company members influences whose 
needs and knowledge is prioritised in designing and implementing social investment. 
Additionally, according to the participants, when implementing social investment, the 
company generally hires the “project facilitator”, who controls the research tools. The 
company also normally establishes the criteria of relevance for social investment projects. 
When participants talked about engaging with communities through social investment as a 
way to promote communities’ sense of empowerment and project ownership, experts drew 
on working with discourses of social investment. However, the fact that companies are not 
passive and neutral actors in the design and implementation of O&G social investment 
means that working on discourses can also be operating in a ‘participatory’ and 
‘community-centred’ social investment.  
In the next section, I focus on how interviewees discussed engagement with communities’ 
expectations. In particular, participants talked about the importance of managing 
communities’ expectations and the implications of these expectations when it was the 




8.2.2 Managing communities’ expectations 
All participants considered managing communities’ expectations key to developing a 
sound social investment. Participants specifically believed that companies’ inability to 
manage communities’ expectations led to communities’ frustrations. According to 
participants, communities’ frustrations, in turn, thwarted any prospect of a successful 
social investment. This section investigates participants’ recommendations for engaging 
with communities’ terms to manage their expectations. 
Participants such as P5 talked about the first steps towards managing communities’ 
expectations: 
And I think part of that [recommendations] have to do with expectations and it has to do with 
the levels of community engagement and involvement in designing the projects. And so I think 
… and again back to the description of kind of this more participatory approach, increasingly I 
think we are trying to do more research and analysis than outreach, more like a needs 
assessment before we go in and really design projects so that community members feel that 
their voices have been heard (P5, social investment expert). 
P5 understood that knowing the communities’ needs indicated to locals that their 
perspectives were being taken into consideration. However, when the opposite happened, 
the lack of knowledge concerning the community’s aspirations and cultures generated: 
… anger and frustration over a whole range of issues that weren’t just about our company, … 
there was even some vandalising of projects’ buildings and I think that was a turning point to 
the company to realise that you have to approach the stakeholders and approach the projects in 
a much more participatory way (P5, social investment expert). 
In the statement above, P5 talked about how locals’ frustration may have led to destructive 
actions. P5 considered a participatory approach towards social investment as an effective 
way of dealing with community’s frustrations and expectations. However, P5’s rationale 
for dealing with communities’ frustrations drew on working around discourses of 
protecting O&G operations through social investment, in that, s/he emphasised 
engagement as a means for ensuring communities’ cooperation. 
A government expert, P17, also understood that companies had to understand and manage 
communities’ expectations and frustrations. In fact, P17 believed that companies’ inability 




communities. P17 asserted that “local communities, mainly the ones that live near the 
shore, are the ones mostly affected by O&G activities because of companies’ lack of 
management/awareness of communities expectations” (Government expert - translated). 
P17’s quote indicates her/his discursive attempt to attribute responsibility for the 
community’s expectations and frustrations to O&G companies’ “lack of 
management/awareness of communities expectations” (P17).  
However, the social investment experts in my research shared a different view of who was 
responsible for managing communities’ expectation of O&G social investment, in that, 
O&G social investment experts emphasised government’s absence in providing host 
communities with basic social services was responsible for communities unrealistic 
expectations of O&G social investment. P3, for instance, believed that communities’ 
expectations derived from the inability of the host country government to perform its role 
as a social provider:  
[The] problems [are] with the communities’ [expectations] because they either make demands 
from the government to fix their social issues, [or] they don’t get any response from the 
government and then suddenly the O&G company arrives and [communities] use the 
opportunity to put pressure on governments through O&G companies (P3, social investment 
expert). 
P3’s reservations were also shared by P1, who said: 
People in general sometimes feel that the company who works, who has money, should solve 
all the problems, so they come up with some strange … plans that may not be part of our 
policy or our strategy and they insist of giving them a chance of doing something like building 
a road, or [financially] assist[ing] a football team or something like that. … And you have to 
explain that the company is not here to undertake the responsibility of the government (P1, 
social investment expert). 
P3 and P1’s interview excerpts have suggested that communities’ unrealistic expectations 
sometimes derived from the host country government’s inability to perform its role as a 
social service provider. These participants believed that O&G companies should not 
replace the government as a welfare provider (see Chapter 6) when providing social 
investment. 
As noted, O&G social investment as an alternative to government spending on social 




Chapter 3 (Cash, 2012; Garriga & Melé, 2004; Hilson, 2012). An unequal balance occurs 
because O&G social investment: (1) raises high and unrealistic expectations of what can 
be expected of O&G companies; (2) provides an alternative to corrupt governments which 
withhold their investment in development; (3) raises community dependency on company 
provision; (4) can lead to communities’ sense of abandonment during post-production 
times, and (5) hinders democratic decisions on operational licensing because of the 
unequal balance of power between the firm, government and local community (Cash, 
2012; Frynas, 2009b). P3 and P1 understood that communities’ expectations of O&G 
social investment were unrealistic because communities tended to transfer their 
expectations of the provision of social services onto companies’ social investment. When 
P3 and P1 discussed their concerns about social investment being used as a substitute for 
government, they expressed reservations about top-down, non-participatory approaches to 
social investment. These participants criticised social investment based on working on and 
working for discourses because they felt such programmes moved away from local 
community needs. According to the participants, such forms of social investment primarily 
focussed on the agendas of companies or governments (see Chapter 6).  
Experts’ caveats in regard to the idea of ‘company as government’ can, however, 
rethorically ‘enable’ companies to avoid having to commit to a longer-term relationship 
with host communities. In situations where the retreat of the state from responsibility for 
extractive operations is well established, the community perspective is likely to be 
different to that of social investment experts and their companies. On the other hand, the 
risks associated with the notion of ‘company as government’ are still present, especially 
when companies prioritise profit.  
To counterbalance experts’ caveats in relation to social investment substituting 
government welfare provision, participants recommended that O&G companies engage 
with the government through public-private partnerships. However, participants also 
recognised the risk of governmental absence in such approaches to O&G social 
investment. The following section focuses on participants’ recommendations for engaging 




8.3 Engaging with the government 
The majority of the social investment experts considered engaging with the government to 
be a critical component of constructive, participatory social investment (see Chapter 6). 
However, participants’ views on how to best engage with the host governments were 
diverse, and often conflicting. In this section, I discuss how participants’ spoke about 
engaging with the government into two sections: (1) experts’ recommendations with 
respect to partnering with the government, and (2) experts’ beliefs about the role of the 
government in supporting O&G social investment.  
8.3.1 Partnering with the government 
As already mentioned, participants recommended that O&G companies partner with the 
host government in order to assist, rather than substitute, with the government in delivering 
its social services. However, participants also recognised the risk of governments’ absence 
in the design, implementation, and provision of O&G social investment.  
Social investment experts attributed communities’ expectations of O&G social investment 
to the lack of basic social service provision by many host governments. The following 
quotes represented interviewees’ sense of companies being coerced to provide social 
services instead of governments: 
The difficulties are that in many times the government is absent, right? They invest the tax 
revenues in other places/cities and the host community ends up just having the company to rely 
on. In this sense, the company is the only actor there and you cannot force the government to 
sit at the table [and talk to the community]. We have had cases where the community closed 
ports and took over O&G companies in order to make the company put pressure in the 
government to make them develop a plan for the community. Actually, O&G companies 
become a hostage [of the circumstances] in order to make the government fulfil its roles (P11, 
social investment expert, translated). 
P11’s interview excerpt illustrated how companies can be caught between communities’ 
expectations for basic social services and governments’ failure to provide these services. 
According to P11, the tension between the host communities’ expectations and the 
government’s absence made her/him feel as though the company was pressured to provide 




P4 made a similar point: “You see, the government is not playing its primary role and that 
puts the pressure on O&G companies to try to increase social investment in these areas”. 
P4’s feelings of being pressured to shape social investment according to the gaps left by 
the government were also noted by P5. However, P5 thought that when this happened, 
companies and governments should partner together in order to make sure companies 
supported governments’ development plans for their countries: 
I think they [the government/the community] are bringing a role for us to play. And supporting 
the communities, especially in the areas where we operate, but sometimes we get into 
situations where there is sort of an absence of basic service delivery and I think that is really 
problematic. And so I think the government should partner with O&G companies to ensure 
that the work that we are doing and the social investment decisions that we are making are 
aligned with, you know, whether it is a national development policy or the other government 
priorities. Now sometimes there is a tension between what the government thinks should be 
done and what the communities want, and so it is a balancing act that the company has to, you 
know, has to deal with. But I do think that often times the government does not play enough of 
a role (P5, social investment expert). 
In contrast, P2 suggested that any notion of O&G companies partnering with the 
government to, (1) fill the gaps left by the government and (2) to align the social 
investment with the country’s agenda is problematic. S/he said: 
The company has to pay millions in social investment when actually the government should 
have met these costs in the first place. The government doesn’t have the right to make 
companies develop social investment, when they do not perform its role [as a social provider] 
(P2, social investment expert). 
P2 and P5’s excerpts illustrate participants’ dissonant views of the roles of the 
government. Some believed that O&G companies had an important role to play in assisting 
the government in delivering social services to local communities, while others thought it 
was the government’s sole responsibility to provide social services, and therefore, the 
government had no role to play in O&G social investment. Such conflicting views indicate 
the complexity of the social investment terrain and the challenges that social investment 
experts face when engaging with the government. In the following section, I explore 
further participants’ discussion of the government’s role in O&G social investment. 
Understanding how participants considered the role of the government indicates some of 
the underlying discursive tensions regarding the relationship between the government and 




8.3.2 The government’s role 
Participants expressed divergent opinions about the role of the government in O&G social 
investment. Experts’ opinions ranged from the government not having any role in social 
investment to the government’s participation in social investment being indispensable 
guaranteeing the sustainability of social investment.  
Not all participants considered that the government had a role to play in O&G social 
investment. P1, for instance, expressed such a view: “First of all, there is the question: 
should the government interfere in O&G companies? I mean it [social investment] is 
something that cannot be compulsory. …They [Companies] don’t have to be forced to do 
it [social investment]” (social investment expert). According to P1, if social investment is 
not compulsory, governments do not have a role to play in assisting O&G companies to 
develop social investment programmes. Another participant, P4, also assumed that 
governments do not have a role to play in O&G social investment “because social 
investment is something that is part of the company identity, which also contributes to 
company’s reputation. So you don’t want the government dictating how you should do it” 
(P4, social investment expert).  
When asked if they believed governments had a role to play in O&G social investment, 
P14, a government expert, replied: 
But I think in general in [name of country], the government, the national government approach 
is not to force or compel companies to undertake social investment or particular ... and as 
previously I said, I think, we see that … what the government requires is slightly different or in 
fact quite different. It’s the taxes and the royalties, which we then of course use to pay for 
infrastructure, social services and welfare (P14, Government expert). 
P14 believed that if the government does not compel companies to develop social 
investment with local communities, the government, in turn, should not have a role to play 
in O&G social investment. As government expert, P14 represented a country where 
legislation does not require social investment in its sets of conditionalities. This might 





When I asked government experts about their views of the government’s role in O&G 
social investment, they all shared the opinion that the government should not interfere in 
O&G social investment. In fact, none of the three government interviewees considered that 
governments had a role to play in O&G social investment. This understanding might imply 
that a partnership approach towards social investment was not conceptualised by the 
government experts interviewed. If other government experts around the globe share the 
views of the government experts involved in this research, this might explain social 
investment experts’ perception of government absence in partnering with O&G social 
investment. Notably, the three government interviews in my research do not represent the 
views and understandings of governmental experts around the globe, but they nevertheless 
illustrate how these government experts perceived their role in relation to O&G social 
investment.  
In contrast, seven social investment experts considered that governments had important 
roles to play in O&G social investment. These experts considered that the governments’ 
roles were to ensure that the social investment, (1) followed the country’s relevant laws; 
(2) followed the government’s development plans; and (3) provided a favourable 
environment, such as an appropriate policy framework and fair tax regimes. P6, P10, and 
P3 illustrate the experts’ understandings of government roles in O&G social investment. 
For example, P6 said, “[Governments should] make sure that social investment projects 
are in line with the district medium term development plan” (P6, social investment expert). 
Whilst P10 commented: 
I think they [government] have a huge role that sometimes they don’t always take on. … I 
mean they [government] should be the one to ensure that no company comes in to do projects 
that the government is against. … I think they [government] should be the ones to really ensure 
that companies follow all the applicable laws and procedures and they really have a big role to 
play in communications speech I think to, so spread the word about the benefit about a 
particular investment, or the benefits of particular projects, you know, and really be there as a 
partner for the company that is making the investment (P10, social investment expert). 
Finally, P3 commented: 
I think primarily [government] just being in the driver seat and also proactively asking O&G 
companies the right questions about footprint, about aims for local communities and creating 
and enabling environment for companies to do the right things for companies, for 




regime, and effective banking system for small enterprises, so this is one role. Secondly, as I 
said, [governments should] ask companies right questions and making sure they [companies] 
act and behave responsibly (P3, social investment expert). 
For P6, P10, and P3, the role of the government is key to effective O&G social investment. 
They suggested that, the government’s position may determine the success or failure of the 
social investment project. These participants believed the government should actively 
regulate and collaborate in companies’ delivery of social investment.  
Not only did some participants report that the host country government should support 
social investment, but also that social investment experts’ company peers should support 
social investment practices. The following section explores participants’ recommendations 
for social investment practices in terms of how O&G companies should engage internally 
with O&G company peers. 
8.4 Engagement with company peers 
The final recommendations offered by the participants, came mostly from social 
investment experts, and concerned social investment experts receiving support from their 
own company peers. Social investment experts reported that their company peers often 
failed to support O&G social investment. According to the participants, this happened 
because O&G employees do not understand the benefits O&G social investment can 
generate for the O&G business, as P10 articulates:  
Social investment is a really important thing that is overlooked by everyone from rank and file 
employees to shareholders and boards of directors. The good ones, they get it, and they 
prioritise it and realise that even in an oil company where you’re making huge investments 
sometimes it is really small or relatively small, six figure, sometimes, you know less figure, 
less size investment can produce huge dividends if done well, and so they should be a part of 
the company’s bottom-line that is given a lot of importance, a lot of attention, a lot of support 
because the rewards can far outweigh the cost of the investment (P10 O&G, expert). 
P10 believed that O&G social investment, “if done well” (P10), could generate positive 
and important outcomes for companies. P10 drew on working around discourses of social 
investment when s/he focussed on the benefits for O&G companies, rather than the 
communities. However, P10 is saying that social investment has to be done well. As such, 




Not all participants drew on working around discourses to frame the support of their O&G 
peers for social investment. P16 drew on working with discourses when s/he, for example, 
assumed that O&G employees/shareholders should not be solely worried about profit, but 
also about how communities were being impacted by the company. S/he said, “to show 
[high executives] the company should not only be worried about profit, but also about [the 
company’s] performance within the host society” (P16). However, P16 described the 
challenge of engaging with senior executives about community matters because, according 
to P16, “[some] companies’ directors … do not even read the company’s social balance 
report” (social investment expert, translated). Similarly, P8 found it extremely “difficult to 
have the company’s board of directors, shareholders and CEOs engaged in social 
investment practices” (P8, social investment expert, translated). 
According to P16 and P8, top executives such as CEOs, shareholders, and boards of 
directors, who should be the ones to approve and develop the company’s principles, often 
did not recognise the relevance of O&G social investment. P8 supposed that this lack of 
engagement was due to the fact that some O&G companies considered social investment 
one of “the company’s themes” instead of a mechanism that reflected the company’s 
“values and principles” (P8, social investment expert, translated). 
The participants above recommended that social investment experts seek support from the 
government and host communities to develop social investment, as well as from their own 
peers within the company. However, arguably, experts’ use of working around discourses 
of social investment to convince their O&G peers to support O&G social investment may 
reduce the likelihood of O&G social investment being truly participatory, or meaningful 
for, and driven by, communities. 
8.5 Summary 
The current chapter has explored participants’ recommendations with respect to four key 
practices of social investment: considering the purpose of social investment, engaging with 
the community, engaging with the government, and engaging with the company. The key 





Table 8.1: Social investment practices and key recommendations 
Key points and recommendations analysed in Chapter 8 
Social Investment practices Key recommendations 
Considering the purpose of social 
investment 
Social investment should go beyond a social license to operate. 
Social investment should serve the twin interests of business 
and communities through capacity building programmes (view 
held in tension). 
Engaging with the community 
Social investment should approach communities through 
participatory means. 
Social investment should foster communities’ sense of 
ownership of the social investment. 
Companies should manage communities’ expectations of social 
investment (view held in tension). 
Engaging with the government 
Social investment experts should be aware that the gaps left by 
the government in providing social services to host 
communities pressures companies to provide social 
investment. 
O&G companies should partner with the government to deliver 
social services to communities (view held in tension). 
The government should provide the basic social services to 
ensure the sustainability of social investment (view held in 
tension). 
Engaging with the company 
O&G companies should create an in-house culture that 
supports social investment. 
CEOs, shareholders and board of directors should see the 
relevance of social investments and support social investment 
practices (view held in tension). 
 
The experts’ perspectives on how to enact ‘ideal’ social investment were complex and 
contradictory. At face value, participants’ recommendations drew on working with 
discourses of social investment. However, in describing recommended social investment 
practices, participants also drew on other conflicting discourses, such as working around, 
working on, and working for discourses of social investment. My research highlights how 
social investment experts in O&G companies negotiate challenging discursive terrain 
when talking about social investment. 
My analysis of experts’ recommendations highlights how experts’ discursive practices are 
shaped by different institutional expectations for social investment (including 




expectations influence experts’ adoption of particular discourses, perhaps, despite their 
own, different ideals. Participants’ recurrent adoption of both working with and working 
around discourses may suggest that social investment is ‘shifting’ practice and that the 
principles embedded in working with discourses may be difficult to enact in a corporate 
context.  
In my research, while participants drew on working with discourses to construct their 
recommendations for social investment, they also proposed that O&G social investment 
should address business interests, for example, in their references to capacity building 
programmes, the participants suggested that capacity building could address business 
demands while assisting the country to develop. However, participants’ views often 
seemed to prioritise business’ interests, relegating the community’s needs to a secondary 
concern. 
In reference to engaging with the community, experts described principles of participation, 
community empowerment, and ownership as critical to developing sound social 
investment. Experts adopted working with discourses of social investment when they 
talked about community participation and project ownership. One social investment expert 
suggested that companies have to step back from initial processes of project design and 
planning in order to give communities space and time to exercise, (1) the project’s politics, 
and (2) to develop a sense of ownership. However, once again, complex power relations 
were also evident in participants’ references to communities’ needs and ‘local knowledge’. 
Working on discourses of social investment might underlie participatory approaches of 
social investment. Understanding how working on discourses could operate may give 
experts additional tools in avoiding these discourses from interfering in community-
centred, participatory approaches towards social investment. In this section, I presented 
participants’ arguments that social investment experts feel hostage to governmental 
absence in the host community area and the communities’ needs in relation to basic social 
services. 
Social investment experts in my study also emphasised the need to engage with the 
government. However, in developing social investment, participants held diverse views 
regarding the role of the government. Government experts in particular recommended 




investment experts’ efforts to develop partnerships with government to develop social 
investment. For some social investment experts, however, the government position could 
determine the success or failure of the social investment project. Participants suggested 
that government’s absence from social investment design and delivery may make a social 
investment project unsustainable. 
Finally, participants also spoke about the need to engage with the company to develop 
social investment. Participants recommended that social investment experts seek support 
from their peers within their companies. Participants drew on both working around and 
working with discourses of social investment when discussing engaging with peers. They 
expressed conflicting views about how best to persuade O&G peers to support O&G social 
investment. In the interview discussion, some drew on working around discourses, while 
others adopted working with discourses to justify why O&G peers should support social 
investment. The participants’ use of both working around and working with discourses 
may suggest that satisfying the business’ interests was seen as a way to persuade O&G 
high executives that of O&G social investment is important. It seems that the participants 
were required to negotiate different ideas about the meaning and purpose of social 
investment, even within their own companies. In particular, there was a clear tension 
between participants’ concern meeting the communities’ needs and business’ interests in 
profit making. In summary, this chapter highlights the conflicting nature of discourses of 
social investment as emerged in experts’ recommendations for social investment practices.  
In the following chapter, I revisit my research questions and reflect on the study findings 
overall. I suggest that experts’ different views and conflicting discourses of social 
investment derive from the challenges experts face negotiating their own, communities’, 
and governments’ interests, needs, and concerns in developing social investment. I argue 
that social investment is not a miracle solution for an intricate net of challenges such as 
community engagement, operational license, risk mitigation, social compensation, and 
sustainable community development. Finally, I propose an alternative approach that social 




Chapter 9:  Closing Reflections 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first, I briefly revisit each of the 
thesis chapters and summarise their key points. In the second, I revisit the research 
questions, and synthesise my main findings regarding O&G social investment. In the third, 
I outline the main implications of my research and how these may contribute to social 
investment policies and practices. In the fourth and final section, I identify some 
limitations of my research, and suggest some areas for future research in the field of O&G 
social investment. 
9.1 A brief overview of the thesis 
In this research, I aimed to explore how O&G social investment experts understood and 
practised social investment in the O&G industry through attending to the discourses they 
adopted when talking about social investment in the O&G sector. I also aimed to explore 
how experts dealt with the challenges they faced while implementing social investment. 
Specifically, I interviewed 20 social investment experts, from 11 countries. Whilst all the 
experts worked within the O&G sector, 17 were social investment experts and three were 
government experts. My findings provided important insights into a multitude of different 
ways social investment is understood and practised in the O&G sector.  
Chapter 2 introduced and contextualised the O&G sector, its project cycles and activities, 
and main impacts on host communities and societies. This chapter drew on examples of 
direct and indirect (environmental and economic) impacts on communities and societies 
that host O&G operations around the globe. This chapter also contextualised social 
investment as a mechanism used by O&G companies to compensate and/or mitigate for the 
risks and impacts of O&G activities; and by funding institutions, such as the World Bank 
Group, to promote sustainable development in countries with low indicators of human 
development. 
Chapter 3 explored the body of literature on social investment programmes developed by 




programmes. The literature demonstrated that social investment is likely to fail or succeed 
depending on its capacity to address host communities’ needs and interests. Further, social 
investment based on universal designs may be harmful to communities; rather, it should 
ideally be shaped according to local communities’ demands and cultures. Additionally, 
social investment was more successful if local communities were active participants in the 
design, implementation and maintenance of social investment programmes. 
Chapter 4 outlined the theoretical lenses that informed this research. Specifically, Freire 
and others’ understandings of power hierarchies and its mechanisms of ‘false generosity’ 
helped me understand top-down, hierarchical approaches to social investment programmes 
(see Chapter 6; Freire & Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973). Andreotti’s (2011), 
Escobar’s (2002; 2004) and Shrestha’s (1995) critical perspectives guided my thinking 
around ‘community-centred’ social investment programmes that utilised labour, space and 
people in service of O&G businesses. These authors’ ideas also guided my thinking around 
social investment developed under compensatory claims; and how monetary compensation 
might not be sufficient to address the needs of communities whose interests in capital 
accumulation is not a primary societal focus (see Chapter 7). Poststructural theoretical 
perspectives also informed this research. They helped me consider how power, discourse, 
and agency appear in social investment experts’ narratives. Poststructural perspectives 
informed how I analysed the complex and contradictory relations of power in the 
discourses my participants adopted when they talked about social investment.  
Chapter 5 explained my research methodology. There, I introduced the participants and 
described the process of recruiting and interviewing my research participants. I outlined 
how I used Foucauldian discourse analysis to analyse my participants’ interviews and the 
guideline documents participants mostly drew on to inform their social investment 
practices. In this chapter, I also talked about my use of reflexivity when conducting this 
research.  
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 discussed my research findings and addressed my research questions. 





9.2 Addressing the research questions 
In Chapters 6, 7, and 8, I addressed four research questions: which discourses do O&G 
social investment personnel draw on to talk about social investment; how are the 
discourses adopted by the O&G participants reproduced in the social investment guideline 
documents; what are the experts’ recommendations for future O&G social investment; and 
which discourses are evident in participants’ recommendations for future O&G social 
investment?  
The experts adopted four main discourses when they talked about social investment. In this 
thesis, I referred to these discourses as working with, working on, working around, and 
working for discourses. Working with discourses represented a participatory and 
community-centred approach to social investment, with several actors, including local 
communities being involved in the design and implementation of the social investment 
project. Working on discourses emerged when participants referred to social investment as 
involving a top-down approach towards the host community, or where the local 
community had very limited involvement in designing and implementing social investment 
programmes. Working around discourses were embedded in the understanding that social 
investment should be developed in order to ultimately fulfil the company’s operational 
interests. While communities could benefit from social investment, the main purpose of 
working around social investment was to meet O&G operational demands. Finally, 
working for discourses conceptualised social investment as assisting the host government 
deliver social goods and meet its development agenda.  
The four discourses emerged in all participants’ accounts of O&G social investment, 
revealing tensions and contradictions in their conceptualisation of social investment. Most 
participants agreed that O&G social investment was likely to be most effective in assisting 
host communities if developed in partnerships with communities (or framed in relation to 
working with discourses). However, as evident in the participants’ narratives, working with 
communities was not a simple process. Working with discourses of social investment 
referred to partnerships with a range of institutional actors, including host communities, 
host governments, and O&G companies. In many cases these actors have different 




parties speak the ‘same language’, and hold similar expectations, are likely to create 
tensions. 
Additionally, participants considered social investment that contributed to communities’ 
dependency as something inherently negative. As noted in Chapter 6, relationships of 
dependency often (re)produce hierarchical relations of power between companies and 
communities. However, as previously acknowledged, dependency could also be 
constructed, by O&G companies, with negative moralistic overtones to justify avoiding 
fully committing to a corporate-community relationship according to community 
expectations.  
As Ferguson claims “the real questions are not about whether people are or should be 
dependent, but rather which forms of dependency are to be promoted and which 
discouraged” (Ferguson, 2013, p. 234). In this sense, dependency can be beneficial if 
communities are relying upon O&G resources, negotiated through a community-centred, 
participatory and meaningful process, in a way that promotes new forms of belonging and 
wellbeing. On the other hand, dependency can be harmful if communities are relying upon 
O&G resources delivered through hierarchical, patronage-based relationships, which have 
historically been associated with corruption and negative impacts on communities 
(Ferguson 2015; 2013).  
The guideline documents that the participants most frequently referred to as guiding their 
social investment practice were the IFC Performance Standards and the World Bank 
Group Community-Driven Development Principles. My analysis of these documents 
revealed that the four discourses of social investment that emerged in the research 
interviews also appeared in the guideline documents in complex and conflicting ways. One 
example is when the IFC Performance Standards deployed working on discourses when 
referring to companies having to disclose operational information to affected communities. 
The Performance Standards positioned disclosing information as a participatory action, 
which reflected the recognition that the community should somehow be involved with the 
company. However, the document ultimately did not specifically include the community as 
a participatory body in the decision-making and design processes of the project, instead 
positioning communities as mere recipients of operational information, as in a top-down 




The IFC Performance Standards and the World Bank Group Community-Driven 
Development’s complex and conflicting adoption of the four discourses of social 
investment showed how participants’ contradictory discussion of social investment were 
also reflected in the guideline documents participants drew on to guide their social 
investment practices. With this in mind, participants’ talk about social investment can be 
seen as unremarkable, or, to be expected, given the conflicting adoption of the four 
discourses of social investment in the guideline documents.  
Participants also adopted the four discourses of social investment in conflicting and 
concomitant ways when talking about their recommendations for social investment. This 
can be read as revealing how experts were working both within and against dominant 
discourses of social investment that guided company practice, and how they had to 
negotiate a challenging discursive terrain when talking about their recommendations for 
social investment. Participants’ conflicting recommendations highlighted the complexity 
and messiness of social investment practice. 
According to the interviewees, four main practices of O&G social investment should 
receive special attention. These practices included: (1) considering the purpose of social 
investment, (2) engaging with the community, (3) engaging with the government, and (4) 
engaging with the company. While discussing each of these practices, participants made 
key recommendations. 
When participants discussed engaging with the community, they drew on working with 
discourses to refer to principles of participation, community empowerment, and ownership 
as critical to developing sound social investment. However, as noted in Chapter 8, unequal 
power relations may shape companies’ understandings of communities’ needs and ‘local 
knowledge’, leading to social investment approaches that reflect working on discourses 
rather than genuinely participatory approaches of social investment.  
In relation to engaging with the government, participants expressed diverse 
recommendations for and opinions about the role of government in relation to social 
investment. Experts’ recommendations ranged from the government not having any role in 
social investment to the government’s participation in social investment being 




some social investment experts, the government’s non-involvement in social investment 
matters could hinder O&G experts’ efforts to develop partnerships that were necessary to 
the sustainability/maintenance of the social investment programme.  
In relation to engaging with the company, participants recommended that O&G experts 
seek support from peers within the company. Participants drew on both working around 
and working with discourses of social investment to discuss engaging with the company. In 
particular, participants disagreed about how to persuade O&G peers to support O&G social 
investment. Some interviewees used working around discourses to justify social 
investment as a tool to address operational interests; while others adopted working with 
discourses to justify social investment as a tool to benefit and support communities. 
Participants’ use of both working around and working with discourses may indicate that 
some participants believed that satisfying the business’ interests were, somehow, necessary 
for persuading O&G high executives about the importance of O&G social investment, 
regardless of their own view on social investment. Clearly, participants were constantly 
negotiating the meaning and purpose of social investment. In particular, participants were 
required to negotiate their own views of how best to address communities’ needs, and 
companies’ interests in profit making. 
9.3 The research implications 
This research has five key implications for people who work in social investment, or who 
are interested in social investment policies, politics, and practices. The first is the need to 
reconceptualise social investment in more modest terms. The second is that the 
Community-Driven Development Principles should be reframed in such a way that 
communities are positioned as capable of envisaging social investments, rather than 
exclusively managing the programmes. The third is that guideline documents should 
include and acknowledge the challenges of social investment and possible ways to address 
them. The fourth implication is that, if committed to working with communities, O&G 
companies should avoid influencing communities’ perceptions of their own needs when 
designing and implementing social investment. Finally, I propose that O&G companies 
establish open dialogue with host governments prior to social investment design and 




9.3.1 Implication 1: Reconceptualising social investment in more modest terms 
In experts’ (and guideline documents’) references to social investment, multiple functions 
of social investment were discussed in relation to companies’ attempts to engage with 
communities. These included the disclosure of operational activities, (as outlined in the 
IFC Performance Standards and mainly informed by working on discourses), a social 
and/or legal license to operate (mainly informed by working around and working for 
discourses respectively), operation risk mitigation (mainly informed by working around 
discourses), social compensation for operation impacts (mainly informed by working 
around discourses), and community development (mainly informed by working with 
discourses). O&G experts in this research aimed to address these multiple functions with 
one single tool: social investment. Arguably, social investment was positioned by both 
participants and the guideline documents as a kind of ‘miracle’ tool for addressing multiple 
institutional requirements. It is not surprising, therefore, that the participants’ discussion 
and guideline documents revealed multiple, conflicting discourses in relation to social 
investment.  
One way of addressing the contradictions inherent in how social investment is currently 
conceptualised would be to limit the scope or intent of social investment. Instead of 
approaching social investment as the company’s sole approach to community engagement 
needs, social investment could be conceptualised solely as a means to address community 
development aspirations. These should be determined via a community-centred, 
participatory approach, as reflected in working with discourses.  
In my study, participants’ narratives and guideline documents positioned community 
engagement functions, such as disclosure of information of operational activities, social 
and/or legal license to operate, operation risk mitigation, and social compensation as 
mainly centred on business considerations. This suggests that these functions should fall 
outside the social investment arena, and may be better addressed by other (more 
transparent) corporate mechanisms of community engagement aimed at fulfilling the 
interests of O&G operations.  
If social investment was conceptualised only as a mechanism to address community 




when thinking about and implementing social investment. However, given that the bottom 
line of O&G companies is to make a profit, drawing solely on working with discourses of 
social investment may be impossible. Where human relations are shaped and articulated 
through a power imbalance intended to address the economic interests of powerful groups, 
the profit interests will always dominate O&G activities (Andreotti, 2011; Freire & 
Macedo, 1995; Freire & Mellado, 1973). In other words, removing profit-making 
considerations from O&G social investment experts will not change broader company 
imperatives. 
Nevertheless, social investment experts can still be seen as playing a very important role 
for host communities. Given that there is an inherent power imbalance between O&G 
companies and host communities, and that social investment experts ‘sit’ between 
companies and impacted communities, then social investment experts are key players in 
the company-community relationship. This is because social investment experts, as 
company insiders, can access company decision-making mechanisms and serve as 
community ‘translators’, and potentially, advocates. If, as argued above, social investment 
experts’ work was solely focussed on working with communities, social investment experts 
could be more effective as community advocates, or community liaison personnel. 
However, for social investment experts’ work to have value in the inherently unequal 
O&G context, then companies would need to recognise the complexity and the importance 
of the work that they do, and provide the tools necessary for developing social investment 
that is genuinely community-centred and participatory. 
9.3.2 Implication 2: Reframing communities’ roles in the Community-Driven 
Development Principles 
Participants’ discursive constructions of O&G social investment were likely shaped not 
only by the expectations of communities, governments, and O&G companies, but also by 
the international banks within the World Bank Group, the major funding institution of 
O&G activities (for more, see Chapter 2). Taken-for-granted understandings that funding 
institutions (such as international banks, O&G companies, and NGOs) know what is best 
for communities, implies a top-down approach to social investment. Specifically, the 
Community-Driven Development Principles drew on working on discourses when referring 




programmes. Although the Community-Driven document portrayed communities as central 
actors in relation to their own development processes, the document still framed 
communities as, initially, the recipients of social investments. This could hinder 
communities’ sense of empowerment in relation to social investment programmes, 
possibly compromising any possibility of working with communities in a genuinely 
participatory way. In this sense, the Community-Driven documents could acknowledge that 
communities have the expertise and abilities not only to drive the social investment 
programme, but also to initiate and shape it according to their needs and knowledge. 
9.3.3 Implication 3: Including and acknowledging the challenges of social 
investment in the guideline documents 
The IFC Performance Standards and the World Bank Group Community-Driven 
Principles do not acknowledge the possible obstacles that companies could encounter 
when developing social investment, particularly through a participatory approach. 
Guideline documents should acknowledge the main challenges associated with social 
investment, and outline possible practical solutions. As an example, guideline documents 
could acknowledge upfront the conundrum of focussing on profit versus communities’ 
actual aspirations and needs, and identify possible ways to address this conundrum. In this 
way, social investment experts may find additional support in the guideline documents on 
how to overcome some of the most common and recurrent challenges associated with 
social investment, or at least, transparent acknowledgement of the complexities associated 
with their work. 
9.3.4 Implication 4: Establishing open dialogue with host governments 
Power relations influence companies’ and communities’ understandings of communities’ 
needs and ‘local knowledge’ even when companies take a community-centred approach to 
social investment (Mosse, 2001). As Mosse (2001) argues, actors such as governments and 
donor institutions are not passive facilitators of local knowledge production and planning. 
Governments and international donors, such as international banks and O&G companies, 





In community-centred and participatory social investment programmes, having donors and 
government agendas influencing social investment design promotes a paradigm shift from 
a participatory approach to a top-down model of social investment (Mosse, 2001). With 
this in mind, O&G personnel may need to step back from parts of the project design in 
order to accommodate a genuinely participatory approach to social investment. As 
explored in Chapter 8, one expert (P4) remarked how communities exercised ownership 
through negotiating the project’s framework and organisation. According to this expert, the 
community took over the project design and delivery and dealt with its inherent tensions 
and conflicts by negotiating their own domestic politics independently of any company 
involvement.  
In this sense, social investment experts and government representatives should exercise 
caution during social investment design and planning phases. Companies’ and 
governments’ presence may disrupt a community’s sense of ownership of any social 
investment programme. Rather, companies and governments could develop mechanisms 
(such as that discussed by P4) which ensure communities have the necessary space and 
time to manage their own domestic politics and take ownership of any social investment 
programmes.  
9.3.5 Implication 5: Raising social investment experts’ awareness of their influence 
on shaping communities’ needs 
Experts in this research extensively discussed the impact of governments’ participation – 
or lack of participation – on O&G social investment. Participants held diverse opinions 
regarding the role of the government. Social investment experts’ opinions ranged from the 
government’s participation in social investment being indispensable to the sustainability of 
the social investment, to the government ideally not having any role in O&G social 
investment.  
Prior to designing social investment programmes, O&G companies should clarify with 
host governments their (governments’) expectations and roles for social investment, in line 
with working with discourses of social investment. In this way, governments and O&G 




misunderstandings, (2) reduce unrealistic expectations, (3) reduce frustrations for either 
party, and (4) optimise social investment outcomes.  
9.4 Research limitations and future research 
This research predominantly focussed on listening to the people who directly work with 
O&G social investment. The thesis includes a range of voices, including social investment 
experts and some host country government representatives. However, the perspectives of 
three government experts cannot provide an in-depth understanding of how government 
experts understand and experience O&G social investment programmes. Additionally, host 
communities and NGOs’ views and understandings of social investment, although 
relevant, lay beyond the scope of this research project. Further research is needed that 
more deeply investigates communities’, NGOs’, and governments’ discursive 
understandings and practices of social investment. Research could explore whether the 
four discourses of social investment, adopted by the social investment experts in this 
study, are echoed by other social investment stakeholders.  
In this research, it was difficult to recruit participants, as people who worked in the O&G 
industry were suspicious of the research. Future, larger scale research would be beneficial 
that explores issues such as the gender imbalance in particular countries’ O&G social 
investment personnel, and the links between gender, location, and how O&G social 
investment is constructed and enacted. 
Because of budget and time constraints, recruitment and interviews were carried out 
through digital media such as email, LinkedIn, Skype, and telephone calls. If I had had the 
financial resources and a longer time frame to carry out this research, I could have 
personally visited companies and government experts, and spoken to participants face-to-
face. A more personal approach might have increased the number of research participants, 
made interviewees feel more comfortable while being interviewed, and provided me with 
further information about participants’ perspectives, through attention to their body 
language. Future research with participants onsite could provide deeper insights into 




Another limitation of my research was my use of one-off interviews as a basis for 
exploring participants’ ideas. Multiple interviews with the same participants may have 
provided me with more in-depth understandings of how participants’ discursive 
understandings shift over time. Future research could explore social investment experts’ 
understandings and practices longitudinally to provide a richer analysis of participants’ 
complex understandings of social investment (Phillimore & Goodson, 2004).  
Future research could include attention to participants’ actual social investment practices. 
This research focussed on participants’ narratives, but the inclusion of observational data 
may provide additional insights into the complexity of envisaging and enacting social 
investment in O&G company settings. 
Two guideline documents were selected for analysis based on those most frequently 
mentioned by participants. Future research could explore how other social investment 
guideline documents construct social investment, and whether they use the four discourses 
identified in this research. 
9.5 Research contributions 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, several countries are in the process of shifting their main 
energy streams from fossil crudes to alternative renewable resources (Bergek, Hekkert, & 
Jacobsson, 2008; Kern & Smith, 2008; Lund & Mathiesen, 2008; Strunz, Gawel, & 
Lehmann, 2016). This suggests that the lifespan of the O&G sector is limited. Once O&G 
companies become less profitable, this may affect how much funding companies set aside 
for social investment. However, if social investment is conceptualised as a tool for impact 
mitigation or compensation, then social investment is likely to continue, regardless of the 
sector’s proftability.  
Although the O&G industry might have a limited lifespan, the current research could 
inform social investment in the extractive and renewable energy sectors more broadly. 
Renewable energy operations and extractive industries impact local environments in 
myriad ways, and social investment may be deployed as a tool of impact mitigation and 




insights for social investment experts and/or academics working outside O&G, in the 
extractive and renewable energy sectors. 
In my review of the social investment literature, I noted that no published research 
research has explored the complexity of social investment experts’ positioning in O&G 
companies, or the different ways in which experts contruct social investment. My thesis 
makes a new contribution in this regard. It reveals how O&G personnel are influenced by 
different, often conflicting agendas, shaped by community group, O&G industry, and 
national and local government agendas. At the same time, within the asymmetric, 
contradictory and multi-leveled power relations that shape their work, social investment 
personnel actively construct social investment in particular ways, working within/against 
(Lather, 2006) specific guideline and/or institutional constraints, and constructing 
themselves as experts who are accountable for social investment outcomes. 
As noted, some potential participants were suspicious about the research, revealing the 
vulnerable positioning (professional isolation) of social investment experts in O&G 
companies. My hope is that this research provides social investment experts with a kind of 
‘collective space’ in which the ambiguities and contradictions of their daily work are 
acknowledged and critically considered, offering insights that can inform their work 
negotiating the relationships between companies and communities.  
9.6 Conclusion 
This research has highlighted the conflicting interests guiding O&G social investment, and 
the complexity of O&G experts’ work. This research provides a basis for companies, 
funding institutions, such as international banks, and O&G host governments to consider 
different approaches to social investment. The research may also provide a basis for 
training social investment experts in the O&G industry, for example, by prompting 
reflection on their own (and their companies’) values, and possible tensions they may face 
in future social investment work. 
This research highlights both the importance and the complexity of social investment 
experts’ work in O&G operations. Social investment experts’ work is important because 




decision-making personnel, lessening the power imbalance between companies and 
impacted communities. Social investment work is complex because they must negotiate 
conflicting community engagement functions. This research highlights the need for O&G 
companies to recognise the work social investment experts do and to ensure that they have 
the tools to do it genuinely, for example, by re-envisaging social investment in more 
modest terms, rather than as a ‘miracle tool’ aimed at performing multiple community 
engagement functions. 
Although this research was small in size and scope, it usefully highlights the contradictory 
nature of O&G social investment, and the complex positioning of social investment 
personnel, particularly when their personal views are at odds with institutional policies and 
practices. I hope that this research serves as a starting point from which companies, O&G 
experts, communities, host country governments, and international banks can build more 
creative and ethical approaches to social investment which promote positive futures for all 
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Appendix A – Information sheet for participants (Phases 1, 2, and 3) 
Ethics Committee’s reference code: 15/016 
         Day/Month/Year 
 
 
AN EXPLORATION OF THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR’S SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
IN HOST COUNTRIES 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we 
thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we 
thank you for considering our request.   
My name is Rafaela Rabello and I am undertaking a PhD at the University of Otago. I 
have worked for some years as a social investment expert for an Oil and Gas 
multinational. Although I felt great joy at developing social investment activities for this 
company, I have also faced some challenges in addressing local development needs 
through Social Investment. I believe O&G companies play a big part in supporting social 
welfare in the countries where they work; and because of this, I have decided to 
investigate factors that will assist O&G companies and employees to develop Social 
Investment that will promote human development, alleviate poverty, and diminish 
entrepreneur risks and negative repercussions.  
If you have been involved in the development of social investment programmes for O&G 
companies or/and social investment/responsibility guidelines, I would like to invite you to 
take part in this research. Your contribution will be extremely valuable for informing the 





What is the project about? 
This study seeks to investigate how Oil and Gas (O&G) companies have implemented 
social investments in host countries; and to survey social investment staff about their 
impressions of the practicality of O&G social investment guidelines.  
What are participants asked to do? 
If you agree to take part in this research, you will be invited to participate in either an 
online, face-to-face or telephone interview according to your availability. 
Protecting your identity 
You and your company’s identity will be protected with code names in written reports. 
However, I might not be able to guarantee your anonymity because of:  (1) the unique 
social investment context you work in (in the case of social investment experts), (2) the 
restricted number of institutions that develop guidelines and safeguard policies for O&G 
companies (in the case of social guidelines experts) and (3) the restricted number of 
governmental agencies and agents who are involved with O&G companies and/or social 
development in your country (in the case of government agents). It is possible that 
someone may guess your identity. In addition, the security of electronic information 
cannot be guaranteed. Nonetheless, I will make every effort to protect your identity. If you 
wish, you will have access to your interview transcript and the final PhD results. 
How long will the interview take? 
 
The interview might take up to 40 minutes. However, participants might bring it to a close 
whenever he/she feels like. 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
Data about your experiences of and views on O&G Social Investments and guidelines will 
be collected. My data analysis will be published in a PhD thesis and scientific articles. 
Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 5 years in secure 
storage. Any personal information will be destroyed at the completion of the research even 
though the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or 
possibly indefinitely.  
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but again every attempt will be made to preserve 
your anonymity. 
Can I change my mind and withdraw from the project? 
You may withdraw from the project at any time and refuse to answer any of the interview 




What if I have any questions? 
If you have any questions about the research either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either: 
 
Rafaela Costa Camões Rabello (PhD student) Associate Professor Karen Nairn 
(Supervisor) 
University of Otago College of Education University of Otago College of Education 
Email: cosra@student.otago.ac.nz Email: karen.nairn@otago.ac.nz 
University Office Number 
+64 3 479 8804 
University Office Number 
+64 3 479 8619 
Linkedin hyperlink 
https://www.linkedin.com/pub/rafaela-costa-





This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have 
any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). 







Appendix B – Information sheet for participants (Phase 4) 
Ethics Committee’s reference code: 15/016 




AN EXPLORATION OF THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR’S SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
IN HOST COUNTRIES 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  
My name is Rafaela Rabello and I am undertaking a PhD at the University of Otago. I 
have worked for some years as a social investment expert for an Oil and Gas 
multinational. Although I felt great joy at developing social investment activities for this 
company, I have also faced some challenges in addressing local development needs 
through social investment. I believe O&G companies play a big part in supporting social 
welfare in the countries where they work; and because of this, I have decided to 
investigate factors that will assist O&G companies and employees to develop Social 
Investment that will promote human development, alleviate poverty, and diminish 
entrepreneur risks and negative repercussions.  
If you have been involved in the development of social investment programmes for O&G 
companies, or/and social investment/responsibility guidelines, or if you are a member of 
the Brazilian or New Zealand government with responsibility for with extractive 
industries, I would like to invite you to take part in this research. Your contribution will be 
extremely valuable for informing the development of O&G social investment. 
What is the project about? 
This study seeks to investigate how Oil and Gas (O&G) companies have implemented 




government leaders about their opinions of the practicality of O&G Social Investment 
guidelines.   
What are participants asked to do? 
If you agree to take part in this research, you will be invited to participate in either an 
online, face-to-face or telephone interview according to your availability. 
Protecting your identity 
You and your company’s identity will be protected with code names in written reports. 
However, I might not be able to guarantee your anonymity because of:  (1) the unique 
social investment context you work in (in the case of social investment experts), (2) the 
restricted number of institutions that develop guidelines and safeguard policies for O&G 
companies (in the case of social guidelines experts) and (3) the restricted number of 
governmental agencies and agents who are involved with O&G companies and/or social 
development in your country (in the case of government experts). It is possible that 
someone may guess your identity. In addition, the security of electronic information 
cannot be guaranteed. Nonetheless, I will make every effort to protect your identity. If you 
wish, you will have access to your interview transcript and the final PhD results. 
How long will the interview take? 
 
The interview might take up to 40 minutes. However, you may bring it to a close whenever 
you wish. 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
Data about your experiences of and views on O&G Social Investments and guidelines will 
be collected. My data analysis will be published in a PhD thesis and scientific articles. 
Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 5 years in secure 
storage. Any personal information will be destroyed at the completion of the research even 
though the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or 
possibly indefinitely.  
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but again every attempt will be made to preserve 
your anonymity. 
Can I change my mind and withdraw from the project? 
You may withdraw from the project at any time and refuse to answer any of the interview 
questions without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
What if I have any questions? 






Rafaela Costa Camões Rabello (PhD student) Associate Professor Karen Nairn 
(Supervisor) 
University of Otago College of Education University of Otago College of Education 
Email: cosra@student.otago.ac.nz Email: karen.nairn@otago.ac.nz 
University Office Number 
+64 3 479 8804 
University Office Number 
+64 3 479 8619 
Linkedin hyperlink 
https://www.linkedin.com/pub/rafaela-costa-
camoes-rabello/                                                 Or 
 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics 
Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be 





Appendix C – Interview questions (Phases 2 and 3) 
Ethics Committee’s reference code: 15/016 




SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 OIL AND GAS SOCIAL INVESTMENT EXPERTS  
Thanks for agreeing to participate in this research! You can answer the questions below as 
fully or briefly as you wish, and you can ignore any that you’d rather not answer. I am 
really interested to hear about your perceptions and experiences of Oil and Gas social 
investments. If you would like to discuss the questions outlined below via a conference 
call before the interview takes place, please do not hesitate to ask. You can email the 
researcher at cosra@student.otago.ac.nz and set up a day and time to meet online via 
Skype or any other free of charge video call software. Again, you are under no obligation 
to answer any of the following questions.  
1. I would be grateful for the following demographic information: Your job position/your 
ethnicity (ies)/your age/ your gender/ how long you have been working with O&G Social 
Investment/ where your office is based/ where the Social programmes are based?  
2. Do you believe the O&G industry is accountable for promoting and implementing 
Social Investment where they operate? Why or why not?  
3. Which was the most rewarding social investment you have ever helped implement. 
Why?  
4. Have any of the company’s Social Projects experienced any difficulties? If so, what 
were they? What could have helped you/ your team solve them?  
5. Have you ever used social investment guidelines to implement Social projects? Do you 
find guidelines in Social Investment or in Social Responsibility helpful when 




6. How were you trained to deliver social investments?  
7. Do you believe the company where you work for supports you when you are 
implementing or selecting a social investment programme?  
8. Which type of programmes are you more likely to promote?  
a) Projects that provide infrastructure. b) Projects that provide health care.  
c) Projects that provide commodities, eg. All types of donations such as clothes, food, air 
conditioning, energy generators, and so forth.  
d) Projects that provide services, such as allowing your experts to deliver services to the 
community (plumbing, carpentry, etc)  
e) Education programmes.  
For education programmes please specify? (i) Postgraduate (ii) Undergraduate/Graduate 
(iii) Technical (iv) Secondary (v) Primary (vi) Adult literacy (vii) others [Please describe]  
9. Could you explain why you promote this type of programme?  
10. How do you evaluate the success of the social investments in education?  
11. Does the company you work for provide you with any safeguard policy or guidelines 
for social investments and social investments in education. If so, were they developed by 
the company or by outsiders?  
12. In your opinion, what is the role of the government in assisting O&G companies 
deliver social investment?  
13. Is there any issue relating to social investment that you believe could be improved in 
your country?  









Appendix D – Interview questions (Phase 4) 
Ethics Committee’s reference code: 15/016 
         Day/Month/Year 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
GOVERNMENT EXPERTS 
Thanks	 for	 agreeing	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 research.	 You	 can	 answer	 the	 questions	
below	as	 fully	or	briefly	 as	you	wish,	 and	you	 can	 ignore	any	 that	 you’d	 rather	not	
answer.	I	am	really	interested	to	hear	about	your	perceptions	and	experiences	of	Oil	




















































Appendix E – Consent form (Phases 1, 2, 3, and 4)  
Ethics Committee’s reference code: 15/016 
         Day/Month/Year 
 
AN EXPLORATION OF THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR’S SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
IN HOST COUNTRIES 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. 
All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to 
request further information at any stage. 
I know that: 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
3. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 5 years in secure 
storage. Any personal information will be destroyed at the completion of the research even 
though the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or 
possibly indefinitely. 
4. The interview will be about my experiences of and views on Oil and Gas Social 
Investments. This project involves an open-questioning technique. The precise nature of 
the questions which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend 
on the way in which the interview develops and that in the event that the line of 
questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to 
answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any 
disadvantage of any kind. 
5. The results of the project will be used in Rafaela Rabello’s PhD thesis and scientific 
articles and they will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New 
Zealand). Although complete anonymity cannot be guaranteed, every attempt will be made 




participants will be protected via code names and I can choose my own code-name to be 
used in any written work, if I wish. 
6. I can request a copy of my interview transcript and/or the final PhD, if I wish. 
7. I understand the researcher cannot guarantee the security of the information provided 
electronically and I am therefore advised to exercise caution when providing information 
through electronic means. 
I agree to take part in this project. 
............................................................................. ...............................  
(Signature of participant)                                             (Date) 
.............................................................................  
(Printed Name) 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have 
any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). 






Appendix F - Recommendations from Phase 1 
 Ethics Committee’s reference code: 15/016 
       
 
Recommendations from advisory phase (Phase 1)  
! Social investment and social responsibility are highly criticised and ‘demonised’. 
! The importance of social investment: it is a gateway for companies to do social 
responsibility.  
! The guidelines (international guidelines) in social investment and social 
responsibility were created as a way of showing the companies’ clients that local 
social investments were indorsed by international norms. 
! Social investments are in many times a marketing tool and not a serious 
programme. 
! Social investment is not interrelated to the petroleum value chain. And it should be 
as a means of enhancing human capital. 
! There is no consensus about what social investment adresses. That is, some 
companies focus on education, others in health and others in infrastructure. There 
should be a coherent area of social investments as a way of strengthening the 
programme. 
! There is poor involvement on the behalf of governments in O&G social 
investments 
! O&G analysts do not have access and are not trained to apply the international 
guidelines in local contexts. They end up absorbing the principles by their own – 
It’s a lonely journey. 
! Philanthropy: social investment should be viewed as an investment and not 
charity. 
! There should be a closer relationship between social investments and their impacts 
to social impact in society  
! Some governments have unique legislations that oblige O&G companies to 
promote ‘voluntary social investment’ in order to maintain its license to operate. 
! All social investments should be in education because education is main element 
for sustainability.  
! Participant did not see the distinction between Phase 2 and Phase 3 because 
according to the participant, social investment analysts develop their own 




! Researcher should be careful not to solely consider analysts that adopt international 
guidelines. 
! Be aware that some social investment experts that develop the guideline is the one 
that implements social investments in the community. 
! Social investment analysts do not have access to the international guidelines via the 
company. There isn’t any training either. Analysts are “thrown alone into the 
community and they have to survive in there” 
! The research is very relevant to O&G social responsibility practitioners and that 

















Photography by: Ricardo Mello  
 
